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This thesis develops a composite index to evaluate takeover efficiency and deal quality, 
and then examines the impact of social connection on takeover process and acquisition 
performance with U.S mergers and acquisitions (M&A). 
Initially, Chapter 2 constructs a composite indicator (“M&A index”) to measure 
takeover efficiency and evaluate the overall deal quality based on stochastic frontier 
analysis. The M&A index is computed for each takeover transaction and standardised 
between 0 and 1. Deals with a higher M&A index imply higher takeover efficiency. 
The empirical results show that the M&A index is significantly and positively 
associated with the probability of deal completion and post-acquisition performance 
in the short run and even in the long run, indicating that the M&A index is effective 
and forward-looking indicator. 
Then Chapter 3 examines social connections between bidders and targets and its 
impact on acquisition premium. Consequently, acquirers, who are closely connected 
with targets, pay significantly lower premium and tend to use stock as the method of 
payment. The findings indicate that social connection enhances information transfer 
and reduces information asymmetry between connected firms. Therefore, acquirers 
with social connections have better access to target information and enhanced 
bargaining power in negotiations. 
Finally, Chapter 4 addresses the connection between acquirers and their M&A 
advisors. Investment banks are further classified into full-service advisors and 
boutique advisors. Consequently, it is found that acquirers are more likely to hire 
closely connected boutique advisors, especially domestic boutique advisors, in 
takeover deals while connections between bidding firms and full-service advisors 
reduces the probability of full-service banks being appointed. Moreover, boutique 
advisors, who have strong social linkage with bidders, serve the interests of bidders, 
negotiate lower acquisition premiums and deliver higher deal quality. In contrast, 
full-service banks act against the interests of the connected acquirers, leading to higher 
premiums paid and inferior long-run acquisition performance.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) have grown to reach an unprecedented level in 
recent decades. In the US, there have been 300,000 takeover deals totalling $320,000 
billion since 1985. As milestones in corporate development, M&A have a profound 
influence on firms’ financial, operational and stock performance, and therefore 
attract considerable academic interest (e.g. (S. Chang, 1998; Dong, Hirshleifer, 
Richardson, & Teoh, 2006; Lang, Stulz, & Walkling, 1989; Loughran & Vijh, 1997; 
Moeller, Schlingemann, & Stulz, 2004, 2007; Myers & Majluf, 1984; Schwert, 2000; 
Servaes, 1991; Travlos, 1987) etc.). 
Previous M&A literature has devoted significant attention to takeover outcomes and 
the determinants of acquisition performance. However, the existing literature is 
mostly concerned with partial takeover issues with no attention given to the overall 
evaluation of takeover activities. Additionally, in most M&A studies, the 
determinants of acquisition performance are confined to the deal characteristics and 
firm characteristics of merger parties (such as Tobin's q and profitability). This thesis 
provides a new perspective to re-examine takeover quality and investigates the role 
of social connection in mergers and acquisitions. 
1.1 Brief introduction for Chapter 2 
Initially, the thesis attempts to create a composite benchmark for M&A to 
comprehensively evaluate takeover processes and gauge deal quality. The composite 
index is preferable in aggregating and simplifying information or diverse results, 
resulting in easy interpretation and comparison for complex processes and therefore 
easily attracting the public’s attention and interest (Sharpe, 2004). Recently, 
2 
composite indexes have been increasingly recognised and adopted in corporate 
finance, such as the KZ index (Almeida, Campello, & Weisbach, 2004; Baker & 
Savaşoglu, 2002; Kaplan & Zingales, 1997; D. Li, 2011) to measure financial 
constraints; the Governance Index (Gompers, Ishii, & Metrick, 2003); and the 
Entrenchment Index (Bebchuk, Cohen, & Ferrell, 2009) to qualify corporate 
governance (e.g. (Chae, Kim, & Lee, 2009; Dittmar & Mahrt-Smith, 2007; Jiraporn 
& Gleason, 2007; Masulis, Wang, & Xie, 2007; Villalonga & Amit, 2006). As an 
important area of corporate finance, M&A studies lack a composite index to quantify 
takeover activities. 
Motivated by this research gap, Chapter 2 introduces the concept of “takeover 
efficiency” and constructs a composite indicator – the M&A index – to assess overall 
M&A quality from the acquirers’ standpoint. A takeover deal is defined as “efficient” 
if and only if acquisition attempts could maximise acquirers’ gain when announced 
to the public. Strong-form market efficiency is assumed (Fama, 1965), indicating 
that the stock price on announcement day incorporates takeover information and 
fully reflects market responses and expectations regarding acquisition transactions. 
Higher acquirer announcement return implies that the market is optimistic about a 
particular takeover deal. The degree of efficiency is measured by comparing 
acquirers’ observed announcement return with the hypothetical maximum return. 
The deviation from the optimal announcement return is attributed to inefficiency 
factors in takeover transactions, such as agency problems in bidding firms, 
overpayment issues, resistance from target management and winners’ curse. 
To gauge takeover efficiency, Chapter 2 adopts the stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) 
approach. Specifically, the benchmark M&A index is developed with production 
3 
function in stochastic frontier analysis and defined as a ratio of acquirers’ actual gain 
over the optimal and maximum announcement return. The M&A index is assigned 
for each takeover deal, with a range from 0 to 1. To construct the M&A index, the 
research includes pre-bid information and the information released on the 
announcement day as the inputs. Stock movement on announcement day is chosen as 
the output for the index. A higher M&A index represents a smaller gap between 
observed return and optimal gain at the announcement, implying that acquiring firms 
are expected to achieve higher deal quality and more favourable outcomes. Since 
stochastic frontier analysis requires taking logarithms of variables, the acquisition 
sample is limited to the deals with positive acquirers’ return on announcement day, 
which relatively outperform the transactions with negative return. 
With a sample of 6,254 US public deals announced from 1980 to 2013, the empirical 
results show that the M&A index could be regarded as a forward-looking indicator 
for takeover efficiency due to its strong relationship with merger outcomes. 
Strikingly, the M&A index is positively related to the probability of success and 
announcement return of acquirers. Acquirers with higher M&A indices pay 
significantly lower premiums to targets. In addition, M&A index shows a strong and 
positive relationship with the buy-and-hold return and industry-adjusted return on 
the asset over the post-acquisition period, indicating that acquirers in more efficient 
deals achieve better acquisition performance in the long run. Moreover, the research 
develops the buy-and-hold strategy according to the M&A index. The full takeover 
deals are split into three portfolios based on the M&A index. Overall, the portfolio 
with the most-efficient deals (highest indices) significantly outperforms the portfolio 
with the least-efficient transactions (lowest indices). The most-efficient portfolio 
(with the highest indices) earns a higher return and monthly alpha than the inefficient 
4 
portfolio (least efficient with lowest indices), especially when the holding period is 
less than six months. Overall, Chapter 1 provides an effective index for measuring 
takeover efficiency and forecasting post-acquisition performance in the sample with 
positive acquirer announcement return. 
1.2 Brief introduction for Chapter 3 
Next, my thesis combines M&A studies with social network theories and explores 
the role of social connections in takeover activities in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. 
Research on social network and its application has become a recent trend and point 
of interest in corporate finance. A large body of literature shows that social 
connection through directors’ personal network significantly affects firm 
performance and corporate decisions. The main advantage of inter-firm ties is 
information advantage. Social connection enhances information-transfer through 
personal networks and facilitates information-exchange, therefore reducing 
information asymmetry (Engelberg, Gao, & Parsons, 2012; Mol, 2001; Myers & 
Majluf, 1984; Schoorman, Bazerman, & Atkin, 1981; Uzzi, 1999; Wasserman & 
Faust, 1994). Moreover, firms with social connections could save costs and efforts in 
obtaining and processing information (Myers & Majluf, 1984). In particular, a closer 
connection between firms is associated with larger information advantage and 
higher-quality information. 
Furthermore, social connection builds trust beyond business cooperation and results 
in familiarity bias as well as social conformity, therefore affecting investment 
decisions. Firms are more likely to bring “friends” to the table and select connected 
firms as business partners. On the one hand, firms with familiar partners may benefit 
from better access to information about a target’s true value. Additionally, “friends” 
5 
could take into account the interests of their partners, leading to favourable business 
outcomes (Cohen, Frazzini, & Malloy, 2008; Cooney, Madureira, Singh, & Yang, 
2015; Hochberg, Ljungqvist, & Lu, 2007). On the other hand, firms may overtrust 
connected organisations, miss out on better opportunities and ignore more 
appropriate business partners, resulting in agency problems and worse firm 
performance (Ishii & Xuan, 2014). 
The growing literature addresses social connections between acquirers and targets 
and finds mixed results of the social connection effect (Cai & Sevilir, 2012; Ishii & 
Xuan, 2014; Renneboog & Zhao, 2014). Motivated by the conflicting results in the 
previous literature, Chapter 3 of this thesis provides further evidence of the impact of 
bidder-target connection on M&A. This research manually checks board connections 
in the BoardEx database and classifies social connections into first-degree and 
second-degree connections. A first-degree connection refers to acquiring firms and 
target firms sharing the same board directors or executives before takeover 
announcement. A second-degree connection is defined as two individuals, 
respectively from the acquirer and target firm, having the same educational 
background and employment history as well as other experiences (such as 
government background, joining in the same club).  
Chapter 3 focuses on the impact of social connection on acquisition premium. 
Among the takeover outcomes, acquisition premium is directly affected by social 
connection, and could best reflect the bargaining power between acquirers and 
targets. Therefore, premium analysis could better verify the information hypothesis 
in the social network theory. Furthermore, this study introduces another 
psychological standpoint in the form of the reference point theory (Baker, Pan, & 
6 
Wurgler, 2012) to test which factors determine the target valuation and offer 
premium in the bidding process. According to Baker et al. (2012), target 52-week 
high is the psychological reference point for both acquirers and targets when pricing 
target firms and negotiating acquisition premiums. Merger parties would adjust the 
target valuation by anchoring the target 52-week high. The previous literature 
confirms the strong and positive relation between target 52-week high and premium 
(Alexandridis, Fuller, Terhaar, & Travlos, 2013; Baker et al., 2012; Betton, Eckbo, 
Thompson, & Thorburn, 2014). Chapter 3 examines whether information advantage 
or reference points play the determining role in premiums. 
With 1,072 US takeover deals over the period from 2001 to 2012, Chapter 3 
illustrates that social connection reduces the acquisition premium by 5.54% on 
average. Especially, acquirers pay 25.59% less premium for targets in deals 
involving a first-degree connection than non-connected M&A transactions. However, 
the target 52-week high reference point is 2.40% higher in first-degree connected 
deals than in non-connected ones. Based on the reference point theory, a higher 
target 52-week high reference point is related to a higher premium. Therefore, the 
deals in the first-degree connected deals (with higher target 52-week high) should be 
related to  higher premiums. However, first-degree connected deals show a 
significantly lower premium regardless of the level of the reference point, which is 
confirmed and verified by both univariate and multivariate analysis. The findings in 
the thesis imply that connected firms ignore psychological reference points in target 
valuations. Social connection determines offer premium by reducing information 
asymmetry and increasing acquirers’ negotiating power. In addition, the thesis adopts 
an alternative proxy – CEO connection – and further confirms that premium is 
mainly affected by information advantage rather than psychological reference. 
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Moreover, connected deals are more likely to take place when acquirers have a 
relatively higher stock valuation and are more likely to be financed using the 
acquirers’ stocks, indicating that connected acquirers have stronger bargaining power 
and could persuade targets to accept the less-favourable deal items. 
Furthermore, the research explores the reasons why acquirer-target connection 
favours acquiring firms and why target firms accept a lower premium. The findings 
show that connected directors may act in the interest of acquiring firms attributed to 
either a higher level of positions in acquirers or self-interest. In first-degree 
connected deals, all the interlocking directors who serve in both the acquirer and the 
target remain on the board of the newly merged firms. In 90.25% of M&A 
transactions with first-degree connections, overlapping directors are appointed to 
positions in acquirers at a higher level than,
1
 or equivalent level to, their positions in 
targets. These interlocking directors who are offered higher positions in the acquirers 
receive more benefit and therefore give priority to acquiring firms at the cost of 
targets’ interest, resulting in significantly lower premiums (on average 11.49%). 
Moreover, acquirers generally have a larger firm size than the targets and can 
provide directors with more benefits and opportunities such as information, social 
network, and appointments from other outside firms (Ferris, Jagannathan, & 
Pritchard, 2003). In second-degree connected deals, connected directors have a 
higher probability of being retained in the newly merged firms. Moreover, the board 
seats of the combined firm certify the quality of the directors and bring both financial 
and non-financial benefits to connected board members (H. Wang, Sakr, Ning, & 
Davidson, 2010). Therefore, target connected directors or executives have a strong 
                                                 
1
 Higher-level position refers to the situation where interlocking directors are appointed as the CEO or 
chairman in the bidding firm while hired as an independent or ordinary board director of the target. 
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incentive to accept a low premium and promote deal completion by sacrificing the 
interests of the target shareholders. 
1.3 Brief introduction for Chapter 4 
Finally, Chapter 4 investigates the connection between acquirers and investment 
banks and its impact on the advisor-selection process and on acquisition performance. 
Similar to the classifications in Chapter 3, social connection in Chapter 4 is divided 
into first-degree connection and second-degree connection
2
. Furthermore, the 
research classifies M&A advisors into full-service investment banks and boutique 
investment banks
3
 and examines whether the influence of acquirer-banking 
connection varies in deals advised by different types of investment banks. 
Using a sample of 1,565 US takeover deals from 2005 to 2016, Chapter 4 shows that 
acquiring firms are more likely to hire boutique banks, especially domestic boutique 
banks, who have first-degree connections with them, as their M&A advisors. When 
acquirers share board directors with domestic boutique advisors (first-degree 
connection), the probability of domestic boutique banks being selected is 4.87 times 
greater than the probability of not being chosen, implying that a close connection 
through a personal network helps boutique advisors to obtain business. Acquirers are 
willing to hire closely connected domestic boutique banks as M&A advisors. 
However, the social connection between acquirers and full-service banks reduces the 
                                                 
2
 First-degree connection refers to the situation where the board directors of acquiring firms 
concurrently sit on the board of investment banks, while  a second-degree connection is defined as two 
individual directors, respectively from the acquirers and the advisors, serving on the board of the third 
firm. 
3
 Consistent with Song et al. (2013), a full-service advisor refers to an investment banker who engages 
in full-line financial services including trading, underwriting, M&A advisory, security and debt services, 
etc. Boutique advisors are non-full-service advisors, providing expertise in certain industries 
(technology, healthcare, etc.) or corporate finance (mergers and acquisition, restructuring, etc.). 
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likelihood of being chosen since most of the overlapping directors are recruited as 
independent directors in bidding firms or/and full-service investment banks. 
Additionally, acquirers may recognise that hiring connected full-service banks raises 
the issue of agency conflicts. 
Furthermore, in deals advised by boutique advisors, acquirers who have a 
first-degree connection with boutique banks pay a significantly lower premium than 
firms than those with no connection, suggesting that boutique advisors with social 
ties serve the interests of acquiring firms and negotiate lower premiums for firm 
clients. In contrast, social connections with full-service banks increase the 
acquisition premium paid to targets, indicating that acquirers hiring connected 
full-service advisors suffer more agency problems. In the short run, acquirers’ 
announcement returns are not affected by social connections with M&A advisors in 
deals involving boutique banks or full-service advisors. In the long run, first-degree 
connections with boutique advisors exert a positive impact on post-acquisition stock 
and operating performance. Specifically, a closer relationship with boutique banks is 
positively associated with acquirers’ stock return when holding for three months, six 
months and nine months following takeover announcement. Moreover, first-degree 
connected boutique advisors increase acquirers’ industry-adjusted return on assets as 
well as cash flow performance for the fiscal year post-takeover. However, the 
research shows a strong and negative relationship between first-degree connection 
and acquirers’ buy-and-hold return in the deals advised by full-service investment 
banks. Combing the premium analysis and findings for short-run performance, the 
empirical results provide evidence that closely connected boutique advisors serve in 
the interests of acquiring firms and deliver better deals while full-service banks with 
social connections act against the interest of acquirers and generate more agency 
10 
conflicts, therefore leading to less favourable takeover outcomes. 
1.4 Contribution and implication 
Overall, this thesis provides a new perspective to revisit takeover outcomes and the 
determinants of acquisition performance from the standpoint of acquirers. The 
research develops an effective and forward-looking indicator and illustrates that 
more efficient deals are expected to have better acquisition performance. Moreover, 
it shows that social connections matter in takeover deals and affect acquisition 
performance through changes in agency conflicts. 
This thesis has contributed to the current M&A literature in several aspects. First, the 
research creates an effective and forward-looking index for mergers and acquisitions. 
To the best of the author’s knowledge, Chapter 2 is the first to develop a composite 
indicator to measure the degree of efficiency of takeover transactions and to evaluate 
deal quality with a comprehensive perspective. As the KZ index measures in studies 
of financial constraint, the M&A index simplifies the complicated takeover process 
and facilitates the analysis and interpretation of M&A activities in both practice and 
academic research. 
Second, Chapter 2 introduces stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) to M&A research. 
The SFA methodology is applied to measure the efficiency change of banks during 
pre- and post-acquisition periods. This study expands this approach to the whole 
field of M&As studies. Moreover, current SFA research focuses on the degree of 
efficiency of firms and the impact of events on firms’ efficiency. Few studies have 
utilised the SFA approach to study and analyse events. The M&A index is an 
efficiency measurement to evaluate acquisitions, which enriches the application of 
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SFA to event studies. 
Third, this research contributes to the existing body of literature by also 
incorporating social network theory. Chapter 3 investigates the social ties between 
bidding firms and target firms and provides evidence of the information advantage of 
social connections. Unlike previous studies that have combined social network and 
M&A studies, Chapter 3 emphasises the effect of acquirer-target connection on 
acquisition premium, and compares the influence of social connections on a 
psychological reference point (Baker et al., 2012) in the negotiation process. 
Complementary to previous studies, Chapter 3 provides support for the information 
advantage hypothesis
4
 and explains why social connection favour acquirers and why 
targets in connected deals accept less favourable deal outcomes. In the previous 
literature on M&A, the firm-banking relationship is generally developed through 
previous business, such as IPO issuance, debt issuance or previous takeover 
transactions. Connection through personal networks has not been explored. Social 
network increases information exchange and sense of trust beyond individual 
transactions, therefore leading to a larger impact than previous business linkages in 
corporate decisions and M&A performance. Moreover, to the author’s best 
knowledge, Chapter 4 is the first to explore the social connection between acquirers 
and their M&A advisors.  
Chapter 4 also contributes to the current literature by analysing the difference 
between full-service investment banks and boutique investment banks. Recently, 
boutique advisors have attracted considerable interest from firm clients and have 
                                                 
4
 The information advantage hypothesis indicates that social connection could facilitate the information 
exchange and reduce information asymmetry between connected firms.  
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grabbed a good deal of market share from full-service banks, especially following 
the 2007 financial crisis. However, few academics have devoted much attention to 
boutique investment banks. Chapter 4 fills this gap and re-examines the difference 
between full-service banks and boutique advisors from the standpoint of 
acquirer-banking connection. The findings show that the effects of acquirer-banking 
connections are affected by types of investment banks. 
Fourth, this thesis has important implications for academic research and practitioners. 
In Chapter 2, the empirical evidence shows that the M&A index can evaluate 
takeover quality and effectively forecast long-run post-acquisition performance. 
Similar to existing composite indices (such as the KZ index, entrenchment index, 
and governance index) in corporate finance, the M&A index could be incorporated 
into financial models to measure the effect of acquisition on firm performance or 
business activities. Moreover, investors could design trading strategies based on the 
M&A index. Chapter 2 develops a buy-and-holding strategy based on the M&A 
index and confirms that holding portfolios with the highest M&A indices is 
profitable during post-acquisition periods. In addition, Chapters 3 and 4 have 
implications on corporate governance for acquisition partners. Chapter 3 suggests 
that acquirers benefit more from social connections with targets while target 
management may accept inferior deal items due to their personal interests. Therefore, 
acquirers who initiate acquisition attempts could consider connected firms as target 
candidates while target shareholders in connected deals should take extra care in 
their negotiations with acquirers. Furthermore, Chapter 4 implies that closely 
connected boutique advisors serve the interests of acquiring firms while full-service 
banks who are socially tied with acquirers act against the interest of clients. 
Acquirers could benefit from using their boutique advisor friends and therefore 
13 
achieve better deal outcomes. Moreover, hiring connected full-service investment 
banks increases agency conflicts between acquirers and advisors, resulting in inferior 
deals for acquirers. Therefore, acquirers should try to avoid appointing full-service 
investment banks as their M&A advisors. 
The remainder of the thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 creates a composite 
benchmark (M&A index) to measure takeover efficiency and re-evaluate the overall 
quality of M&A transactions. Chapter 3 focuses on the impact of acquirer-target 
connections on acquisition premiums and examines the effects of social connections 
on psychological reference points (target 52-week high (Baker et al., 2012) when it 
comes to pricing M&A targets and negotiations. Chapter 4 investigates the social 
connections between acquiring firms and their M&A advisors and examines the 
impact of firm-banking connections on takeover outcomes in deals advised by 
full-service investment banks or boutique advisors. Chapter 5 concludes the thesis 
and discusses the implications and limitations involved herein, and also sets out 
areas for future research.
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Chapter 2: Indexing Mergers and Acquisitions 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter introduces the first composite index (M&A index) for mergers and 
acquisitions to measure takeover efficiency and evaluate deal quality from the 
standpoint of acquiring firms. Specifically, chapter 2 investigates whether acquirers 
efficiently takeover targets, and whether the efficiency of acquisitions (measured by 
the M&A index) forecasts post-acquisition performance in both the short run and the 
long run. Furthermore, this chapter develops a trading strategy based on the M&A 
index. 
The existing M&A literature devotes considerable attention to merger outcomes 
(e.g.(S. Chang, 1998; Dong et al., 2006; Lang et al., 1989; Loughran & Vijh, 1997; 
Moeller et al., 2004; Myers & Majluf, 1984; Schwert, 2000; Servaes, 1991; Travlos, 
1987) and their determinants (mostly firm and deal characteristics). Merger 
outcomes are multidimensional, including probability of deal completion, bid 
premium, stock performance during announcement period or post-acquisition 
long-run performance. Previous literature has segregated takeover processes and 
investigated partial acquisition outcomes. In addition, these M&A studies have 
generally emphasised the effect of single or multiple factors of deal characteristics 
and corporate fundamentals. Moreover, the impact of each determinant on 
acquisition performance is affected or biased when different variables are controlled. 
For example, Tobin’s Q, defined as firms’ market value over the book value of their 
equity (M/B), is positively related with acquirer return (Lang et al., 1989; Servaes, 
1991). In contrast, Dong et al. (2006) employ the reverse B/M as q ratio and find that 
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bidders with a high q (B/M) earn positive returns. Another example is hostility. 
Servaes (1991) indicates that acquirers involved in hostile bids earn less while 
Schwert (2000) finds that bidder return is unaffected by takeover attitude. The 
uncertain or controversial relationship between determinants and takeover outcomes 
is attributed to the complication of takeover processes and the lack of overall 
evaluations of M&A activities. Motivated by this research gap, this chapter redefines 
the concept of takeover efficiency
5
 and develops a composite index, the M&A index, 
in order to provide a comprehensive understanding of takeover quality.
6
 
The composite index is widely applied to research analysis in macro-economics and 
I used to determine metrics such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP), Genuine 
Progress Indicator (GPI), and Human Development Index (HDI). Sharpe (2004) 
indicates that the composite index has a great advantage in consolidating information 
from a complex process and standardising diverse empirical results. Indexing 
economic behaviour facilitates the interpretation and comparison of complicated 
issues, and therefore attracts more and more public attention and interest. 
In the field of corporate finance, composite indicators are increasingly recognised 
and adopted. For example, the KZ Index was constructed to measure financial 
situations by (Kaplan & Zingales, 1997) and is widely applied to analyse cash flow 
sensitivity (Almeida et al., 2004), investment (Baker, Stein, & Wurgler, 2003) and 
R&D investment (D. Li, 2011). Another example is the Governance Index (Gompers 
et al., 2003) and the Entrenchment Index (Bebchuk et al., 2009) to evaluate corporate 
                                                 
5
 “Efficiency” in recent M&A studies refers to the “efficiency gain” – acquirers’/ targets’ 
announcement returns show whether an acquisition partner earns an abnormal return during the 
announcement period. In this paper, however, efficiency is related to the whole takeover process and is 
used to measure overall acquisition quality. 
6
 Tehranian, Zhao, and Zhu (2013) illustrate that high-quality acquisitions are deals where bidding 
firms earn a higher announcement return, pay a lower premium and enjoy a higher trading volume. 
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governance. Gompers et al. (2003) create a “Governance Index” to measure how 
much rights shareholders gain in companies. A higher “Governance Index” implies a 
higher level of shareholder interest, less agency problem and better stock 
performance. Bebchuk et al. (2009) constructed the “Entrenchment Index” by 
including more governance provisions. The presence of the “Governance Index” and 
“Entrenchment Index” makes it easier to incorporate the quality of corporate 
governance into studies (e.g. (Dittmar & Mahrt-Smith, 2007; Jiraporn & Gleason, 
2007; Masulis et al., 2007; Villalonga & Amit, 2006).  
Both a company’s financial situation and its corporate governance are subjective, 
abstract and multi-dimensional elements. Previously, scholars have investigated 
these two issues generally using a basket of various financial ratios and descriptions. 
The development of composite index quantifies and simplifies abstract topics, 
making it easier to capture the general situation and analyse the determinants. 
Therefore, constructing a standardised and meaningful index has implications in 
academic research. The composite indicator could measure finance issues 
quantitatively so as to be investigated in econometric models as a variable. 
However, M&A, as one of the largest corporate investments possible, tends to exert 
strong and long-lasting influence on firms’ operating and financial performance. 
Takeover outcomes are the overall results of various firm characteristics and deal 
characteristics. However, previous M&A studies lack comprehensive evaluations of 
takeover activities, and have mainly focused on the relationship between merger 
outcomes and single or multiple determinants. Hence, a composite benchmark, 
which could accurately measure overall takeover quality, is necessary to re-evaluate 
and forecast acquisition performance effectively. To the best of this author’s 
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knowledge, this chapter is the first to fill the research gap and hence enrich the M&A 
literature. 
To index mergers and acquisitions, this chapter introduces the concept of “takeover 
efficiency” to assess overall takeover quality
7
 from the perspective of acquiring 
firms. A takeover deal is regarded as being “efficient” if and only if the acquisition 
attempt could maximise the acquirer’s stock return
8
 when it is announced to the 
public. Strong-form efficiency (Fama, 1965) is assumed, suggesting that the stock 
movement on the announcement day could fully reflect the market reaction and 
expectations regarding the takeover transaction. A higher announcement return 
signifies that the market is more optimistic towards the deal. The M&A index is 
designed to gauge the degree of efficiency for each takeover transaction and is 
constructed as a ratio of the acquirers’ observed announcement returns with the 
hypothetically maximum gain on announcement day. 
Ideally, acquiring firms could achieve the optimal announcement return in each 
takeover transaction as acquisition per se is an efficient strategy for firms to develop 
and expand their business. There is a growing body of literature showing that 
takeover transactions could benefit acquirers with synergy gains, including financial 
and operational improvements (Devos, Kadapakkam, & Krishnamurthy, 2009; 
Hoberg & Phillips, 2010; Houston, James, & Ryngaert, 2001). Therefore, bidding 
firms should receive a good and positive response from the market. The 
                                                 
7
 Tehranian et al. (2013) illustrate that acquisition with high quality is a deal when bidding firms earn a 
higher announcement return, pay a lower premium and enjoy a higher trading volume. Herein, we 
adjust the standards for good quality acquisitions and relate the deal quality with takeover efficiency. 
8
 The M&A index is constructed with acquirers’ stock performance rather than combined firms’ stocks 
because acquirers generally have much larger firm-size than targets. The value-weighted announcement 
returns for combined firms are heavily affected by the acquirer’s stock performance on the 
announcement day. Moreover, the post-acquisition performance in the long run is mainly determined by 
bidding firms since acquirers take control of targets. 
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announcement return in ideal acquisitions is the optimal and maximised return of 
acquirers. In practice, however, the observed announcement return is less than the 
optimal gain, resulting from the existence of various takeover inefficiencies. For 
example, merger outcomes are negatively affected by agency problems in acquirers 
and resistance from target management etc.
9
 The gap between the actual and optimal 
announcement returns could be estimated with the efficiency degree of each takeover 
transaction. Higher takeover efficiency indicates that the actual acquirers’ return is 
closer to the optimal market reaction, implying that acquirers are involved with 
higher quality deals and are expected to gain better post-acquisition performance. 
Accordingly, this chapter constructs the M&A index
10
 to score the efficiency degree 
for each takeover deal quantitatively. By design, the M&A index is expected to 
predict merger outcomes, including the probability of deal completion, 
announcement return in the short run and long-run post-acquisition operating 
performance. 
Specifically, the M&A index is developed using the stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) 
approach.
11
 SFA is a parametric approach used to measure firms’ efficiency, which 
refers to their ability to maximise their profit given a set of inputs or minimise their 
costs given a set of outputs with technic stable. Most studies adopt the SFA approach 
to measure the efficiency of firm performance. A few studies have developed SFA in 
event analysis, such as IPO underpricing (Hunt-McCool et al., 1996; Koop & Li, 
                                                 
9
 Take an analogy: pasta is delicious and can be scored at 10 (optimal). The score of pasta will be lower, 
say 7, if too much salt is added or if the pasta is overcooked. “Pasta” the dish is a takeover. “Too much 
salt” and “overly boiled” is the inefficiency. 
10
 In the subsample with the entrenchment index (Bebchuk et al., 2009), the findings show that the 
M&A index is negatively related with the entrenchment index (agency cost problem) and the premium 
paid by the acquirer (overpayment), indicating that the acquirer agency problem and overpayment 
reduces the M&A index. The choice of a cash payment increases the M&A index. The findings indicate 
that the M&A index could reflect and capture the takeover efficiency. 
11
 See Aigner, Lovell, and Schmidt (1977); Meeusen and van Den Broeck (1977). 
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2001) and the managerial problem (Habib & Ljungqvist, 2005). In this chapter, the 
SFA is implemented to measure the deviation from the optimal market reaction to 
acquirers’ takeover announcements. The acquirer’s announcement return is 
employed as an output of SFA to quantify the market attitude towards the takeover 
deal. Market optimism would be reflected in a high announcement return for 
acquirers and would imply better deal quality. The inputs of the M&A index include 
the pre-bid characteristics of acquisition partners (bidders and targets), and the 
information revealed on the announcement day. Due to data availability, the chapter 
only considers public acquisitions in which both acquirers and targets are 
public-listed firms. Strong-form market efficiency is assumed, so that all public and 
private information regarding the deal is realised in the stock price on the 
announcement day. 
In essence, the M&A index is the technical efficiency
12
 of stochastic frontier models, 
calculated as the actual acquirer’s return divided by the optimal return on the 
announcement day. The optimal announcement return represents the maximum 
feasible announcement return that a bidding firm could reach without inefficiency 
factors in the transaction. The M&A index is assigned to each takeover deal and 
standardised between 0 and 1.
13
 The higher M&A index indicates the smaller 
deviation from optimal announcement returns and implies a better deal quality. 
This chapter adopts a full sample of 6,254 US public acquisitions over the period 
                                                 
12
 Technical efficiency in SFA is measured as firm’s actual output over maximum output value. 
13
 Stochastic frontier analysis assumes that optimal output is the maximum value that a firm could 




therefore less than 1. This chapter assumes that acquirers ’optimal announcement return is larger than 




, is limited to 1.  
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1980 to 2013. On average, the M&A index for the full sample is 0.9795. The lowest 
index is 0.6928 while the highest is 0.9969, almost close to 1. The general high index 
could be explained by the deals selected in the sample. Due to the restriction of SFA, 
the acquisition sample in this chapter is limited to deals with positive acquirers’ 
return on announcement day. In addition, the higher index is attributed to the public 
deals, implying that the market is efficient to reflect the influence of takeovers on 
acquirers. Compared to the transactions with private targets, acquiring firms in 
public deals can better acknowledge the target information, therefore valuing targets 
and evaluating takeovers more reasonably. Additionally, the market can evaluate and 
respond to public takeovers more efficiently as listed firms disclose more firm 
information to the public. Due to the efficient market, the actual investors’ response 
approaches the optimal abnormal return that bidders should have on the 
announcement day. 
Moreover, empirical results show that the M&A index could effectively measure 
takeover efficiency and forecast post-acquisition performance. The M&A index is 
positively and significantly associated with the probability of deal completion, 
indicating that deals with higher indices are more likely to be successfully 
consummated. Moreover, a 1% increase in the M&A index leads to a 7.37% decrease 
in offer premium with explanatory variables and fixed effects controlled, indicating 
that acquirers in more efficient deals pay a lower acquisition premium to the targets. 
In this study, short-run performance is measured by the cumulative abnormal returns 
(CARs) calculated with the market model (Brown & Warner, 1985), over the period 
from 3 days to 5 days after the announcement (ACAR (+3, +5). As a consequence, 
acquirers in high-efficiency deals earn 0.1145% more than acquirers in 
low-efficiency transactions. Moreover, the M&A index shows a strong and positive 
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relationship with stock performance one year following acquisition, implying that 
the M&A index demonstrates predictability of post-acquisition stock performance in 
the medium run. Additionally, the M&A index shows a positive and strong 
relationship with long-run post-takeover operating performance, estimated as an 
“Industry-Adjusted Return on Asset” (Healy, Palepu, & Ruback, 1992) for acquirers. 
In all, the M&A index is an effective indicator to measure and forecast merger 
outcomes in the sample of deals with positive acquirers’ announcement return, 
including success rate, offer premium and post-acquisition performance.  
Finally, this chapter develops a buy-and-hold trading strategy based on the M&A 
index over the post-acquisition period. Specifically, all sample deals are divided into 
three different portfolios based on the M&A index: Portfolio 1 with the least efficient 
deals (lowest M&A indices); Portfolio 2 with deals of moderate efficiency; and 
Portfolio 3 with the most efficient deals (highest M&A indices). The findings show 
that, in the acquisition sample, acquirers in the most efficient deals (Portfolio 3 has 
the highest quantile of the M&A index) significantly outperform firms bidding in the 
least efficient deals (Portfolio 1 lowest quantile of the M&A index) in monthly 
holding returns and monthly alphas. This superior performance of Portfolio 3 is 
robust when applying different asset pricing models, including the CAPM model, the 
Fama-French three-factor model, the Fama-French four-factor model and the 
Fama-French five-factor model. On average, the portfolio with the most efficient 
deals (Portfolio 3) earns a 7% higher monthly return than the portfolio with the least 
efficient transactions (Portfolio 1) for one-month to six-month holding periods after 
acquisition. Especially, the monthly alpha of Portfolio 3 is also 9.08% higher than 
the monthly alpha of Portfolio1 when holding one month. 
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To the best of the author’s knowledge, this chapter is the first to develop a composite 
index to measure the efficiency of takeovers and forecast merger outcomes. The 
M&A index has implications for both practitioners and academics alike. Financial 
practitioners can evaluate and forecast acquisition performance in a simpler way. In 
addition, researchers can use the M&A index to measure the impact of acquisitions 
in asset-pricing models or the field of corporate finance. 
This study contributes to the current studies in several ways: firstly, this chapter 
creates a comprehensive indicator – the M&A index – to evaluate the takeover 
quality of bidders. It also re-evaluates the acquisition consequences from a bird’s eye 
view and re-examines the determinants of acquisition outcomes by capturing all ex 
ante deal information. More importantly, the complicated acquisition process is 
quantified with representative numbers. Similar to the KZ index, or the Governance 
index, the M&A index simplifies the interpretation of takeover activities and 
facilitates comparison with competitors in the same industry and even the whole 
market. 
Secondly, this study contributes to financial studies by providing an alternative 
indicator for market reactions to acquisition announcements. Luo (2005) indicates 
that bidders’ management learn from market reaction to the takeover bid and decide 
whether to complete the deal or not. Currently, stock movements are the main proxy 
for market reactions to acquisition transactions. The M&A index is an efficiency 
ratio of the actual market reaction compared to what the market response should be 
when inefficiency factors (such as overpayment) do not exist. Lower indices mean a 
larger gap between actual and ideal stock reaction, indicating that outsiders look 
down on an acquisition more. Therefore, the M&A index could be an efficient 
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indictor for investors to learn market reactions.  
Thirdly, this study provides a new reference for a trading strategy based on the 
mergers and acquisitions. The M&A index could be regarded as a tool for investment 
selection. A higher M&A index signifies a more efficient deal. Investors could take 
long positions on efficient deals or short inefficient takeovers at the same time to 
earn a positive acquirer’s return over the holding period within six months of an 
acquisition being announced to the public. Furthermore, being linked to strong and 
positive relationships with deal success rates, the M&A index could be a 
supplementary indicator of merger arbitrage, reducing possible losses due to deal 
completion risk.  
The fourth contribution of this chapter is its introduction of stochastic frontier 
analysis (SFA) to M&A research. SFA has only been used to measure the efficiency 
change of banks during pre- and post-acquisition periods. This study expands this 
approach to the whole of M&A studies. Moreover, current SFA research focuses on 
the efficiency degree of firms and the impact of events on firm efficiency. Few 
studies have utilised the SFA approach. This chapter creates M&A index as an 
efficiency measurement to evaluate acquisitions and enriches the application of SFA 
into event studies.  
The chapter is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature; Section 3 
presents our hypothesis; Section 4 describes the methodology and variables used to 
construct the M&A index; Section 5 shows the descriptive data and the M&A indices; 
Section 6 reports the empirical results of the study; and Section 7 provides a 
conclusion. 
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2.2 Literature review 
2.2.1 Stochastic frontier analysis  
Stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) is introduced to calculate the M&A index. The 
stochastic frontier model was first proposed by Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen and 
van Den Broeck (1977) as a production function in econometrics. Traditional 
literature on the SFA presumes that all firms could reach their maximum output and 
lie on the efficient frontier with fixed technology. Aigner et al. (1977) develop the 
previous studies by suggesting that the error component in the production function 
could be decomposed as two parts – random error and the gap from the theoretical 
value estimated by the model. The deviation with half-normal distribution represents 
the inefficiency in the production process, which can be controlled and improved by 
firms. Additionally, Meeusen and van Den Broeck (1977) employ the Cobb-Douglas 
production function and propose a similar view on the error component. Specifically, 
the deviation from the optimal value on the frontier could be attributed to human 
errors. However, unlike Aigner et al. (1977), Meeusen and van Den Broeck (1977) 
assume the inefficiency component to be exponentially distributed. Stevenson (1980) 
shed light on the stochastic frontier function by assuming the inefficiency term as 
truncated normal-distributed. Additionally, Greene (1990) introduced the stochastic 
frontier model with a gamma-distributed inefficiency term. Moreover, all of these 
studies opted for the maximum likelihood method to estimate the frontier model. 
Jondrow, Lovell, Materov, and Schmidt (1982) contributed to the field of the 
stochastic frontier model by separating idiosyncratic error from firm effect 
(inefficiency), therefore making it possible to predict the technical efficiency for 
each producer. The production function with cross-sectional data is applied in the 
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paper. This research adopts half-normal and exponential distribution for the 
inefficiency component and estimates the technical efficiency as the expected value 
of inefficiency conditional on the total error of production function. Based on the 
estimation method, subsequent studies have explored the calculation of technical 
efficiency using different samples and models.   
Schmidt and Sickles (1984) develops individual firm effect (efficiency) research by 
substituting the cross-sectional data in Jondrow et al. (1982) with panel data. Panel 
data is superior to cross-section sampling in three respects. First, technical efficiency 
for individual firm can be consistently estimated. Second, the distribution 
assumption for the inefficiency part can be neglected. Third, the researcher can relax 
the condition that inefficiency is uncorrelated with independent variables. 
Battese and Coelli (1988) expand Jondrow et al. (1982) and further develop the 
estimation method on technical efficiency for individual firms. The inefficiency 
component is assumed to be truncated distribution, which generalises firm effects. 
Additionally, frontier production for panel data is employed in the paper. The value 
of technical efficiency, ranging from 0 to 1, can be obtained by dividing the actual 
production output of each firm by the optimal output without inefficiency. Moreover, 
an empirical case – the Australian dairy industry – is used to test the stochastic 
frontier model. The results show that in the sample, the normal-truncated model is 
superior to the traditional Cobb-Douglas production function estimated by OLS and 
frontier production with inefficiency as half-normal distributed. 
SFA is a parametric approach used to measure firm efficiency, which refers to a 
firm’s ability to maximise its profit given a set of inputs or to minimise its costs 
given a set of outputs with stable technology. Cummins and Weiss (1999) point out 
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that the SFA approach enables the comparison between firm performance and its best 
practice and summarises firm performance in a single meaningful and reliable 
indicator, which is the advantage of SFA over traditional accounting and financial 
indicators. For this reason, SFA has been widely applied to empirical research in 
economic analysis, the banking industry, corporate governance and so forth. 
Baik, Chae, Choi, and Farber (2013) adopt both SFA and data envelopment analysis 
(DEA) to estimate operational efficiency and explore the linkage between efficiency 
and firm performance. They indicate that firms that take action to improve their 
operational efficiency perform better in both current and future earnings. Moreover, 
enhancement in firm efficiency is considered by market in firm evaluation, implying 
that firms with higher efficiency earn larger stock returns. Improvement in firm 
operational efficiency also predicts better stock returns in the future, suggesting that 
the market does not fully incorporate changes in firm efficiency. Additionally, 
analysts take improvement of operational efficiency into account when adjusting 
their forecasts. 
Habib and Ljungqvist (2005) construct a benchmark with a production function in 
SFA to analyse the agency problem and managerial incentive. Tobin’s Q is used as 
the measurement for firm value. Essentially, the benchmark is a ratio of actual 
Tobin’s Q to the optimal Tobin’s Q for each firm, representing the firm efficiency to 
achieve best performance. The optimal level can be reached when managers 
maximise shareholders’ value given the firm’s opportunity set and fixed 
characteristics. The discrepancy between actual and ideal firm value is attributed to 
the agency cost, and specifically managerial incentives. The paper shows that an 
increase in CEO’s stockholdings reduces the disparity with the hypothesised firm 
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value, and therefore improves firm efficiency. The relationship is stronger when the 
firm size is smaller. In contrast, larger option-holding leads to larger shortfall from 
best performance, implying that higher agency cost exists in the firm. Moreover, the 
vega of the options, representing the volatility of option-holding, is smaller for less 
efficient firms. In other words, this shows if an option is not risk-sensitive enough to 
stimulate management to maximise shareholders’ value. 
Nguyen and Swanson (2009) follow the procedure in Habib and Ljungqvist (2005) 
and employ SFA to develop a benchmark to measure firm efficiency. The market 
appreciates efficient firms, resulting in high firm valuation (measured by Tobin’s Q). 
Their paper further explores the relationship between firm efficiency and equity 
returns. The full sample is divided into 10 portfolios based on their efficiency level. 
A buy-and-hold strategy is applied to each portfolio. The findings indicate that those 
firms with the highest efficiency underperform the least efficient ones after 
controlling for size, Tobin’s q and momentum. Moreover, the inefficient firms are 
related to a higher cumulative return when held for five years. The findings could be 
explained that inefficient firms indeed improve their performance. 
Khiari, Karaa, and Omri (2007) adopt SFA and develop a comprehensive index to 
measure the disparity between firms with the best corporate governance practices. 
The larger index represents less efficient governance management in firms. Previous 
studies have focused on the impact of particular governance mechanisms on 
governance quality and performance. Unlike those studies, however, Khiari et al. 
(2007) integrate the most common governance mechanisms into a synthetic 
inefficiency score, including inside control, managerial discretion, and ownership 
concentration. Firm characteristics are controlled to construct the governance index. 
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The results show that firms with a high dividend yield, high return on equity and 
large firm size tend to perform more efficiently in terms of corporate governance. 
Higher leverage is associated with worse governance quality. However, the sample 
for the governance index is 230 US firms from Forbes 500, most of which are large. 
The selection bias limits the application and generalisation of the corporate 
governance index. 
H.-J. Wang (2003) studies the investment of financing-constrained firms in Taiwan 
using SFA. The paper adjusts the original frontier model by improving two aspects 
related to the empirical examples in Taiwan. The first improvement is to include both 
firm and time fixed effects in the production function. The second is to adopt a 
flexible approach to avoid heteroscedasticity in the inefficiency component. By 
employing the adjusted model, they create an investment efficiency index ranging 
from 0 to 1 to represent the efficiency of firm investment. A higher efficiency index 
implies a more optimal rate of investment for finance-constrained firms. The results 
show that investment in financially constrained firms can be well modelled using the 
frontier production function. Moreover, smaller-sized firms in Taiwan can be more 
efficiently improved through financial liberalisation. 
Most papers utilise the SFA approach to measure the efficiency of firm performance. 
Only a few studies have developed SFA in event analysis, such as IPO underpricing 
(Hunt-McCool et al., 1996; Koop & Li, 2001) and the managerial problem (Habib & 
Ljungqvist, 2005). Some previous studies have employed efficiency measures to 
analyse takeover activity in the banking industry. They have focused on the 
efficiency changes of bidder and targets in pre- and post- acquisition periods. 
However, the efficiency concept has not been expanded to other takeover activities. 
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This chapter fills the gap of application in SFA. 
Berger and Humphrey (1992) were the first to introduce cost functions and analyse 
megamergers in US banking from 1981 to 1989 with direct efficiency measures 
(X-efficiency). The results show that acquisitions among banks did not successfully 
improve cost efficiency. The increase in X-efficiency after acquisition was found to 
be insignificantly less than five percentages points, which can be party explained by 
diseconomies of scale. DeYoung (1997) re-examined pre-and post-merger 
X-efficiency with a sample of US mergers from 1987 to 1988 using a thick cost 
frontier methodology. The paper posits that 58% of acquisitions improve the 
efficiency of combined firms. However, this finding is inconsistent with the relative 
efficiency hypothesis, which indicates that efficiency gains can be predicated in 
takeovers between high-efficient acquirers and low-efficient targets. Additionally, 
acquisitions are more likely to generate efficiency gains for acquirers with more 
experience in takeover activities. Akhavein, Berger, and Humphrey (1997) 
contributed to the efficiency and profitability gain in banking-merger research by 
studying profit efficiency and market power. The paper obtains the same 
megamerger sample from 1981 to 1989 and determines the three sources of 
profitability gains – improvement in cost efficiency, enhancement in profit efficiency, 
and rise in market power. The authors find that profit efficiency is significantly 
improved in US bank megamergers on average, yet there is a small and insignificant 
increase in market power, which is reflected in price changes. Al‐Sharkas, Hassan, 
and Lawrence (2008) use both a parametric (SFA) and non-parametric approach 
(DEA) to estimate the cost and profit efficiency of pre-and post-merger transactions. 
The sample of mergers consists of 440 US bank acquisitions from 1985 to 1999. The 
paper proves the improvement of cost and profit efficiency in bank mergers. By 
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studying all-sized bank mergers, the authors conclude that small bank mergers create 
more cost efficiency than large bank mergers while profit efficiency is significantly 
improved for both small and large banks. 
2.2.2 Mergers and acquisitions 
Many studies on mergers and acquisitions (M&A) have investigated what could 
affect the post-acquisition performance of bidding firms. Yet these have mainly 
focused on the impact of single or multiple factors from deal characteristics and/ or 
firm information. Interestingly, the influence on acquirers’ return of an individual 
determinant becomes deepened, weakened or uncertain when introducing a second 
factor or more than one other. The previous studies are just pieces of the puzzle in 
terms of understanding the bidders’ post-acquisition returns. There are a few 
documents that have explored the combined effects by considering all of the 
determinants together. 
The impacts of some determinants are strengthened when involving other factors. 
For instance, Travlos (1987) demonstrates that bidding firms that complete deals 
using stock as payment earn significantly negative abnormal returns whereas firms 
with cash offers earn their normal return at the event date. This finding is attributed 
to the signalling hypothesis whereby the market regards stock payments as negative 
information where overvalued bidders finance acquisitions using their own stock, 
which is consistent with the adverse selection framework in Myers and Majluf 
(1984). Loughran and Vijh (1997) investigate the influence of acquisition mode and 
payment method on post-acquisition performance. Merger bids and stock offers are 
associated with negative acquisition returns. In particular, bidders’ excess returns are 
significantly more negative when the merger bids are paid with stock. In contrast, 
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bidders in cash tender offers earn significantly positive excess returns. The excess 
returns for target shareholders are not significantly positive, and even negative when 
the relative target size is large. Moeller et al. (2007) posit that both diversity of 
opinion and information asymmetry have a strong negative effect on acquirer return 
in stock offers.  
The impact of target status (Officer, 2007) is reinforced when taking into account 
payment method (S. Chang, 1998). Officer (2007) investigates discounts when 
private or subsidiary targets are acquired from the perspective of sellers of these 
firms. Compared to acquisitions of public targets, acquiring unlisted targets 
generates on average 15% to 30% of acquisition discount. The parent companies of 
these unlisted targets benefit from the sale by having improved liquidity. The 
discounted sale price is affected by sellers’ pre-takeover stock performance, other 
available sources of liquidity and information asymmetry between the acquirers and 
sellers of targets. S. Chang (1998) sheds lights on the role of target status in 
determining takeover announcement return for bidders. The influence of private or 
public status varies with different methods of payment. He suggests that bidders with 
stock financing earn positive abnormal returns when acquiring private targets and 
losses when acquiring public ones. Furthermore, bidders earn zero abnormal returns 
in cash deals. Positive returns in stock offers can be explained by previous target 
shareholders becoming incremental monitors of the combined firms, therefore 
effectively reducing agency cost and improving post-acquisition performance. 
Additionally, target shareholders’ acceptance of stock offers conveys a positive 
signal to the bidders and the market. 
On the other hand, the effects of some factors are uncertain or even controversial, 
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such as Tobin’s Q. Tobin’s Q, defined as a firm’s market value over the book value of 
its equity (M/B), is positively related with acquirer return. Lang et al. (1989) 
analysed the Tobin’s Q (MV/B) of both bidders and targets in completed tender 
offers. The bidding firms with high q earn more abnormal return for shareholders 
than the ones with low q whereas the targets with low q gain more than high q targets. 
Strikingly, both bidders and targets can benefit from the acquisition in which bidders 
have a high q and targets have a low q. The result can be explained by the positive 
market reaction and increased investment opportunities when high q bidding firms 
acquire low q targets. Servaes (1991) develops the research of Lang et al. (1989) 
with a wide sample consisting of mergers and tender offers and with more deal 
characteristic variables controlled. The results support the previous research and 
show that bidding firms and targets profit mostly from acquisitions in scenarios with 
high q acquirers and low q targets in both mergers as well as tender offers. The 
relationship between q and takeover gains is improved with deal variables added. 
Moreover, Tobin’s Q is proved to be not correlated with other deal characteristics in 
determining acquisition return. 
In contrast, Dong et al. (2006) employ the reverse B/M as the q ratio and find that 
bidders with a high q (B/M) earn positive returns. Another example is hostility. 
Servaes (1991) indicates that acquirers involved in hostile bids earn less while 
Schwert (2000) finds that bidder return is unaffected by the takeover attitude. 
Schwert (2000) analyses the distinctions between friendly and hostile takeovers. He 
concludes that acquisitions with larger-size targets are more likely to be hostile, and 
hostile bids are related to a decrease in bid success rate, a slightly higher takeover 
premium, and a higher probability of competing bids. Bidder return and pre-bid 
run-up are found to be unaffected by takeover attitude. Furthermore, the resistance of 
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hostile takeovers is attributed more to the bargaining hypothesis (seeking a better 
price) than to the entrenchment hypothesis (refusing to be acquired). 
2.2.3 Application of M&A index  
The composite index is widely applied to research analysis in macro-economics, 
such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP), Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI), and 
Human Development Index (HDI). Sharpe (2004) indicates that a composite 
indicator could aggregate multi-dimensional information and reflect the nature and 
reality of research issues. Moreover, a single composite indicator facilitates the 
interpretation of the study and comparison between different samples and makes it 
easier to attract the public’s attention and interest.  
In corporate finance, composite indicators are increasingly recognised and adopted 
to qualify and simplify abstract studies. Lamont, Polk, and Saaá-Requejo (2001) 
developed the KZ index by adopting the coefficients for variables in Kaplan and 
Zingales (1997). Afterwards, the KZ index has been widely used as a measurement 
of financial constraints to analyse cash-flow sensitivity (Almeida et al., 2004), 
investment (Baker et al., 2003) and R&D investment (D. Li, 2011).  
Moreover, Gompers et al. (2003) created a Governance Index to measure how much 
rights shareholders tend to gain in target companies. A higher Governance Index 
implies a higher level of shareholder interest, less agency problem and better stock 
performance. Bebchuk et al. (2009) constructed the Entrenchment Index by 
including more governance provisions. The Governance Index and Entrenchment 
Index make it easier to incorporate the quality of corporate governance in studies 
(e.g. (Chae et al., 2009; Dittmar & Mahrt-Smith, 2007; Jiraporn & Gleason, 2007; 
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Masulis et al., 2007; Villalonga & Amit, 2006). 
Corporate governance or firms’ financial situations are abstract, complicated, and 
multi-dimensional. Financial ratios or descriptions are unable to capture and analyse 
abstractive topics. The single indicator makes it possible and easier to investigate 
these studies by just adding the index as the variable. M&A are one of the largest 
investments possible and have an essential and long-term influence on firm 
performance. A composite index is necessary for researchers to represent overall 
takeover quality and measure takeover impact. Therefore, the following papers could 
simply investigate M&A-related studies by incorporating M&A index as a variable. 
M&A index can be regarded as an indicator of market reaction to acquisition 
announcement and can be adopted by the management of merging firms. Luo (2005) 
demonstrates that market reaction to takeover bid is taken into account by merging 
firms when deciding whether or not to complete the transaction. “Learning from 
outsiders” can be interpreted that the market has better access to the target’s 
information, industry and economic situation and therefore evaluates the acquisition 
more comprehensively and objectively than the bidder itself. Thus, smaller-sized 
bidders are more willing to consider the market’s opinions due to their disadvantage 
in terms of information flow. Managers of acquiring firms are more likely to 
consider the stock reaction when the deal is announced to the public before finalising 
any such deals. Additionally, bidders are prone to learning from the market, that is 
except firms in high-tech industries since technology firms disclose limited 
information to the public.  
Currently, acquiring firms learn market reactions mainly from stock movements. 
Since changes in stock prices are absolute values, one cannot distinguish the degree 
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of optimistic or pessimistic market evaluations to takeover deals. Moreover, it is 
unreasonable to directly compare price changes between different acquisitions since 
the characteristics of firms and deals can be very different. Yet the M&A index could 
be an efficient indictor for insiders to interpret market reactions. The M&A index is 
an efficiency ratio of actual market reaction to what the market’s response should be 
if inefficiency factors (such as overpayment) did not exit. A lower index implies a 
larger gap between actual and ideal stock reactions, indicating that outsiders are 
pessimistic on a particular acquisition. Furthermore, an ideal stock reaction can be 
regarded as the standard for each deal, therefore making it possible to compare 
different deals or previous and current transaction for identical bidding firms. 
The M&A index can predict whether an acquisition will be completed and can 
therefore be utilised in merger arbitrage. Merger arbitrage or risk arbitrage is a 
common event-trading strategy based on M&A. The trading strategy is executed by 
holding stocks of target firms when a takeover bid is announced to the public and 
liquidating the shares when the deal is consummated and the target receives its 
acquisition premium. Investors can profit from merger arbitrage by earning arbitrage 
spread – the difference between the offer price and the purchase price when the 
target shares are purchased. The essential risk is whether the acquisition is 
successfully completed. Investors would suffer a loss if the takeover transaction fails 
(Andrade, Mitchell, & Stafford, 2001; Baker & Savaşoglu, 2002; Hutson & Kearney, 
2005; Mitchell, Pulvino, & Stafford, 2002, 2004). 
Previous studies on merger arbitrage have concentrated on return and factors 
affecting arbitrage return. (Andrade et al., 2001; Baker & Savaşoglu, 2002; Hutson 
& Kearney, 2005; Mitchell et al., 2002, 2004). Few studies have focused on 
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forecasting any takeover deal completion rate. Branch and Yang (2003) constructed a 
model for predicting deal success rate by involving a step-wise logistic regression 
with a completion dummy as the dependent variable. The success probability for 
each deal is calculated by involving the coefficients of variables representing firm or 
deal characteristics. The prediction model is limited since the coefficient of each 
factor is estimated by previous takeover deals. The relationship between each 
variable and completion rate may change since various industry and market 
situations affect acquisitions as well. 
In contrast, the M&A index does not rely on the estimation of previous acquisitions 
and instead focuses on pre-bid firm information and deal characteristics on deal 
announcement dates. Due to the strong and positive relationship with deal success 
rate, the M&A index can be regarded as an indicator of the predictability of 
acquisition completion. Besides merger arbitrage, investors can further develop their 
investment strategy using the M&A index as higher indices imply better performance 
in both the long and short run. The following section proves that investors could 
benefit from a buy-and-hold strategy within six months and earn excessive returns 
and positive alpha. 
The M&A index could also be meaningful for analysts. Mergers and acquisitions 
draw the attention of many financial analysts as takeover activities may alter their 
analyst buy/sell recommendations and coverage decisions. Tehranian et al. (2013) 
point out that the accuracy of earnings and return forecasts influence analysts’ 
decisions on whether or not to cover merging firms. Inaccurate forecasts and 
recommendations may harm analysts’ reputation and threaten their careers. 
Therefore, analysts with greater ability, insider information or that put in more effort 
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are more likely to cover merged firms after acquisition. According to Tehranian et al. 
(2013), financial analysts that cover target firms are prone to following merged firms 
when takeover deals are regarded as good-quality transactions, in which bidding 
firms pay a lower acquisition premium and earn a higher return during the 
announcement period. 
The M&A index is estimated by only involving pre-bid information and public 
information on announcement day. As a measurement for takeover quality, a higher 
M&A index is associated with a higher probability of deal consummation, a lower 
paid premium and better post-acquisition performance in both the long and short run. 
Therefore, the M&A index can be used to forecast merger outcomes and stock 
performance after announcement dates. Financial analysts could take advantage of 
the M&A index to improve the accuracy of their coverage and buy/sell 
recommendations even in the absence of private or insider information. Moreover, 
the single and comprehensive score (M&A index) for each deal could simplify and 
facilitate analysts’ analysis of takeover transactions. 
2.3 Hypotheses 
This section formulates hypotheses on the relationship between the M&A index and 
takeover outcomes, including the probability of deal completion, acquisition 
premium, short-run announcement return and long-run post-acquisition performance. 
Luo (2005) argues that the probability of deal completion is influenced by the market 
response to a takeover announcement as an acquirer’s management would learn from 
the market’s reaction whether or not to complete a takeover transaction. The M&A 
index, computed as a ratio of actual acquirer return to the optimal announcement 
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return, could be an alternative indicator of market reaction to announced deals. The 
announcement return reflects the market’s reaction and expectations of an attempted 
acquisition immediately after the public release; the optimal announcement return is 
the highest return that an acquiring firm could reach if a deal is completely efficient. 
A higher M&A index implies that the acquisition is closer to an efficient deal and 
therefore has better takeover quality. Therefore, acquiring firms would be motivated 
to complete such a deal if the market appraisal is positive and significant. As a result, 
this study proposes the following hypotheses: 
H1: Probability of deal completion is positively related with M&A index of bidding 
firm. 
Bid premium is defined as the log percentage difference between the bid price and 
the pre-bid target value over the latter (Baker et al., 2012). Previous studies indicate 
that a larger premium is paid to public targets (Schwert, 1996). Baker et al. (2012) 
show that bidders pay an average premium of 45.65%. Acquisition premium are 
taken into account by investors to evaluate takeover transactions. A larger premium 
paid may demonstrate that the management of the acquiring firm is overconfident 
about their takeover synergy and their abilities to run the merged firms, and therefore 
overpay for the target (Roll, 1986). A high offer premium increases the cost of an 
acquisition, possibly resulting in a negative market reaction and an abnormal 
decreased return on the announcement day. Therefore, a higher premium would lead 
to a lower M&A index. Consequently, this chapter establishes the hypothesis that: 
H2: Bid premium is negatively related with M&A index of bidding firm. 
Olson and Pagano (2005) illustrate that short-term stock reaction reflects investors’ 
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expectations of takeover deals. Therefore, acquisition partners would benefit from 
higher stock returns if investors have better reactions and expectations of takeover 
transactions. The M&A index measures the shortfall between actual acquirers’ return 
and optimal return at the time of announcement, which shows the market’s response 
to an attempted acquisition. A higher index implies that the market positively 
responds to the acquisition. Therefore, a more efficient deal with a higher index is 
expected to have better stock performance in the short run. As a consequence, the 
chapter assumes: 
H3: Acquirer announcement return is positively associated with M&A index of 
bidder. 
Andrade et al. (2001) indicate that post-merger operating performance reflects 
whether acquirers eventually obtain the gain expected at the announcement date. 
Hence, long-run operating performance signifies the takeover quality and synergy 
gain to acquirers. Takeover deals with higher M&A indices imply that market 
participants are more optimistic about merger outcomes. Therefore, more efficient 
deals are expected to generate more synergy gains for acquirers in the long run, 
which would be realised in the form of post-merger profitability. A higher M&A 
index implies better long-run operating performance. Therefore, the chapter develops 
the hypothesis that: 




2.4.1 Motivations to use stochastic frontier analysis to construct M&A index 
Previous studies documented that the frontier efficiency methodology, including 
stochastic frontier analysis (SFA), is superior to traditional financial ratios. Cummins 
and Weiss (1999) employ stochastic frontier analysis to examine the performance of 
US insurance firms. They emphasise that the frontier efficiency method has 
advantages over the conventional financial ratio to measure firm performance. SFA 
compares current firm status with the best performance when profit is maximised or 
cost is minimised. Moreover, a single indicator generated from SFA captures 
comprehensive determinants of performance and has a solid theoretical background 
in economics. Moreover, the SFA approach ignores the various characteristics among 
firms and facilitates comparison across firms, industries and even nations. 
Additionally, SFA provides alternative methods to prove economic or financial 
hypotheses. For instance, SFA could be applied to corporate governance research to 
test whether or not managers maximise shareholder value (agency problem). By 
analysing inefficiency in firm performance, management could improve governance 
and performance by reducing or eliminating inefficient elements in companies. Oral 
and Yolalan (1990) study the operating performance and profitability of Turkish 
commercial banks by applying data envelopment analysis (DEA) – another 
efficiency methodology like stochastic frontier analysis (SFA). They suggest that the 
financial ratio describes the current firm status or short-term changes in bank 
performance. Many determinants of performance, such as management or 
investment decisions, cannot be captured in traditional ratios but can be taken into 
account in efficiency analysis. Efficiency could reflect comprehensive bank 
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performance in the long term and assist management in allocating financial resources 
among bank branches more efficiently. Farrell (1957) demonstrates that technical 
efficiency takes into account many factors that affect performance and help to 
analyse firm performance more comprehensively while the traditional financial 
method just reflects a single dimension. 
Moreover, the other estimation method is not appropriate to construct a composite 
index for M&A. Firstly, linear regression with ordinary least squares is exculpated 
from the possible methodology. Clearly, the cross-impact of factors in both firm 
information and deal characteristics is not just linearly related to acquirers’ return. 
The coefficients in linear regression (with Ordinary Least Squares OLS) cannot 
indicate the relatively accurate correlation between each variable and acquirers’ 
return because of the uniqueness and complexity of acquisitions.  
Secondly, it is inappropriate to employ principal component analysis (PCA) in 
multivariate analysis. Although PCA is widely used to construct composite indices, 
the basic idea is that a composite index is the linear combination of principal 
components. The principal components are further linear combinations of original 
variables. In all, PCA is essentially a linear-based method. Therefore, PCA is not 
appropriate to solve the non-linear relation between each determinant of acquisition 
return. 
Lastly, SFA is relatively appropriate to measure mergers and acquisitions and is a 
parametric approach used to measure firms’ efficiency, which centres on how to 
realise more outputs (return on acquisition). Efficiency, especially productive 
efficiency, is meaningful for takeover activity. 
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2.4.2 The M&A index 
2.4.2.1 Takeover efficiency and acquirers’ announcement return 
This chapter aims to create a composite index to evaluate takeover activities. 
Previous M&A studies have lacked  an indicator to comprehensively measure and 
reflect the acquisition outcomes, including the probability of deal completion, 
premium, announcement return, and long-run post-acquisition performance. 
Therefore, this chapter introduces the new concept of “takeover efficiency”, which is 
measured by the M&A index. Takeover efficiency examines whether the takeover 
process is efficient: for example, whether bidding firms overpay for the targets, 
whether the target’s management resist the takeover, or whether bidders adopt an 
effective payment method. The concept of takeover efficiency is proposed to 
evaluate takeover deals that have already been announced to the public, rather than 
to discuss whether an acquisition attempt should be initiated. Takeover efficiency is a 
“relative” term, which compares the actual takeover outcome and the theoretically 
outcome if the deal is processed in the most efficient way. To take an analogy, pasta 
is delicious and can be scored at 10 (optimal). The score of pasta will be lower, say 7, 
if too much salt is added or the pasta is over-boiled. “Pasta”, the dish, is the takeover. 
“Too much salt” and “over-boiled” are examples of inefficiency. Whether or not to 
eat the pasta is not discussed; whether or not the pasta tastes delicious is the 
question. 
The creation of “takeover efficiency” is motivated by literature that applies 
stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) to the managerial problem (Habib & Ljungqvist, 
2005) and IPO underpricing (Hunt-McCool et al., 1996). Habib and Ljungqvist 
(2005) examine the agency problem using a ratio of actual Tobin’s Q to the optimal 
43 
Tobin’s Q for each firm, representing the firm efficiency to achieve best performance. 
Hunt-McCool et al.(1996) compare the actual initial price with the theoretically 
optimal share price to study whether the firm is efficiently valued in IPO. Inspired by 
these references, this chapter attempts to seek an informative output to measure the 
overall takeover quality and represent the “productivity” of M&A. The indicator on 
announcement day is preferred, since the M&A index (the benchmark for takeover 
efficiency) is expected to predict the deal outcomes in the medium term and even in 
the long term. In addition, acquisition premium is not significantly related with deal 
outcomes. Finally, this chapter selects the acquirers’ return at the announcement 
(Day 0), which reflects market reaction to takeover transactions and expectation of 
deal outcomes. Moreover, a strong-form efficient market is assumed. 
In a strong-form efficient market, security price would adjust fully and immediately 
after information is released. Therefore, acquirers’ stock on deal announcement dates 
should reflect the market reaction and expectations regarding the takeover bids. 
Higher acquirer return at announcement suggests that the market is more optimistic 
of the outcomes of the merger, including the probability of deal completion and 
post-acquisition performance. Therefore, this chapter adopts acquirers’ return on 
announcement day as the output for the M&A index. Acquirers’ stock performance is 
included in the M&A index’s construction rather than combined firms’ stocks is 
because acquirers generally have much larger firm size than targets. On average, 
acquirer firm size in the full sample is 32.9044 times larger than target size. The 
value-weighted returns of combined firms are strongly affected by acquirers’ 
announcement return. Additionally, the takeover sample is limited to the deals in 
which acquirers take control of their targets after acquisition. 
44 
Optimal announcement return can be achevied in an efficient deal. Ideally, takeovers 
would expand a business efficiently by generating synergy gains and improving the 
acquirers’ financial and operational performance (Devos et al., 2009; Hoberg & 
Phillips, 2010; Houston et al., 2001). Therefore, acquirers should have received 
positive market reactions and expectations regarding their takeover announcements. 
The return gained in an ideal takeover deal is the optimal announcement return of 
acquiring firms. However, the actual acquirer return is less than the optimal value 
due to concerns of acquirers’ agency cost, such as the CEO hubris problem, the 
motivation of empire-building, resistance from target management, and overpayment 
for the target. A smaller disparity between the actual and optimal announcement 
returns signifies fewer agency problems in takeover deals and therefore results in 
better deal quality. 
In this chapter, takeover efficiency is defined as acquisitions maximising acquirers’ 
announcement return. Higher-efficiency deals suggest a smaller deviation of actual 
acquirers’ return from the optimal gain and imply lower agency cost and better deal 
quality. 
2.4.2.2  Constructing a benchmark for takeover efficiency 
To score takeover efficiency, this chapter uses the production function in SFA 
(Aigner et al., 1977; Meeusen & van Den Broeck, 1977). SFA evaluates firms’ ability 
to maximise their output given a set of inputs (production function) or to minimise 
their costs given a set of outputs (cost function). In order to measure the degree of 
efficiency of takeover deals, this chapter employs the production function in SFA. 
There are two reasons for not adopting  cost function. On one hand, the cost in 
takeover activities refers to acquisition premium, which cannot fully reflect the deal 
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quality. Previous M&A literature finds no evidence that premium is significantly 
associated with takeover outcomes. On the other hand, cost function requires taking 
the logarithm of premium (cost), the input and output (also required in production 
function). Therefore, the application of cost function would include fewer takeover 
deals in the sample than the selection of production function. 
Production function in SFA allows this study to compare the actual takeover 
outcomes with the estimated outcomes in efficient deals. Inspired by M&A literature 
and previous SFA studies (Habib & Ljungqvist, 2005; Hunt-McCool et al., 1996), 
this chapter finally adopts the acquirer return on announcement return to reflect the 
productivity of M&A and evaluate takeover outcomes. Specifically, takeover 
efficiency, measured by the M&A index, is defined as the takeover bid that can 
maximise acquirer return on the announcement day. In itself, the M&A index is the 
technical efficiency of the production function and is expressed as acquirers’ 
observed return divided by the optimal gain at announcement.  
This construction of the M&A index begins with the production function and 
includes the acquirers’ adjusted return on announcement day 𝐴𝐶𝑄_𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖 , which 
measures the acquisition impact as the output. The acquirers’ adjusted announcement 
return 𝐴𝐶𝑄_𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖 is calculated as a ratio of the actual acquirers’ return 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖 at a 
date announced over the hypothetical return 𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝑡). The stock price information for 
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖 and 𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝑡) are adopted from the CRSP database. The expected return 𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝑡) 
is calculated by the market model (Brown and Warner, 1985) with the estimation 
period starting from 200 trading days to 20 trading days before the announcement 
day. To obtain the parameters, firms’ daily returns are regressed on value-weighted 
market returns over the estimation period. Finally, the predicted return 𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝑡) is 
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obtained by using the coefficients and market return as at the announcement day. 
Herein, this research does not employ abnormal return 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖 − 𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝑡) as the output 
as SFA requires the log transformation of the output. Therefore, output is limited to a 
positive value. To include more takeover transactions, the author takes into account 
the ratio of actual announcement return over predicted return rather than abnormal 
return. 
 𝐴𝐶𝑄_𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖 =  
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖
𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝑡)
                           (1) 
𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝑡) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡 + 𝜉𝑖                        (2) 
Where  𝐴𝐶𝑄_𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖  measures the acquirer’s announcement return of the 𝑖
𝑡ℎ 
firm. 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖 is observed return for 𝑖
𝑡ℎfirm on the date announced from CRSP. 𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝑡) 
is the expectation of return calculated by the market model (Brown and Warner, 
1985). 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the rate of return for the 𝑖
𝑡ℎ firm on day t from CRSP, 𝑅𝑚𝑡 is the 
market value-weighted excess return on day t from CRSP. 
The original production function for takeover efficiency can be estimated as follows: 
 𝐴𝐶𝑄_𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖 = 𝑓(X𝑖 , 𝛽) exp(𝜀𝑖)                     (3) 
𝜀𝑖 = 𝑣𝑖 − 𝜇𝑖                     (4) 
where  𝐴𝐶𝑄_𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖 measures the acquirer’s announcement return of the 𝑖
𝑡ℎ firm. 
𝑋𝑖  is an input vector which affects the acquirer’s return.  𝛽 is a vector of the 
estimated coefficients. 𝜀𝑖 is a composite error component. 𝑣𝑖 is the idiosyncratic 
component for the 𝑖𝑡ℎdeal, 𝑢𝑖 is the inefficiency in the 𝑖
𝑡ℎdeal. 
In SFA, the error term 𝜀𝑖 is decomposed into random error 𝑣𝑖 and inefficiency 
component 𝑢𝑖. The two-sided error component 𝜈𝑖 is the same as the residual in the 
conventional econometric model, which is𝜈𝑖~ 𝑁 (0, 𝜎𝜈
2) symmetric, identically and 
independently distributed with zero mean. The random error 𝑣𝑖  represents 
idiosyncratic risk, which cannot be eliminated. The inefficiency component  𝑢𝑖 
represents the disparity between observed value and optimal value. The inefficiency 
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term 𝑢𝑖 is caused by human error and can be reduced or even eliminated. 𝑢𝑖 is an 
error with one-side distribution. Aigner et al. (1977) assume that inefficiency is 
distributed as half-normal distribution. Meeusen and van Den Broeck (1977) assume 
that the inefficiency component is exponential distributed. Stevenson (1980) assumes 
that the inefficiency term as truncated normal distributed. 
Then, the study adopts deal characteristics and corporate fundamentals of acquisition 
partners as inputs. The vector of inputs is proven to affect acquirers’ announcement 
return and is often included in the previous M&A literature as control variables. The 
sample for the M&A index is limited to public deals in which both the acquirers and 
targets are public firms, in order to incorporate firm and deal characteristics as 
comprehensively as possible. Definitions of these input variables are listed in 
Appendix A.  
Due to the requirements of SFA, this chapter takes logarithmic transformations
14
 of 
the outputs and inputs and also includes dummy variables to characterise deals. 
Finally, a frontier function for takeover efficiency (logarithm of equation (3)) can be 
written as: 
ln (𝐴𝐶𝑄_𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖)  =
 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ln (𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑟 𝑀/𝐵𝑖) + 𝛽2 ln (𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑟 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖) + 𝛽3 ln ( 𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑟 𝑀𝑉𝑖) +
𝛽4 ln (𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 𝑀/𝐵𝑖) + +𝛽5 ln ( 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖) + 𝛽6 ln(𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑖) +
𝛽7 𝐻𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒 + 𝛽8 𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 + 𝛽9 𝑇𝑜𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 + 𝛽10 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 + 𝛽11𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 +
𝛽12 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝑣𝑖 − 𝜇𝑖                                         (5) 
Specifically, the inefficiency component 𝑢𝑖 ≥ 0 and is assumed as exponential 
                                                 
14
 In SFA, log transformation is commonly applied due to the concern of skewness in the sample. 
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distribution (Meeusen & van Den Broeck, 1977). For takeover transactions, 
inefficiencies are mainly due to agency problems of acquirers, such as CEO hubris, 
empire-building
15
, winners’ curse and overpayment. When the inefficiency factor 
exists (𝑢𝑖 > 0) in takeover transactions, the observed announcement return of 
acquirers would be negatively affected and less than the optimal announcement 
return. When the deal is fully efficient (𝑢𝑖 = 0), actual acquirers’ stock performances 
are equal to the optimal announcement return. The above model (5) is estimated by 
the maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) method. In order to confirm the existence 
of inefficiency, the study runs a likelihood-ratio test and compares results with MLE 
and the model (5) estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS). 
[Insert Table 2.1 About Here] 
Table 2.1 tabulates coefficients of the independent variables for the production 
function and regression results estimated by OLS for comparison. The remarkable 
difference between SFA and OLS is the error component. SFA decomposes the error 
term into a random error and inefficiency component while OLS regards all errors as 
idiosyncratic. Therefore, the OLS method assumes that all takeover deals are 
efficient, in which acquirers could achieve the optimal (maximum) return on the 
announcement day. Therefore, the estimation results in the OLS method should be 
identical to the results in SFA if and only if the inefficiency component does not exist. 
In addition, this study conducts a series of likelihood-ratio tests to examine the 
presence of inefficiency. As a consequence, the null hypothesis that inefficiency does 
not exist is rejected at the 1% significant level. Lambda, 𝜆 =  𝜎𝑢/𝜎𝑣, calculated 
                                                 
15
 Empire-building refers to the situation in which acquirers’ management initiate acquisition attempts 
in the interest of management if their compensation is positively associated with firm size. 
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standing for the standard deviation of inefficiency against the standard deviation of a 
random shock, equals 0.4371. That is, the standard deviation of the inefficiency 
component is 43.71% of the standard error of the idiosyncratic component, 
suggesting that the inefficiency in the acquisitions should not be neglected. 
Therefore, the SFA is a more appropriate method to estimate the M&A index than 
the OLS. 
Then, the study calculates the M&A index to measure the degree of efficiency for 
each takeover deal. In this chapter, a deal is defined as efficient if the acquisition 
maximises the acquirer’s return on the announcement day. Therefore, the M&A 
index gauges the takeover efficiency by estimating the disparity between the actual 
acquirer’s return and the optimal gain when the deal is announced to the public. The 
optimal announcement return is the maximised feasible return for the acquirer, which 
can be reached by reducing the inefficiency issues (agency cost in acquisitions). 
Specifically, the M&A index is computed as a ratio of the actual announcement 
return to the optimal return for acquirers, which in nature is a technical efficiency. 
The formula for M&A index is specified as follows: 




where 𝑢𝑖 represents a one-side error for inefficiency in the 𝑖
𝑡ℎdeal,  𝐴𝐶𝑄_𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖  is the observed 
acquirer’s announcement return, and  𝐴𝐶𝑄_𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖
∗ is the optimal acquirers’ announcement return on 
the announcement day. 
Due to the existence of inefficiency in takeover transactions,  𝐴𝐶𝑄_𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖 is less 
than 𝐴𝐶𝑄_𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖
∗
. Therefore, the merger efficiency index (M&A index) ranges from 0 
to 1. If the M&A index equals one, the bid is on the frontier, which indicates that the 
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acquirer receives the highest (optimal) return on the announcement day. 
2.5 Data 
2.5.1 Data selection criteria 
Data is gathered from several databases. Takeover events and relevant information 
are collected from Thomson ONE. This chapter employs a sample of US takeovers 
announced between January 1, 1980 and December 31, 2012. Due to data 
availability limitations, the study only includes public acquisitions, in which 
acquirers and targets are/were publicly listed firms. The original sample is 28,065 
deals including successful and failed transactions. Takeover deals worth less than $1 
million are excluded. The study also requires that acquirers take control of their 
targets after the acquisitions and thus own more than 50% of their target, which 
brings the sample down to 14,706 deals. Financial information and price/return data 
were obtained from COMPUSTAT and Center for Research in Security Prices 
(CRSP), respectively. The takeover sample is then merged with COMPUSTAT and 
CRSP by excluding missing values, leading to a final sample of 6,254 deals. 
2.5.2 Descriptive data 
[Insert Table 2.2 About Here] 
Next, the M&A index is computed for each takeover deal. Table 2.2 reports the 
M&A index for the full sample and the distribution of M&A indices across year and 
industries (Fama-French industry classification). On average, the M&A index for the 
full sample is as high as 0.9795 with a minimum of 0.6928 and maximum of 0.9969. 
Among the 6,254 deals in the final sample, only 30 bids have indices less than 0.90. 
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This fact is due to the limitation of stochastic frontier analysis. SFA requires taking 
the logarithm of output; therefore, only deals with positive acquirer return are 
included. According to previous M&A literature, bidding firms tend to have negative 
abnormal return on the announcement day (the difference between acquirer return 
and market return). Therefore, the deals selected in our sample are good and efficient 
relative to the deals with negative acquirer return. More importantly, high average 
M&A indices indicate that public acquisitions are quite efficient, which could be 
explained by the nature of public deals reinforced by market efficiency. Compared to 
acquisitions involving private targets, acquiring firms in public transactions involves 
full information disclosure, enabling better takeover deals to be identified, which in 
turn results in more accurate valuations and better market responses. However, M&A 
indices are all significantly different from 1 (at the 1% level), suggesting that deals 
are not completely efficient. 
In Table 2.2, Panel B shows the M&A index and the number of acquisitions 
distributed by year. In general, the difference of the M&A index is small among 
deals for each year. A merger “boom” can be seen between 1994 and 2000, during 
which the number of takeover transactions is above 300 each year. The average 
efficiency degree gradually decreases. In the early years of the boom (1994 and 
1995), acquisitions are seen to be more efficient than those that occurred before then. 
Conversely, the M&A indices in the later period (1996 to 2000) are much lower, 
indicating that acquisitions driven by the merger boom are less efficient due to more 
irrational decisions being made by acquirers. Moreover, takeover efficiency is 
negatively affected by the financial crisis with M&A indices around the year 2008 
much lower. 
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In Panel C of Table 2.2 , acquisitions are classified according to the Fama-French 
industry classifications. Transactions are concentrated in the business equipment and 
financial industries. Moreover, takeover deals in the financial industry yield 
relatively higher M&A indices than other industries, owing to the expertise and 
experience of financial firms. 
[Insert Table 2.3 About Here] 
Table 2.3 presents the summary statistics of corporate fundamentals and deal 
characteristics. The full sample is divided into low-efficiency and high-efficiency 
deals based on the M&A index. The differences in the M&A index are statistically 
significant between the high-efficiency and low-efficiency deals. Moreover, 
acquirers in high-efficiency deals have better financial (lower leverage) and 
operating performance (higher returns on assets) than those in low-efficiency ones. 
In high-efficiency deals, target firms also have larger firm-size, higher Tobin’s q and 
a higher return on assets.  
2.6 Empirical results 
In this section, the chapter explores the relationship between the M&A index and 
takeover outcomes, including probability of deal completion, short-run 
announcement return, and post-acquisition performance. Moreover, this study 
develops a trading strategy based on the M&A index. 
2.6.1 Deal completion 
Acquirer management learn from the market’s response to deal announcements 
whether or not to consummate their acquisition attempts (Luo, 2005). The M&A 
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index could be an alternative indicator for market reactions to takeover 
announcements. Therefore, the M&A index is expected to be positively correlated 
with the probability of deal completion. To confirm the hypothesis, this study adopts 
univariate and multivariate models. In the univariate analysis, the whole sample is 
split into two subsamples based on the deal status: completed or withdrawn. Panel A 
of Table 2.4 shows that the index for the unsuccessful deals yields 0.9778 on average, 
which is significantly lower than the successful transactions (by 0.0019). This 
finding indicates that in the sample with positive acquirers’ return, deals with a 
higher M&A index are more likely to be completed. 
[Insert Table 2.4 About Here] 
This study then proceeds with probit regressions as a robustness check for the 
previous findings. In Panel B of Table 2.4, the dependent variable is a dummy 
variable, which equals one if a deal is consummated and zero otherwise. The 
independent variable is the M&A index. The firm and deal characteristics are 
controlled in all of the regressions. Models 2 and 4 control the year and industry 
fixed effects. The acquirer clustering effect is also considered in Models 3 and 4. In 
all the models, the coefficients of the M&A index are positive and significant at 1%, 
which is consistent with the findings in the univariate analysis. Hence, the takeover 
deal is more likely to be successfully completed when the actual acquirer’s 
announcement return approaches the optimal value (higher M&A index). According 
to Luo (2005), acquirer management take into account the market’s reactions to 
determine whether or not to complete takeover transactions. As a consequence, 
bidding firms with a better market response (more positive acquirer announcement 
return) are motivated to consummate their deals. Additionally, higher-efficiency 
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deals (higher M&A indices) may suffer less resistance from targets’ management, 
leading to a higher rate of completion. 
In addition, larger-value transactions tend to reduce the probability of success. There 
is a negative relationship between hostile deals and likelihood of completion, which 
is consistent with the results of previous studies (Baker et al., 2012; Schwert, 2000). 
In addition, the probability of deal completion decreases when multiple bidders are 
engaged in the takeover bid (Walkling, 1985). In contrast, transactions is more likely 
to be completed when the deal is a tender offer (Baker et al., 2012). 
2.6.2 Acquisition premium 
In this section, the study investigates the relationship between the M&A index and 
the bid premium paid by acquirers. The acquisition premium is defined as the log 
percentage difference between the offer price and target stock price 30 days 
preceding the announcement date (Baker et al., 2012). In Panel A of Table 2.5, the 
full sample is split into deciles based on the index for each transaction. The acquirers 
in the highest decile (10) pay an average 8.47% premium while the average premium 
for the lowest decile (1) is 23.20%. Acquisitions with a higher index are more 
efficient than deals with a lower index. Strikingly, the offer premium in the most 
efficient deals is 14.74% less than the premium in the least efficient transactions. 
[Insert Table 2.5 About Here] 
The study proceeds with multivariate analysis to justify the previous findings in 
Panel B of Table 2.5. All of the models include variables that are proven to have a 
strong impact on premium in previous studies. The industry and year fixed effects 
are controlled in Models 2 and 4. The results in the regression are the robustness of 
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the findings in the univariate analysis. The M&A index is negatively and 
significantly related to the offer premium. The coefficient is -7.3673 for the index 
even with other variables and fixed effects controlled. Therefore, acquirers in deals 
with a higher index pay a notably lower premium. In other words, M&A efficiency is 
negatively associated with premium for bidders with positive return on 
announcement day. Costing less is one aspect of acquisition efficiency that we define. 
Our finding confirms that in the acquisition sample with positive acquirer 
announcement return, the benchmark can be used as a measurement for M&A 
efficiency, at least in terms of cost-saving.  
Moreover, this study provides evidence of a relationship between other explanatory 
variables and offer premium. The target 52-week high price is positively related with 
offer premium, which is consistent with Baker et al. (2012). Larger-sized acquirers 
tend to spend more while larger-sized targets receive a smaller bid premium (Moeller 
et al., 2004). The premium increases when the acquirer finances their acquisition 
using their own stock. Transactions involving multiple bidders are also associated 
with a higher premium (Walkling & Edmister, 1985). Acquirers pay a higher 
premium in hostile deals (Bargeron, Schlingemann, Stulz, & Zutter, 2008) and in 
diversification transactions. Tender offers also increase the offer premium (Schwert, 
2000). 
2.6.3 Post-acquisition stock performance in short run 
Next, this study investigates whether the M&A index predicts acquirers’ stock 
performance shortly after deal announcement. The short-run stock performance is 
measured by the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) over the period from 3 days to 
5 days after the takeover announcement (ACAR (+3, +5)). The cumulative abnormal 
56 
returns are obtained based on the market model (Brown & Warner, 1985). The 
estimation period for the market model parameters start at 220 trading days prior to 
the announcement day and end 20 trading days before it. The acquirers’ CARs are 
then computed with a post-event period of three days (ACAR (+3, +5)). As the 
return on announcement day (day 0) is included in the M&A index, this chapter 
excludes the date surrounding day 0 to avoid issues of endogeneity. Table 2.6 reports 
the relationships between the M&A index and ACAR (+3, +5) in Panel A (univariate) 
and Panel B (multivariate analysis). 
[Insert Table 2.6 About Here] 
In Panel A of Table 2.6, the full M&A sample is divided into low-efficiency and 
high-efficiency subsamples on the basis of the M&A index. On average, the ACAR 
(+3, +5) is 0.0563% in the subsample with high-efficiency deals, which is 0.1145% 
higher than the return obtained in the low-efficiency ones. The univariate analysis 
suggests that acquirers in higher-efficiency deals a greater return shortly after the 
announcement day. The study then runs a regression on the M&A index estimated 
with the ordinary least squares (OLS) method. All four models involve control 
variables, including firm and deal characteristics. Additionally, Models 2 and 4 
incorporate year and industry effects. Models 3 and 4 include acquiring firm 
clustering effects. Panel B of Table 2.6 lists the multivariate regression results and 
further supports the findings in the univariate analysis. The coefficients for the M&A 
index take a positive sign and are statistically significant at the 1% level, indicating 
that acquirers in higher-efficiency deals (higher M&A indices and more positive 
return on announcement day) achieve a higher short-term return following takeover 
announcement. The results suggest that, in this sample, takeover deals with higher 
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M&A indices are more efficient and produce better takeover quality, proxy by 
post-acquisition stock performance in the short run. 
2.6.4 Post-acquisition stock performance in medium and long run 
Furthermore, the study expands the research on long-run stock performance and 
explores the duration for the M&A index to predict the post-acquisition performance. 
Specially, long-run stock performance is estimated by buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns in the medium period (3 months, 6 months, and 9 months) and long run (12 
months, 24 months and 36 months). Following Bouwman, Fuller, and Nain (2007), 
the buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) are calculated by subtracting the 
buy-and-hold return of the reference portfolio from the buy-and-hold return of 
acquirers. All of the reference portfolios include 50 portfolios in total, classified 
according to their size (market valuation) and book-to-market ratios. Next, 
buy-and-hold return for the reference portfolio is computed by compounding the 
average return for each portfolio. Finally, BHARs are obtained using buy-and-hold 
return for each acquirer minus the buy-and-hold return for the reference portfolio. 
[Insert Table 2.7 About Here] 
In Table 2.7, the finding shows that the index is positive and significantly associated 
with buy-and-hold abnormal return in all regressions. In Panel A, the coefficients for 
the M&A index are statistically significant within one year following acquisitions 
even with fixed-effects and acquirers’ clustering effects controlled. Panel B shows no 
significant relationship between the M&A index and buy-and-hold return for 12 
months, 24 months and 36 months. The results above indicate that the M&A index is 
predictive for acquirer post-acquisition stock performance in the medium run. The 
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forecast horizon for the benchmark is within one year after the announcement date. 
Additionally, buy-and-hold return is negatively affected by transaction value, cash 
payment and diversification deal in which acquiring firms and target firms do not 
operate in the same industry. 
2.6.5 Post-acquisition operating performance in long run 
According to Andrade et al. (2001), the expected gains on takeover announcements 
are realised in the form of post-merger profitability. Therefore, post-acquisition 
operating performance can be regarded as an indicator of takeover quality and 
synergy gain in the long run. Specifically, this study examines the relationship 
between M&A index and post-acquisition operating performance, gauged by 
“Industry-Adjusted Return on Asset” (IAROA; Healy et al., 1992). The IAROA is 
calculated as the difference between the acquirer’s ROA and the median ROA of 
firms in the same industry as the acquirers. 
[Insert Table 2.8 About Here] 
In Table 2.8, the dependent variable is the average IAROA of the acquirers 
(A_IAROA) over a three-year window after the acquisitions. Control variables are 
included for firm and deal characteristics in all regressions. Fixed effects of year and 
industry are controlled in Models 2 and 4. In addition, Models 3 and 4 include 
acquirer clustering effects. In Table 2.8, coefficients of the M&A index are positive 
and statistically significant at 1% in all of the regressions, implying that more 
efficient deals outperform less efficient ones in terms of post-acquisition profitability. 
A higher value of M&A index signifies smaller deviation from the optimal acquirer 
gain, indicating that the market is more optimistic regarding the outcomes of a deal. 
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Therefore, higher-efficiency deals yield to higher acquirers’ operating performance 
in the long run. 
Combining the findings on deal completion, bid premium and post-acquisition 
performance in the long and short run, the empirical results shows that the M&A 
index is forward-looking and has strong power in forecasting acquirers’ 
post-takeover performance. Due to the restrictions of SFA, “acquirers” refers to 
bidding firms with positive return on announcement day. Therefore, the forecasting 
power of the M&A index is limited to “relatively good deals”.  
2.6.6 Trading strategy 
Finally, the study develops and empirically tests the trading strategies based on the 
M&A indices. Specifically, the full acquisition sample is divided into three groups 
(portfolios) according to the value of the M&A index. Portfolio 1 includes deals with 
the lowest M&A indices; Portfolio 2 includes deals with moderate indices; and 
Portfolio 3 includes deals with the highest indices. The trading strategy is to buy and 
hold the acquirers’ stocks over the post-acquisition period. The holding period lasts 
one, two, three, four, five and six months, respectively.
16
 
The return, 𝑟𝑖𝑡, for the 𝑖
𝑡ℎdeal on day t is the acquirer’s daily return obtained from 
the CRSP database. This study then compounds daily returns over the holding period 
T 𝑅𝑇 =  ∏ (1 + 𝑟𝑖𝑡)
𝑇
𝑖=1 − 1 . The monthly return is the geometric mean of the 
holding period return, denoted by 𝑅 = (1 + 𝑅𝑇)
30/𝑇 − 1. In addition, this research 
adopts alternative measurements of trading performance, alphas from a standard 
                                                 
16
 To avoid possible large price swings accompanying merger announcements, the study excludes the 
announcement day and starts to hold acquirers’ stocks from the day after announced date. 
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CAPM model (Sharpe, 1964), the Fama-French three factors, the Fama-French four 
factors and the Fama-French five factors (Carhart, 1997; Fama & French, 1993, 
2015). 
[Insert Table 2.9 About Here] 
In Table 2.9, Panel A presents the average return over various holding periods for the 
three portfolios. Strikingly, acquirer firms with the highest indices earn around a 7% 
higher monthly return than the bidders with the lowest indices in the same holding 
period. The difference of the holding return is significant between the most efficient 
deals (Portfolio 3) and the least efficient deals (Portfolio 1). When holding acquirers’ 
stock for one month after takeover announcement, acquirers in the most efficient 
deals gain 7.89% more than firms in the least efficient ones. In each portfolio, 
monthly returns improve as holding periods increase. However, the discrepancy 
between Portfolio 3 and Portfolio 1 reduces from 7.59% to 6.92% in terms of 
monthly return. Similarly, acquirers in Portfolio 3 profit more than bidders in 
Portfolio 2. The gap between these two groups ranges from 2.17% (six-month 
holding) to 3.97% (one-month holding) and are significant at 1%. In addition, Panel 
B shows the monthly alpha over the post-acquisition holding period. Alpha (monthly 
alpha) is obtained from the CAPM and Fama-French models respectively by 
regressing daily alpha (monthly returns) on market premium and multiple factors. 
Similar to the findings for monthly return, the results show that acquirers in more 
efficient deals achieve a significantly higher alpha than firms with in less efficient 
ones. This is especially when acquirers’ stocks are held for one month following 
takeover announcement: the monthly alpha (obtained from the CAPM model) in 
Portfolio 3 is at least 9% higher than the monthly alpha in Portfolio 1, which is 
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robust in the Fama-French three-factor model and four-factor model. The gap 
between the most efficient deals and the least efficient ones narrows from above 9% 
to around 1% as the holding period lasts longer. 
[Insert Table 2.10 About Here] 
Next, this study reclassifies takeover deals using the Fama-French industry 
classifications and then divides the transactions that occurred in the same industry 
into three subgroups based on their M&A indices. Table 2.10 lists the acquirer return 
and monthly alpha data over one month after takeover announcement in various 
industries. The M&A indices are positively and significantly associated with holding 
period returns in all industries. In particular, in the energy and telecoms industries, 
the acquirers’ return in the group with the highest indices is around 13.3% more than 
the portfolio with the lowest indices. 
[Insert Table 2.11 About Here] 
Finally, all takeover transactions are decomposed by every five years. In Table 2.11, 
more efficient deals outperform lower efficient ones in terms of holding return and 
monthly alpha for investors. In particular, the monthly alpha difference between 
Portfolio 3 and Portfolio 1 is the largest from 1980 to 1994. Over the holding period 
from 2005 to 2009, the acquirer returns and monthly alphas are lowest in the most 
efficient deals (one-month return is 4.89%, and monthly alpha is 3.53%) in all of the 
sample periods, which can be explained by the financial crisis in 2007-2008. 
However, the acquirers in the most efficient deals and therefore with the highest 
M&A indices still earn 9.76% higher return, i.e. the average monthly alpha of the 
acquirers is 9.76% higher than that of the acquiring firms in the least efficient deals. 
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In a nutshell, higher M&A indices are associated with better stock performance in 
most industries over time. Investors could benefit most from holding the stocks of 
acquirers in the most efficient deals. 
2.6.7 Inefficiency in takeover transactions 
In this section, the entrenchment index (E-index) (Bebchuk et al., 2009) is included 
to investigate whether the M&A index could reflect takeover efficiency, whether the 
efficiency degree of transactions is affected by agency conflicts of interest, and what 
the M&A index captures. The entrenchment index (Bebchuk et al., 2009) is a 
composite indicator to evaluate corporate governance. According to Bebchuk et al. 
(2009), firms with a higher E-index are associated with lower firm value and stock 
returns, implying that firms with a higher E-index may suffer higher agency cost. 
The E-index is constructed manually based on the six provisions of Corporate 
Takeover Defenses released by IRRC (Investor Responsibility Research Center). 
Due to the limited data resources available, this study can only obtain E-index 
figures published and contributed by Professor Bebchuk who created the model. 
Public data only covers the S&P 500 and some important firms over the period from 
1990 to 2006. 
[Insert Table 2.12 About Here] 
The final sample consists of 989 takeover deals after merging the E-index file and 
the sample of the M&A index. Bebchuk et al. (2009) find that firms with a higher 
E-index are associated with lower firm value and stock returns, implying that firms 
with a higher E-index may suffer higher agency cost. Table 2.12 shows the univariate 
and multivariate analysis for the relationship between M&A index and acquirers’ 
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agency cost. In Panel A, the full sample of takeover deals is divided based on 
E-index, and the average M&A indices is listed for each subsample. The index 
difference is significant between the high E-index subsample and the low E-index 
subsample. Acquiring firms in the group with a high E-index have lower M&A 
indices, suggesting that acquirers with lower governance quality are associated with 
lower level of takeover efficiency. Panel B of Table 2.12 proceeds with multivariate 
analysis and further examines the relationship between M&A index and governance 
quality as well as other inefficiency factors. As a consequence, the coefficients of 
E-index take a negative sign and are significant at the 1% level. This result supports 
the previous findings, which indicate that a lower governance quality of acquiring 
firms significantly reduces the degree of efficiency of takeover deals. The empirical 
results also show that the M&A index is negatively and significantly related to the 
acquisition premium, indicating that an increase in payment leads to a decrease in the 
M&A index and therefore takeover quality. Moreover, deals completely paid with 
cash increases the efficiency degree of transactions. These findings are consistent 
with common sense and the assumption of the M&A index, suggesting that the M&A 
index could reflect takeover efficiency. 
2.7 Conclusion  
This chapter develops a composite indicator (M&A index) to measure takeover 
efficiency and re-evaluate takeover quality. A deal is efficient when the takeover bid 
maximises the acquirer’s return on the announcement day given a set of firm and 
deal information. Acquirers’ actual returns are reduced due to the inefficiency factors, 
such as agency cost in acquirers’ management and resistance from targets’ 
management. As a proxy for takeover efficiency, the M&A index is calcuated as a 
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ratio of acquirers’ observed return over the optimal gain on the announcement day 
and assigned for each takeover deal with a range from 0 to 1. The announcement 
return reflects the market’s response to and expectations regarding a takeover 
announcement. The smaller gap between acquirers’ observed and optimal gain 
suggests that the market is more optimistic about deal outcomes. By construction, a 
deal with a higher index value is more efficient than one with a lower index value, 
and therefore has better deal quality, bearing in mind that due to the restrictions of 
SFA, the acquisition sample is limited to deals with positive acquirers’ return on 
announcement day. 
By examining the relationship between the M&A index and merger outcomes, the 
empirical results show that takeover deals with higher indices (more efficient deals) 
are associated with higher probability of deal completion, announcement return and 
post-acquisition performance in the long run. The findings indicate that higher M&A 
indices are associated with higher efficiency and better deal quality. Furthermore, 
this chapter develops the buy-and-hold trading strategy and constructs three 
portfolios based on different rankings of the M&A index. As a consequence, 
portfolios with higher M&A indices significantly outperform those with lower 
indices, especially for the six-month holding period. The most efficient portfolio 
(with the highest M&A indices) earns 7.89% higher than the least efficient portfolio 
(with the lowest M&A indices) when holding acquirers’ stocks for one month. In 
addition, monthly alphas for the most efficient portfolio are 11.4% when holding 
acquirers’ stocks for one month after takeover announcement, and this result is 
robust by using different models. 
In a nutshell, this study applies SFA to takeover practice and introduces the M&A 
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index to measure acquisition efficiency. This study contributes to the current 
literature by re-evaluating the takeover process and post-acquisition performance 
with a composite indicator. Due to its significant relationship with takeover 
outcomes, the M&A index could be used as an effective and forward-looking 
indicator in the sample with deals with positive acquirers’ announcement return for 
investors to forecast firm performance and design appropriate trading strategies. In 
academic research, the M&A index can be included in models to gauge the impact of 
acquisitions. Given that, due to the limitations of stochastic frontier analysis, the 
acquisition sample only includes deals with positive acquirers’ announcement return, 
the deals selected in our sample are relatively good and efficient compared to the 
deals with negative acquirer return. Future research could relax the conditions for the 
M&A index and adjust or change the SFA models to include more takeover samples 
and expand the application of the index. 
66 
Table 2.1 – Estimation of M&A index 
Table 2.1 shows the estimation results of the M&A index estimated by the maximum likelihood method 
(MLE) and ordinary least square (OLS). The table tabulates the coefficient for input variables for 
production functions in stochastic frontier analysis (SFA). The variables are the same in the ordinary 
least squares (OLS). Definitions of variables are listed in Appendix A. T-values are shown in the table. 
***, ** and * represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
Estimation method 
Stochastic Frontier Analysis 
(SFA) 
Ordinary Least Square 
(OLS) 
Acquirer Tobin's Q 0.0001 0.0001 
 
(0.86) (0.67) 
Acquirer Leverage 0.0108** 0.0104** 
 
(2.20) (2.08) 
Acquirer MV -0.0010** 0.0001 
 
(-2.03) (0.08) 
Target Tobin's Q 0.0001 0.0001 
 
(0.82) (0.60) 
Target Leverage -0.0028 -0.0011 
 
(-0.67) (-0.24) 
Transaction Value -0.0037*** -0.0046*** 
 
(-7.25) (-9.05) 
Hostile -0.0118*** -0.0084** 
 
(-2.97) (-2.07) 
Tender Offer 0.0229*** 0.0222*** 
 
(12.73) (12.11) 
Toehold -0.0023 -0.0008 
 
(-1.46) (-0.51) 
Stock -0.0148** -0.0157*** 
 
(-8.45) (-8.77) 
Competing -0.0028 -0.0028 
 
(-0.78) (-0.78) 
Diversification -0.0097*** -0.0098*** 
 
(-5.68) (-5.57) 





Observation:  6254 6254 
Log Likelihood  9527.1399 N/A 
Adjusted R-square N/A 0.0876 
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Table 2.2 – Descriptive data for M&A index 
Table 2.2 lists the descriptive data for the M&A index. Specifically, the table shows the observation (number of M&A indices), mean, median, standard deviation, 
minimum, quintile and maximum values for M&A indices. We also tabulate the distribution of M&A indices classified by industry and year. The industry 
classifications are according to the Fama-French 12 industry classifications. 
 
Panel A: M&A index for the full sample 
 
Observation Mean Median Standard deviation Min 25% 75% Max 
M&A index 6254 0.9795 0.9814 0.0125 0.6928 0.9786 0.9837 0.9969 
Panel B: M&A index classified by year 
Year Observation Percent Mean Median Standard deviation Min 25% 75% Max 
1980 4 0.06% 0.9790 0.9781 0.0029 0.9767 0.9768 0.9812 0.9830 
1981 25 0.40% 0.9781 0.9796 0.0077 0.9496 0.9768 0.9818 0.9889 
1982 46 0.74% 0.9797 0.9804 0.0046 0.9664 0.9772 0.9817 0.9905 
1983 86 1.38% 0.9796 0.9804 0.0048 0.9570 0.9782 0.9821 0.9906 
1984 206 3.29% 0.9800 0.9814 0.0086 0.9121 0.9787 0.9836 0.9926 
1985 97 1.55% 0.9796 0.9809 0.0083 0.9141 0.9783 0.9828 0.9911 
1986 98 1.57% 0.9784 0.9808 0.0124 0.8988 0.9778 0.9831 0.9891 
1987 136 2.17% 0.9799 0.9816 0.0103 0.8950 0.9786 0.9847 0.9947 
1988 143 2.29% 0.9797 0.9810 0.0110 0.8694 0.9784 0.9838 0.9944 
1989 163 2.61% 0.9806 0.9813 0.0059 0.9570 0.9784 0.9841 0.9964 
1990 153 2.45% 0.9794 0.9810 0.0076 0.9469 0.9780 0.9836 0.9935 
1991 113 1.81% 0.9800 0.9813 0.0050 0.9632 0.9777 0.9828 0.9903 
1992 98 1.57% 0.9804 0.9819 0.0081 0.9318 0.9786 0.9846 0.9934 
1993 134 2.14% 0.9808 0.9821 0.0074 0.9238 0.9795 0.9840 0.9923 
1994 304 4.86% 0.9810 0.9817 0.0057 0.9296 0.9789 0.9836 0.9969 
1995 331 5.29% 0.9802 0.9812 0.0059 0.9178 0.9785 0.9830 0.9949 
1996 401 6.41% 0.9799 0.9812 0.0122 0.7933 0.9790 0.9834 0.9967 
1997 370 5.92% 0.9799 0.9814 0.0150 0.7205 0.9789 0.9838 0.9924 
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1998 406 6.49% 0.9796 0.9813 0.0107 0.8306 0.9783 0.9838 0.9937 
1999 421 6.73% 0.9799 0.9817 0.0105 0.8872 0.9784 0.9845 0.9960 
2000 471 7.53% 0.9769 0.9816 0.0206 0.6928 0.9776 0.9846 0.9946 
2001 274 4.38% 0.9783 0.9810 0.0150 0.8065 0.9778 0.9837 0.9946 
2002 147 2.35% 0.9793 0.9808 0.0090 0.9176 0.9768 0.9837 0.9944 
2003 193 3.09% 0.9764 0.9808 0.0220 0.8220 0.9773 0.9830 0.9931 
2004 194 3.10% 0.9788 0.9810 0.0108 0.8824 0.9787 0.9833 0.9930 
2005 177 2.83% 0.9794 0.9817 0.0163 0.8262 0.9797 0.9834 0.9920 
2006 187 2.99% 0.9804 0.9820 0.0090 0.9028 0.9796 0.9838 0.9921 
2007 196 3.13% 0.9790 0.9817 0.0233 0.7286 0.9796 0.9834 0.9916 
2008 163 2.61% 0.9792 0.9810 0.0107 0.8925 0.9781 0.9838 0.9939 
2009 112 1.79% 0.9794 0.9807 0.0090 0.9344 0.9774 0.9836 0.9953 
2010 136 2.17% 0.9805 0.9816 0.0062 0.9337 0.9785 0.9835 0.9913 
2011 131 2.09% 0.9802 0.9819 0.0097 0.9082 0.9796 0.9840 0.9940 
2012 138 2.21% 0.9812 0.9824 0.0066 0.9483 0.9797 0.9797 0.9931 
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Panel C: M&A index classified by industry 
Industry Observation Percent Mean Median Standard deviation Min 25% 75% Max 
Consumer Durables 118 1.89% 0.9800 0.9812 0.0102 0.895 0.9812 0.9842 0.9930 
Consumer Non-durables 315 5.04% 0.9809 0.9819 0.0074 0.9176 0.9819 0.9842 0.9927 
Business Equipment 1203 19.24% 0.9775 0.9815 0.0198 0.6928 0.9815 0.9839 0.9946 
Chemical Products 173 2.77% 0.9816 0.9815 0.0039 0.9684 0.9815 0.9845 0.9927 
Oil, Gas, and Coal 216 3.45% 0.9768 0.9804 0.0175 0.8262 0.9804 0.9831 0.9924 
Healthcare 502 8.03% 0.9785 0.9815 0.014 0.8601 0.9815 0.9838 0.9940 
Manufacturing 546 8.73% 0.9792 0.9811 0.0144 0.7808 0.9811 0.9836 0.9930 
Finance 1875 29.98% 0.9806 0.9814 0.0059 0.8755 0.9814 0.9832 0.9964 
Wholesale and Retail 470 7.52% 0.9799 0.9813 0.0097 0.8851 0.9813 0.9838 0.9969 
Telephone and Television 188 3.01% 0.9799 0.9818 0.012 0.8857 0.9818 0.984 0.9953 
Utilities 108 1.73% 0.9795 0.9817 0.0111 0.8927 0.9817 0.9833 0.9926 
Others 540 8.63% 0.9801 0.9812 0.0082 0.9187 0.9812 0.9843 0.9960 
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Table 2.3– Descriptive data for firm and deal characteristics 
Table 2.3 provides the descriptive statistics of variables for takeover deals in the full sample and the subsample 
classified by the value of the M&A index. The table lists the mean (number) and standard deviation (percent) of 
variables (dummy variables) for firm and deal characteristics. The M&A index is the measurement of takeover 
efficiency, calculated as a ratio of actual acquirers’ announcement return over optimal announcement return 
(estimated by SFA). Definitions of variables are listed in Appendix A. ***, ** and * represent significance at 1%, 






















Panel A: Acquirer Related  
      
  
Market Value  8562.2610 30415.9600 5410.0420 22071.1100 11713.5800 36652.3800 6303.5330*** 
Tobin's Q 3.0026 23.9070 2.5716 10.6347 3.4334 32.0883 -0.8618 
Leverage  0.1610 0.1705 0.1678 0.1751 0.1542 0.1655 -0.0136*** 
Return on Assets (ROA) 0.0350 0.1183 0.0308 0.1279 0.0392 0.1077 0.0084*** 
        
Panel B: Target Related  
       Market Value  2853.0660 15288.8500 1589.5170 9162.8300 4105.3370 19471.0300 2515.8200*** 
Tobin's Q 2.4153 15.3577 2.1075 6.9847 2.7230 20.5610 0.6155* 
Leverage  0.1571 0.1924 0.1603 0.1959 0.1538 0.1888 -0.0065 
Return on Assets (ROA) -0.0120 0.6810 -0.0254 0.9320 0.0015 0.2424 0.0269* 
        
Panel C: Deal Related 
       M&A index 0.9795 0.0119 0.9754 0.0153 0.9846 0.0025 0.0093*** 
Transaction Value (USD millions)  773.5128 3510.8970 709.5833 3661.0230 837.4240 3353.4130 127.8407 
Premium (%) 0.1204 1.5178 0.1381 1.9352 0.1026 0.9266 -0.0355 
Hostile Takeover 242 3.87% 124 3.97% 118 3.77% 
 Tender Offer 1275 20.39% 787 25.17% 488 15.61% 
 Toehold 5132 82.06% 2571 82.22% 2561 81.90% 
 Competing Bid 288 4.61% 142 4.54% 146 4.67% 
 Diversification  1328 21.23% 614 19.64% 714 22.83% 
 Cash 4032 64.47% 1975 63.16% 2057 65.78% 
 Stock  1292 20.66% 560 17.91% 732 23.41% 
 Number of observations 6254 3127 3127 
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Table 2.4 – Analysis for probability of deal completion 
Table 2.4 presents the analysis for the rate of successful deals. Panel A shows the M&A index for 
successful and unsuccessful transactions. Panel B tabulates the probit regression results. The dependent 
variable is the dummy variable which equals 1 when the takeover deal is finally completed and equals 0 
when the transactions are failed or withdrawn. The independent variable is the M&A index calculated 
by stochastic frontier analysis (SFA). All models control the firm and deal characteristics. Definitions 
of variables are listed in Appendix A. Fixed effects are considered in Model 2 and Model 4, including 
industry and year fixed effects. Model 3 and Model 4 incorporate acquirer clustering. ***, ** and * 
represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Univariate analysis 
Classification 
Failed Completion Difference 
(І) (ΙΙ) (ΙΙ)-(І) 
Mean 0.9778*** 0.9797*** 0.0019*** 
Standard Deviation 0.0211 0.0107 
 
    






Panel B: Multivariate analysis 
Completion Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
     
M&A Index 5.2729*** 4.5600*** 4.8676*** 4.5600*** 
 
(3.53) (2.98) (3.08) (2.83) 
Acquirer Tobin's Q 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 
 
(0.86) (1.25) (1.49) (1.51) 
Acquirer Price to Earnings 0.0000 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002 
 
(-0.04) (0.44) (0.64) (1.01) 
Acquirer Leverage  -0.0514 -0.1464 -0.0468 -0.1464 
 
(-0.55) (-1.46) (-0.44) (-1.33) 
Acquirer Cash Flow to Assets 0.1802 0.2475 0.1111 0.2475 
 
(0.82) (1.13) (0.53) (1.19) 
Target Tobin's Q -0.0029 -0.0018 -0.0029 -0.0018 
 
(-1.04) (-0.61) (-1.31) (-0.87) 
Target Price to Earnings 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
(0.24) (0.08) (0.05) (0.10) 
Target Leverage  0.0094 -0.0166 0.0169 -0.0166 
 
(0.13) (-0.22) (0.18) (-0.16) 
Target Cash Flow to Assets -0.1156 -0.1013 -0.0902 -0.1013 
 
(-0.82) (-0.72) (-0.67) (-0.75) 
Relative Deal Size  -0.2465*** -0.2439*** -0.2544*** -0.2439*** 
 
(-6.39) (-6.11) (-4.77) (-4.71) 
Hostile Takeover -1.6988*** -1.6977*** -1.7183*** -1.6978*** 
 
(-15.96) (-15.62) (-15.58) (-15.30) 
Tender Offer 0.5901*** 0.6383*** 0.5961*** 0.6383*** 
 
(9.03) (9.41) (8.04) (8.54) 
Pure Cash Deal -0.2846*** -0.2833*** -0.2692*** -0.2833*** 
 
(-5.94) (-5.28) (-4.68) (-4.91) 
Competing Bid -0.8927*** -0.9459*** -0.9592*** -0.9459*** 
 
(-9.63) (-9.84) (-9.16) (-9.10) 
Diversification 0.0164 0.0315 0.0080 0.0315 
 
(0.29) (0.53) (0.13) (0.52) 
Constant -3.7407*** -3.3872** -3.5894** -3.3872** 
 
(-2.56) (-2.25) (-2.31) (-2.13) 
 
    
Year-fixed-effects No Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-fixed-effects  No Yes No Yes 
Firm clustering  No No Yes Yes 
Observations 6254 6254 6254 6254 
Pseudo R2 0.132 0.170 0.163 0.170 
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Table 2.5 – Analysis for Acquisition premium 
Table 2.5 shows analysis of the relationship between acquisition premium and M&A index. In Panel A, 
the full sample is divided into low-efficiency and high-efficiency subsamples based on the M&A index. 
Panel A presents the acquisition premium in the low-efficiency and high-efficiency groups. Panel B 
shows the regression results for acquisition premium. The dependent variable is the acquisition 
premium, which is defined as the log percentage difference between offer price and target stock price 30 
days preceding the announcement date (Baker et al., 2012). The independent variable is the M&A index 
calculated by stochastic frontier analysis (SFA). All of the models also control firm and deal 
characteristics. Definitions of variables are listed in Appendix A. Fixed effects are considered in 
Models 2 and 4, including industry and year fixed effects. Models 3 and 4 incorporate acquirer 
clustering. ***, ** and * represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Univariate analysis 
Acquisition premium 
Low-efficiency High-efficiency Difference 
(І) (ΙΙ) (ΙΙ)-(І) 
Mean 0.1381 0.1026 -0.0355*** 
Standard Deviation 1.9352 0.9266 
 
    




Panel B: Multivariate analysis  
Acquisition Premium Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
     
M&A Index -8.9509*** -7.7338*** -8.9509*** -7.7338*** 
 
(-5.80) (-5.02) (-5.63) (-5.02) 
Target 52-week High 0.0601*** 0.0431*** 0.0601*** 0.0431*** 
 
(5.33) (3.64) (4.65) (3.47) 
Target Market Value 0.2256*** 0.2155*** 0.2256*** 0.2155*** 
 
(19.46) (17.57) (16.89) (14.81) 
Acquirer Market Value -0.3072*** -0.3083*** -0.3072*** -0.3083*** 
 
(-22.20) (-21.82) (-21.77) (-21.64) 
Stock 0.4514*** 0.4959*** 0.4514*** 0.4959*** 
 
(10.01) (10.74) (9.86) (10.54) 
Toehold 0.0915* 0.0925* 0.0915* 0.0925* 
 
(1.78) (1.80) (1.65) (1.75) 
Competing 0.3791*** 0.3502*** 0.3791*** 0.3502*** 
 
(4.83) (4.44) (5.36) (4.92) 
Diversification 0.1614*** 0.1182*** 0.1614*** 0.1182*** 
 
(3.59) (2.61) (3.70) (2.79) 
Hostile 0.6547*** 0.6249*** 0.6547*** 0.6249*** 
 
(7.23) (6.94) (8.81) (8.36) 
Tender 0.4561*** 0.3604*** 0.4561*** 0.3604*** 
 
(10.46) (8.04) (10.90) (8.91) 
Constant 6.9030*** 6.1510*** 6.9030*** 6.1510*** 
 
(4.56) (4.06) (4.44) (4.07) 
     
Year-fixed-effects No Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-fixed-effects  No Yes No Yes 
Firm-cluster  No No Yes Yes 
Observations 3809 3809 3809 3809 
Adjust R2 0.225 0.246 0.225 0.246 
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Table 2.6 – Analysis for post-acquisition stock performance in the short run 
Table 2.6 shows analysis for post-acquisition stock performance in the short run. In Panel A, the full 
sample is divided into low-efficiency and high-efficiency subsamples based on M&A index. Panel A 
presents short-run stock performance in the low-efficiency and high-efficiency groups. Panel B shows 
the regression results for post-acquisition performance in the short run. The dependent variable is the 
cumulative abnormal return for acquirers over the period 3 days to 5 days after announcement day 
(ACAR (+3, +5)). The independent variable is the M&A index calculated by stochastic frontier analysis 
(SFA). All of the models also control firm and deal characteristics. Definitions of variables are listed in 
Appendix A. Fixed effects are considered in Models 2 and 4, including industry and year fixed effects. 
Models 3 and 4 incorporate acquirer clustering. ***, ** and * represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, 
respectively. 
 
Panel A: Univariate analysis 
ACAR (+3,+5) 
Low-efficiency High-efficiency Difference 
(І) (ΙΙ) (ΙΙ)-(І) 
Mean -0.0582% 0.0563% 0.1145%*** 
Standard Deviation 0.0424 0.0488 
 
    




Panel B: Multivariate analysis 
ACAR (+3,+5) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
     
M&A Index 0.1704*** 0.1861*** 0.1857* 0.1861* 
 
(3.64) (3.95) (1.65) (1.66) 
Acquirer Tobin's Q -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 
 
(-0.95) (-0.92) (-1.64) (-1.43) 
Acquirer Price to Earnings 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 
 
(0.47) (0.31) (0.92) (0.84) 
Acquirer Leverage  0.0002* 0.0002* 0.0002* 0.0002* 
 
(1.89) (1.72) (1.86) (1.83) 
Acquirer Cash Flow to Assets 0.0038* 0.0041* 0.0037 0.0041 
 
(1.70) (1.80) (0.96) (1.06) 
Target Tobin's Q 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
 
(0.71) (0.80) (0.59) (0.62) 
Target Price to Earnings -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0000* 
 
(-1.56) (-1.51) (-1.63) (-1.70) 
Target Leverage  -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 
 
(-0.90) (-0.93) (-0.89) (-0.81) 
Target Cash Flow to Assets -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 
 
(-0.84) (-0.76) (-0.86) (-0.81) 
Relative Deal Size  0.0007 0.0008 0.0007 0.0008 
 
(1.03) (1.19) (0.61) (0.73) 
Hostile Takeover -0.0053 -0.0056* -0.0058* -0.0056* 
 
(-1.62) (-1.71) (-1.91) (-1.82) 
Tender Offer -0.0008 -0.0010 -0.0012 -0.0010 
 
(-0.58) (-0.68) (-0.86) (-0.71) 
Pure Cash Deal 0.0025** 0.0023* 0.0025* 0.0023* 
 
(2.11) (1.81) (1.87) (1.70) 
Competing Bid -0.0011 -0.0014 -0.00144 -0.0014 
 
(-0.39) (-0.48) (-0.50) (-0.49) 
Diversification -0.0033** -0.0037** -0.0036** -0.0037** 
 
(-2.31) (-2.53) (-2.33) (-2.38) 
Constant -0.1681*** -0.1892*** -0.1860* -0.1892* 
 
(-3.67) (-4.09) (-1.68) (-1.71) 
 
    
Year-fixed-effects No Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-fixed-effects  No Yes No Yes 
Firm clustering  No No Yes Yes 
Observations 6254 6254 6254 6254 
Adjust R2 0.004 0.009 0.009 0.009 
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Table 2.7 – Analysis for post-acquisition stock performance in medium and long run 
Table 2.7 lists the multivariate analysis of stock performance in the medium and long term. Panel A presents acquirers’ stock performance for 3 months, 6 months and 9 
months after acquisition. Panel B shows the regression results for post-acquisition performance in the long run for 12 months, 24 months and 36 months. The dependent 
variable is acquirer buy-and-hold returns over the post-acquisition period. The independent variable is the M&A index calculated by stochastic frontier analysis. All of the 
models also control firm and deal characteristics. Definitions of variables are listed in Appendix A. Fixed effects are considered in Models 2 and 4, including industry and 
year fixed effects. Models 3 and 4 incorporate acquirer clustering. ***, ** and * represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Stock performance in medium run 
  BHAR_3 months BHAR_6 months 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
M&A Index 0.4791** 0.5358** 0.4791* 0.5358* 0.8306** 0.9128*** 0.8306* 0.9128* 
 
(2.02) (2.24) (1.79) (1.73) (2.38) (2.61) (1.73) (1.91) 
Acquirer Tobin's Q -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001* -0.0001** 
 
(-0.43) (-0.60) (-0.72) (-1.02) (-0.83) (-1.05) (-1.68) (-2.13) 
Acquirer Leverage  -0.0059 -0.0044 -0.0059 -0.0044 0.0151 0.0217 0.0151 0.0217 
 
(-0.43) (-0.31) (-0.35) (-0.26) (0.74) (1.03) (0.65) (0.94) 
Acquirer Cash Flow to Assets 0.0008 0.0069 0.0008 0.0069 -0.0646 -0.0548 -0.0646 -0.0548 
 
(0.03) (0.21) (0.02) (0.12) (-1.39) (-1.15) (-0.67) (-0.53) 
Target Tobin's Q -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0006 -0.0007 -0.0006 -0.0007 
 
(-0.51) (-0.63) (-0.54) (-0.65) (-1.31) (-1.48) (-1.23) (-1.36) 
Target Leverage  0.0078 0.0103 0.0078 0.0103 -0.0032 0.0006 -0.0032 0.0006 
 
(0.67) (0.87) (0.58) (0.76) (-0.18) (0.03) (-0.18) (0.03) 
Target Cash Flow to Assets 0.0113 0.0111 0.0113 0.0111 -0.0389* -0.0383 -0.0389 -0.0383 
 
(0.71) (0.67) (0.42) (0.40) (-1.66) (-1.57) (-0.95) (-0.94) 
Deal Size  -0.0041*** -0.0030* -0.0041*** -0.0030* -0.0071*** -0.0046** -0.0071*** -0.0046** 
 
(-2.99) (-1.91) (-3.10) (-1.91) (-3.54) (-2.02) (-3.77) (-2.02) 
Hostile Takeover -0.0468*** -0.0486*** -0.0468*** -0.0486*** -0.0355 -0.0355 -0.0355 -0.0355 
79 
 
(-2.87) (-2.96) (-2.82) (-2.91) (-1.48) (-1.47) (-1.40) (-1.38) 
Pure Stock Deal -0.0218*** -0.0235*** -0.0218** -0.0235*** -0.0469*** -0.0505*** -0.0469*** -0.0505*** 
 
(-2.81) (-2.90) (-2.55) (-2.67) (-4.12) (-4.25) (-3.95) (-4.00) 
Competing Bid 0.0074 0.0023 0.0074 0.0023 0.0237 0.0143 0.0237 0.0143 
 
(0.50) (0.15) (0.54) (0.16) (1.09) (0.65) (1.18) (0.71) 
Diversification -0.0151** -0.0147* -0.0151* -0.0147* -0.0266** -0.0260** -0.0266** -0.0260** 
 
(-2.04) (-1.96) (-1.83) (-1.75) (-2.43) (-2.34) (-2.22) (-2.13) 
Tender Offer -0.0156** -0.0158** -0.0156** -0.0158** -0.0160 -0.0148 -0.0160 -0.0148 
 
(-2.07) (-2.06) (-2.06) (-2.04) (-1.44) (-1.31) (-1.32) (-1.23) 
Constant -0.4416* -0.5042** -0.4416 -0.5042 -0.7668** -0.8850** -0.7668 -0.8850* 
 
(-1.90) (-2.14) (-1.12) (-1.29) (-2.24) (-2.56) (-1.63) (-1.89) 
         
Year-fixed-effects No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-fixed-effects  No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Firm-cluster  No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Observation 6254 6254 6254 6254 6254 6254 6254 6254 
Adjusted R-square 0.008 0.011 0.008 0.011 0.011 0.022 0.011 0.022 
 
 
Panel A: Stock performance in medium run (continued) 
  BHAR_9 months 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
M&A Index 0.9512** 1.1336** 0.9512* 1.1336** 
 
(2.08) (2.48) (1.73) (2.06) 
Acquirer Tobin's Q -0.0011* -0.0011* -0.0011* -0.0011* 
 
(-1.94) (-1.88) (-1.90) (-1.86) 
Acquirer Leverage  0.0185 0.0223 0.0185 0.0223 
 
(0.71) (0.82) (0.64) (0.77) 
Acquirer Cash Flow to Assets 0.0477 0.0611 0.0477 0.0611 
 
(0.80) (1.00) (0.46) (0.57) 
Target Tobin's Q -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0004 
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(-0.42) (-0.57) (-0.37) (-0.48) 
Target Leverage  0.0120 0.0152 0.0120 0.0152 
 
(0.54) (0.68) (0.52) (0.63) 
Target Cash Flow to Assets -0.0699** -0.0722** -0.0699 -0.0722 
 
(-2.31) (-2.32) (-1.24) (-1.26) 
Deal Size  -0.0098*** -0.0062** -0.0098*** -0.0062** 
 
(-3.77) (-2.14) (-4.06) (-2.15) 
Hostile Takeover -0.0414 -0.0383 -0.0414 -0.0383 
 
(-1.33) (-1.23) (-1.18) (-1.09) 
Pure Stock Deal -0.0427*** -0.0447*** -0.0427*** -0.0447*** 
 
(-2.90) (-2.93) (-2.66) (-2.65) 
Competing Bid 0.0307 0.0162 0.0307 0.0162 
 
(1.09) (0.57) (1.18) (0.62) 
Diversification -0.0404*** -0.0399*** -0.0404*** -0.0399*** 
 
(-2.87) (-2.80) (-2.67) (-2.60) 
Tender Offer -0.0134 -0.0133 -0.0134 -0.0133 
 
(-0.93) (-0.91) (-0.84) (-0.84) 
Constant -0.8770* -1.0868** -0.8770 -1.0868** 
 
(-1.96) (-2.42) (-1.63) (-2.02) 
     
Year-fixed-effects No Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-fixed-effects  No Yes No Yes 
Firm-cluster  No No Yes Yes 
Observation 6254 6254 6254 6254 




Panel B: Stock performance in long run 
     
  BHAR_12 months BHAR_24 months 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
M&A Index 0.2599 0.6687 0.2599 0.6687 -0.2277 0.3742 -0.2277 0.3742 
 
(0.51) (1.32) (0.43) (1.17) (-0.22) (0.37) (-0.24) (0.39) 
Acquirer Tobin's Q -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0001** -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0002* 
 
(-0.13) (-0.71) (-0.46) (-2.14) (-0.29) (-0.79) (-0.86) (-1.96) 
Acquirer Leverage  0.0120 0.0062 0.0120 0.0062 0.0272 -0.0056 0.0272 -0.0056 
 
(0.45) (0.22) (0.40) (0.22) (0.51) (-0.10) (0.50) (-0.12) 
Acquirer Cash Flow to Assets 0.1028* 0.1583*** 0.1028 0.1583 0.1791 0.2773** 0.1791 0.2773 
 
(1.72) (2.65) (1.02) (1.47) (1.52) (2.34) (0.86) (1.24) 
Target Tobin's Q 0.0001 -0.0000 0.0001 -0.0000 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 
 
(0.18) (-0.01) (0.15) (-0.01) (0.13) (0.07) (0.15) (0.08) 
Target Leverage  0.0263 0.0237 0.0263 0.0237 0.0300 0.0182 0.0300 0.0182 
 
(1.17) (1.06) (1.08) (0.95) (0.68) (0.41) (0.85) (0.55) 
Target Cash Flow to Assets -0.1121*** -0.1054*** -0.1121** -0.1054* -0.1326* -0.1322* -0.1326* -0.1322* 
 
(-3.22) (-2.97) (-1.97) (-1.86) (-1.93) (-1.87) (-1.75) (-1.83) 
Deal Size  -0.0084*** -0.0057* -0.0084*** -0.0057* -0.0151*** -0.0095 -0.0151*** -0.0095* 
 
(-2.85) (-1.74) (-3.09) (-1.84) (-2.59) (-1.47) (-3.22) (-1.89) 
Hostile Takeover -0.0536 -0.0525 -0.0536 -0.0525 -0.0707 -0.0592 -0.0707 -0.0592 
 
(-1.51) (-1.50) (-1.61) (-1.64) (-1.01) (-0.85) (-1.53) (-1.34) 
Pure Stock Deal -0.0581*** -0.0554*** -0.0581*** -0.0554*** -0.1423*** -0.1512*** -0.1423*** -0.1512*** 
 
(-3.49) (-3.26) (-3.12) (-2.91) (-4.34) (-4.47) (-4.57) (-4.20) 
Competing Bid 0.0088 0.0107 0.0088 0.0107 0.0479 0.0607 0.0479 0.0607 
 
(0.28) (0.34) (0.31) (0.39) (0.76) (0.96) (1.02) (1.36) 
Diversification -0.0520*** -0.0480*** -0.0520*** -0.0480*** -0.1134*** -0.1084*** -0.1134*** -0.1084*** 
 
(-3.27) (-3.02) (-3.05) (-2.82) (-3.62) (-3.44) (-4.49) (-4.20) 
Tender Offer 0.0028 0.0089 0.0028 0.0089 0.0141 0.0289 0.0141 0.0289 
 
(0.17) (0.55) (0.17) (0.54) (0.44) (0.90) (0.45) (0.89) 
Constant -0.1911 -0.6416 -0.1911 -0.6416 0.3487 -0.3538 0.3487 -0.3538 
 
(-0.38) (-1.28) (-0.33) (-1.14) (0.35) (-0.36) (0.38) (-0.38) 
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Year-fixed-effects No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-fixed-effects  No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Firm-cluster  No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Observation 6254 6254 6254 6254 6254 6254 6254 6254 
Adjusted R-square 0.008 0.046 0.008 0.046 0.008 0.031 0.008 0.031 
 
Panel B: Stock performance in long run (Continued) 
  BHAR_36 months 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
M&A index -2.5550 -1.9621 -2.5550 -1.9621 
 
(-1.60) (-1.63) (-1.47) (-1.06) 
Acquirer Tobin's Q -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0002** 
 
(-0.29) (-0.73) (-1.08) (-2.21) 
Acquirer Leverage  0.0323 -0.0230 0.0323 -0.0230 
 
(0.51) (-0.35) (0.48) (-0.36) 
Acquirer Cash Flow to Assets 0.2813** 0.4226*** 0.2813 0.4226 
 
(1.99) (2.98) (1.09) (1.53) 
Target Tobin's Q -0.0012 -0.0014 -0.0012 -0.0014 
 
(-0.68) (-0.78) (-0.60) (-0.67) 
Target Leverage  0.0687 0.0524 0.0687 0.0524 
 
(1.29) (0.99) (1.45) (1.19) 
Target Cash Flow to Assets -0.2106** -0.2097** -0.2106** -0.2097** 
 
(-2.55) (-2.49) (-2.03) (-2.06) 
Deal Size  -0.0172** -0.0099 -0.0172*** -0.0099 
 
(-2.46) (-1.28) (-2.65) (-1.43) 
Hostile Takeover -0.1039 -0.0850 -0.1039 -0.0850 
 
(-1.24) (-1.02) (-1.56) (-1.31) 
Pure Stock Deal -0.1528*** -0.1827*** -0.1528*** -0.1827*** 
 
(-3.88) (-4.52) (-3.64) (-4.02) 
Competing Bid 0.0235 0.0461 0.0235 0.0461 
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(0.31) (0.61) (0.40) (0.81) 
Diversification -0.1516*** -0.1507*** -0.1516*** -0.1507*** 
 
(-4.02) (-4.00) (-4.64) (-4.50) 
Tender Offer -0.0003 0.0112 -0.0003 0.0112 
 
(-0.01) (0.29) (-0.01) (0.28) 
Constant 2.6589** 1.9653* 2.6589 1.9653 
 
(2.23) (1.65) (1.56) (1.08) 
     
Year-fixed-effects No Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-fixed-effects  No Yes No Yes 
Firm-cluster  No No Yes Yes 
Observation 6254 6254 6254 6254 
Adjusted R-square 0.009 0.041 0.009 0.041 
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Table 2.8 – Long-run operating performance 
Table 2.8 reports the relationship between the M&A index and long-run operating performance after 
acquisitions. The dependent variable is the average industry-adjusted ROA of acquirers for three years 
post-acquisition (IAROA). IAROA is bidder's return on assets, deducting the median ROA in the 
industry with the same first two-digit SIC code as the acquirers. The independent variable is the M&A 
index calculated by stochastic frontier analysis (SFA). All of the models also control firm and deal 
characteristics. Definitions of variables are listed in Appendix A. Fixed effects are considered in 
Models 2 and 4, including industry and year fixed effects. Models 3 and 4 incorporate acquirer 




Average 3-year IAROA Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
     
M&A index 1.4712*** 1.2641*** 1.2724*** 1.2641*** 
 
(3.18) (2.72) (3.60) (3.57) 
Acquirer Tobin's Q -0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 
 
(-0.14) (0.49) (1.00) (1.33) 
Acquirer Price to Earnings -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 
 
(-0.47) (-0.45) (-0.69) (-0.77) 
Acquirer Leverage  0.0546** 0.0591** 0.0632** 0.0591* 
 
(2.33) (2.42) (2.16) (1.85) 
Acquirer Cash Flow to Assets 0.3650*** 0.3586*** 0.3519*** 0.3586*** 
 
(6.74) (6.49) (4.55) (4.69) 
Target Tobin's Q -0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
 
(-0.02) (0.21) (0.11) (0.22) 
Target Price to Earnings 0.0001 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 
 
(0.38) (0.30) (0.78) (0.68) 
Target Leverage  0.0207 0.0236 0.0241* 0.0236 
 
(1.06) (1.20) (1.73) (1.48) 
Target Cash Flow to Assets 0.0665** 0.0765** 0.0707** 0.0765** 
 
(2.07) (2.31) (2.02) (2.25) 
Relative Deal Size  -0.0091 -0.0073 -0.0092* -0.0073 
 
(-1.37) (-1.09) (-1.85) (-1.45) 
Hostile Takeover 0.0048 0.0011 0.0000 0.0011 
 
(0.15) (0.03) (-0.00) (0.11) 
Tender Offer 0.0118 0.0114 0.0094 0.0114 
 
(0.85) (0.80) (0.78) (0.84) 
Pure Cash Deal 0.0149 0.0215* 0.02175** 0.0215*** 
 
(1.31) (1.72) (2.37) (2.77) 
Competing Bid 0.0110 0.0102 0.0112 0.0102 
 
(0.39) (0.36) (0.78) (0.71) 
Diversification 0.0051 0.0062 0.0057 0.0062 
 
(0.37) (0.44) (0.73) (0.86) 
Constant -2.153*** -1.9785*** -1.9812*** -1.9785*** 
 
(-4.75) (-4.33) (-5.61) (-5.60) 
 
    
Year-fixed-effects No Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-fixed-effects  No Yes No Yes 
Firm clustering  No No Yes Yes 
Observations 6254 6254 6254 6254 
Adjust R2 0.016 0.026 0.024 0.026 
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Table 2.9 – Trading strategy 
Table 2.9 shows the holding period return in Panel A and monthly alpha in Panel B for trading strategies with the M&A index. The full sample is split into three 
portfolios on the basis of the M&A index of each deal. Portfolio 1 is the group with the lowest indices, which is the portfolio with inefficient deals. Portfolio 3 is the 
group with the highest indices, which is a portfolio with efficient deals. Portfolio 2 is the group with neutral indices. To avoid large movements in acquirers’ stocks due 
to the takeover announcement, we exclude the date announced and start to hold stocks from the day after the takeover announcement. Panel A reports the average 
holding period return over 1 to 6 months after the announcement day and the mean difference between the two portfolios. To calculate the monthly alpha, we adopt 
four models for benchmarking, including CAPM, the Fama-French three factors, Fama-French four factors and Fama-French five factors. Panel B shows the monthly 
alpha for portfolios over different holding periods and the difference between each of the two groups. ***, ** and * represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, 
respectively.   
 
Panel A: Holding period return 







Difference Difference Difference 
(І) (ΙΙ) (ΙΙΙ) (ΙΙ)-(І) (ΙΙΙ)-(ΙΙ) (ΙΙΙ)- (І) 
       Holding 1 month -0.0184*** 0.0207*** 0.0604*** 0.0391*** 0.0397*** 0.0789*** 
Holding 2 months -0.0082*** 0.0308*** 0.0676*** 0.0390*** 0.0369*** 0.0759*** 
Holding 3 months 0.0067*** 0.0446*** 0.0797*** 0.0380*** 0.0351*** 0.0731*** 
Holding 4 months 0.0067*** 0.0510*** 0.0864*** 0.0442*** 0.0354*** 0.0796*** 
Holding 5 months 0.0299*** 0.0736*** 0.0969*** 0.0437*** 0.0233*** 0.0670*** 
Holding 6 months 0.0365*** 0.0839*** 0.1057*** 0.0474*** 0.0217** 0.0692*** 
       Observation 2085 2085 2084 
   
87 
  
Panel B: Monthly alpha for various models 







Difference Difference Difference 
(І) (ΙΙ) (ΙΙΙ) (ΙΙ)-(І) (ΙΙΙ)-(ΙΙ) (ΙΙΙ)- (І) 
Holding 1 month 
Alpha_CAPM 0.0264*** 0.0451*** 0.1173*** 0.0187*** 0.0721*** 0.0908*** 
Alpha_FF3 0.0205*** 0.0459*** 0.1141*** 0.0254*** 0.0682*** 0.0936*** 
Alpha_FF4 0.0202*** 0.0474*** 0.1172*** 0.0272*** 0.0698*** 0.0970*** 
Alpha_FF5 -0.3937*** -0.3715*** -0.3407*** 0.0222*** 0.0308*** 0.0531*** 
Holding 2 months 
Alpha_CAPM 0.0131*** 0.0203*** 0.0444*** 0.0072*** 0.0241*** 0.0313*** 
Alpha_FF3 0.0074*** 0.0175*** 0.0434*** 0.0101*** 0.0259*** 0.0360*** 
Alpha_FF4 0.0086*** 0.0193*** 0.0410*** 0.0107*** 0.0217*** 0.0324*** 
Alpha_FF5 -0.3885*** -0.3709*** -0.3481*** 0.0176*** 0.0229*** 0.0404*** 
Holding 3 months 
Alpha_CAPM 0.0038*** 0.0101*** 0.0250*** 0.0063*** 0.0149*** 0.0212*** 
Alpha_FF3 -0.0001*** 0.0085*** 0.0249*** 0.0086*** 0.0164*** 0.0250*** 
Alpha_FF4 0.0008*** 0.0100*** 0.0229*** 0.0091*** 0.0129*** 0.0220*** 
Alpha_FF5 -0.3851*** -0.3708*** -0.3497*** 0.0142*** 0.0212*** 0.0354*** 
Holding 4 months 
Alpha_CAPM 0.0009*** 0.0062*** 0.0170*** 0.0053*** 0.0108*** 0.0161*** 
Alpha_FF3 -0.0021*** 0.0051*** 0.0171*** 0.0072*** 0.0120*** 0.0192*** 
Alpha_FF4 -0.0013*** 0.0063*** 0.0154*** 0.0077*** 0.0091*** 0.0167*** 
Alpha_FF5 -0.3816*** -0.3707*** -0.3502*** 0.0109*** 0.0206*** 0.0315*** 
Holding 5 months 
Alpha_CAPM -0.0002*** 0.0043*** 0.0127*** 0.0045*** 0.0084*** 0.0130*** 
Alpha_FF3 -0.0027*** 0.0035*** 0.0129*** 0.0062*** 0.0094*** 0.0156*** 
Alpha_FF4 -0.0021*** 0.0045*** 0.0114*** 0.0066*** 0.0069*** 0.0135*** 
Alpha_FF5 -0.3795*** -0.3699*** -0.3515*** 0.0096*** 0.0184*** 0.0280*** 
Holding 6 months 
Alpha_CAPM -0.0007*** 0.0032*** 0.0101*** 0.0039*** 0.0069*** 0.0109*** 
Alpha_FF3 -0.0028*** 0.0026*** 0.0103*** 0.0054*** 0.0078*** 0.0132*** 
Alpha_FF4 -0.0023*** 0.0034*** 0.0090*** 0.0057*** 0.0056*** 0.0113*** 
Alpha_FF5 -0.3774*** -0.3683*** -0.3509*** 0.0091*** 0.0174*** 0.0265*** 
        Observation 
 
2085 2085 2084 
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Table 2.10 – Trading strategy classified by industry 
Table 2.10 shows a holding period return in Panel A and monthly alpha in Panel B for trading strategies with the M&A index, classified by industry. The full sample 
is split into three portfolios on the basis of the M&A index of each deal. Portfolio 1 is the group with the lowest indices, which is the portfolio with inefficient deals. 
Portfolio 3 is the group with the highest indices, which is the portfolio with efficient deals. Portfolio 2 is the group with neutral indices. To avoid large movements in 
acquirers stocks due to takeover announcement, we exclude the date announced and start to hold stocks from the day after the takeover announcement. Panel A reports 
the average holding period return over 1 to 6 months after the announcement day and the mean difference between the two portfolios. To calculate the monthly alpha, 
we adopt four models for benchmarking, including the CAPM, Fama-French three factors, Fama-French four factors and Fama-French five factors. Panel B shows the 
monthly alpha for portfolios over different holding periods and the difference between the two groups. The industry classifications are according to the Fama-French 
12 industry classifications. ***, ** and * represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
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Panel A: Holding period return 







Difference Difference Difference 
(І) (ΙΙ) (ΙΙΙ) (ΙΙ)-(І) (ΙΙΙ)-(ΙΙ) (ΙΙΙ)- (І) 
Telephone and Television -0.0607*** 0.0254*** 0.0731*** 0.0861*** 0.0477 0.1338*** 
observation 78 77 75 
   
Oil, Gas, and Coal -0.0843*** 0.0350*** 0.0500*** 0.1193*** 0.015 0.1343*** 
observation 84 82 81 
   
Consumer Durables -0.0184*** 0.0207*** 0.0604*** 0.0288 0.0732** 0.1020*** 
observation 54 52 58 
   
Business Equipment -0.0333*** 0.0165*** 0.0639*** 0.0498*** 0.0475*** 0.0972*** 
observation 388 380 381 
   
Manufacturing -0.0115*** 0.0244*** 0.0612*** 0.0359*** 0.0369*** 0.0727*** 
observation 173 172 170 
   
Chemicals Products -0.0264*** 0.0189*** 0.0618*** 0.0453** 0.0429** 0.0882*** 
observation 70 68 73 
   
Consumer Non-Durables -0.0071*** 0.0201*** 0.0734*** 0.0273 0.0533*** 0.0805*** 
observation 103 99 105 
   
Healthcare -0.0284*** 0.0173*** 0.0584*** 0.0457*** 0.0411*** 0.0868*** 
observation 168 174 165 
   
Wholesale and Retail 0.0057*** 0.0278*** 0.0821*** 0.022 0.0544*** 0.0764*** 
observation 163 166 164 
   
Finance -0.0058*** 0.0170*** 0.0440*** 0.0228*** 0.0271*** 0.0498*** 
observation 576 589 594 
   
Utilities -0.0094*** 0.0154*** 0.0294*** 0.0249 0.014 0.0389** 
observation 51 59 57 
   
Other -0.0174*** 0.0322*** 0.0868*** 0.0497*** 0.0546*** 0.1042*** 
       
observation 177 179 181 
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Panel B: Monthly alpha 







Difference Difference Difference 
(І) (ΙΙ) (ΙΙΙ) (ΙΙ)-(І) (ΙΙΙ)-(ΙΙ) (ΙΙΙ)- (І) 
Telephone and Television  -0.2987*** 0.0806*** 0.0306*** 0.3794*** -0.0501*** 0.3293*** 
observation 78 77 75 
   Oil, Gas, and Coal -0.1771*** 0.0296*** -0.1111*** 0.2067*** -0.1406*** 0.0661*** 
observation 84 82 81 
   Consumer Durables 0.0097*** -0.0522*** 0.0251*** -0.0619*** 0.0773*** 0.0154** 
observation 54 52 58 
   Business Equipment 0.0547*** 0.0795*** 0.1231*** 0.0248*** 0.0435*** 0.0683*** 
observation 388 380 381 
   Manufacturing -0.0194*** 0.0191*** 0.1379*** 0.0385*** 0.1188*** 0.1573*** 
observation 173 172 170 
   Chemicals Products 0.0102*** 0.0765*** 0.0942*** 0.0663*** 0.0177*** 0.0840*** 
observation 70 68 73 
   Consumer Non-Durables -0.0628*** -0.0531*** 0.1320*** 0.0097** 0.1851*** 0.1948*** 
observation 103 99 105 
   Healthcare -0.0056*** 0.0456*** 0.1530*** 0.0512*** 0.1075*** 0.1587*** 
observation 168 174 165 
   Wholesale and Retail -0.0312*** 0.0049*** 0.1757*** 0.0361*** 0.0544*** 0.2068*** 
observation 163 166 164 
   Finance 0.0970*** 0.0662*** 0.1315*** -0.0309*** 0.0654*** 0.0345*** 
observation 576 589 594 
   Utilities 0.0999*** 0.0154*** -0.0569*** 0.0383*** -0.1952*** -0.1568*** 
observation 51 59 57 
   Other 0.0056*** 0.0270*** 0.1137*** 0.0214*** 0.0867*** 0.1081*** 
       
observation 177 179 181 
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Table 2.11 – Trading strategy classified by year 
Table 2.11 shows holding period returns in Panel A and monthly alpha figures in Panel B for a trading strategy with the M&A index, classified by industry. The full 
sample is split into three portfolios on the basis of the M&A index of each deal. Portfolio 1 is the group with lowest indices, which is the portfolio with inefficient deals. 
Portfolio 3 is the group with highest indices, which is the portfolio with efficient deals. Portfolio 2 is the group with neutral indices. To avoid large movements in 
acquirer stocks due to takeover announcements, we exclude the announcement date and start to hold stocks from the day after the announcement. Panel A reports the 
average holding period return over 1 to 6 months after the announcement date and the mean difference between the two portfolios. To calculate the monthly alpha, we 
adopt four models for benchmarking, including the CAPM, Fama-French three factors, Fama-French four factors and Fama-French five factors. Panel B shows the 
monthly alpha for portfolios over different holding periods and the difference between each group. ***, ** and * represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, 
respectively. 
 
Panel A: Holding period return 







Difference Difference Difference 
(І) (ΙΙ) (ΙΙΙ) (ΙΙ)-(І) (ΙΙΙ)-(ΙΙ) (ΙΙΙ)- (І) 
       
1980-1984 -0.0215*** -0.0095*** 0.0732*** 0.0121 0.0826*** 0.0947*** 
observation 98 93 85 
   1985-1989 -0.0262*** 0.0246*** 0.0702*** 0.0508*** 0.0456*** 0.0964*** 
observation 204 202 206 
   1990-1994 -0.0104*** 0.0107*** 0.0624*** 0.0211* 0.0517*** 0.0728*** 
observation 273 264 263 
   1995-1999 -0.0112*** 0.0248*** 0.0556*** 0.0360*** 0.0308*** 0.0668*** 
observation 621 636 626 
   2000-2004 -0.0202*** 0.0344*** 0.0644*** 0.0546 0.0300*** 0.0846*** 
observation 441 440 448 
   2005-2009 -0.0333*** 0.0059*** 0.0489*** 0.0386*** 0.0430*** 0.0816*** 
observation 289 295 293 
   2010-2012 -0.0148*** 0.0191*** 0.0642*** 0.0339*** 0.0450*** 0.0789*** 
       
observation 159 154 163 




Panel B: Monthly alpha 







Difference Difference Difference 
(І) (ΙΙ) (ΙΙΙ) (ΙΙ)-(І) (ΙΙΙ)-(ΙΙ) (ΙΙΙ)- (І) 
       
1980-1984 -0.0384*** 0.0521*** 0.1448*** 0.0906*** 0.0927*** 0.1833*** 
observation 98 93 85 
   1985-1989 0.0159*** 0.0198*** 0.1199*** 0.0039 0.1001*** 0.1040*** 
observation 204 202 206 
   1990-1994 0.0422*** 0.0642*** 0.1716*** 0.0220*** 0.1074*** 0.1294*** 
observation 273 264 263 
   1995-1999 0.0367*** 0.0375*** 0.0900*** 0.0009 0.0525*** 0.0533*** 
observation 621 636 626 
   2000-2004 0.0518*** 0.1128*** 0.1719*** 0.0610*** 0.0591*** 0.1210*** 
observation 441 440 448 
   2005-2009 -0.0624*** 0.0229*** 0.0353*** 0.0852*** 0.0124*** 0.0976*** 
observation 289 295 293 
   2010-2012 0.0287*** -0.0129*** 0.1168*** -0.0416*** 0.1297*** 0.0881*** 
       
observation 159 154 163 
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Table 2.12 – Inefficiency in takeover transactions 
Table 2.12 analyses what the M&A index captures. Panel A divides the full sample based on the E-index 
and shows the M&A index for the subsamples. Panel B examines what the M&A index captures. The 
dependent variable is the M&A index calculated by stochastic frontier analysis (SFA). The independent 
variable is the E-index. The entrenchment index (E-index; (Bebchuk et al., 2009)) is constructed 
manually based on the six provisions of Corporate Takeover Defenses released by the IRRC (Investor 
Responsibility Research Center). Bebchuk et al. (2009) find that firms with a higher E-index are 
associated with lower firm value and stock returns, implying that firms with a higher E-index may 
suffer higher agency cost. All models control the firm and deal characteristics. Definitions of variables 
are listed in Appendix A. Fixed effects are considered in Models 2 and 4, including industry and year 
fixed effects. Models 3 and 4 incorporate acquirer clustering. ***, ** and * represent significance at 1%, 
5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Univariate analysis 
M&A index 
Low-E-index High-E-index Difference 
(І) (ΙΙ) (ΙΙ)-(І) 
Mean 0.9815 0.9796 -0.0019*** 
Standard Deviation 0.0004 0.0005 
 
    




Panel B: Multivariate analysis 
M&A index Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  
   
Entrenchment Index -0.0017** -0.0018** -0.0017** -0.0018** 
 
(-2.22) (-2.23) (-2.05) (-2.09) 
Premium -0.0014*** -0.0011*** -0.0014*** -0.0011*** 
 
(-4.09) (-3.41) (-4.07) (-3.34) 
Relative Target Size  -0.0027* -0.0027 -0.0027* -0.0027 
 
(-1.74) (-1.62) (-1.73) (-1.60) 
Competing Bid -0.0028 -0.0025 -0.0028 -0.0025 
 
(-1.10) (-0.97) (-1.11) (-0.97) 
Diversification 0.00102 0.001 0.0010 0.0010 
 
(0.93) (0.86) (0.90) (0.84) 
Pure Cash Deal 0.0019** 0.0021** 0.0019** 0.0021** 
 
(2.05) (2.24) (2.00) (2.17) 
Constant 0.9807*** 0.9811*** 0.9807*** 0.9811*** 
 
(692.93) (407.79) (620.92) (389.58) 
 
    
Year-fixed-effects No Yes No Yes 
Industry-fixed-effects  No Yes No Yes 
Observations 989 989 989 989 
Adjust R2 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.044 
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2.8 Appendix A 
Variables Definitions 
Panel A: Key independent variables 
M&A Index M&A index is the measurement of takeover efficiency, calculated as a ratio of actual acquirers' announcement 
return over optimal acquirers' announcement return (estimated by Stochastic Frontier Analysis). 
Panel B: Post-acquisition performance 
ACAR (+3,+5)  ACAR (+3, +5) refers to the cumulative abnormal return for acquirers over the period 3 days to 5 days after 
announcement day. This variable is calculated by the market model (Brown and Warner, 1985) with the 
value-weighted CRSP index as a benchmark for market return and an estimation period starting 200 trading days 
and ending 20 trading days before the M&A deal announcement.  
Industry-adjusted Return on 
Assets of Acquirer (A_IAROA) 
A_ IAROA is bidder's return on assets (ROA), deducting median ROA in the industry with the same first two-digit 
SIC code as the acquirers’.  
Panel C: Firm characteristics 
Tobin's Q Tobin's Q is computed as the ratio of the market value of a firm to the book value of its assets. 
Market Value (MV) The market value is calculated as the number of shares outstanding multiplied by the respective stock price at four 
weeks before the official deal announcement.  
Leverage Leverage ratio is total debt, which is the sum of a firm’s long-term debt and short-term debt, divided by its total 
assets. 
Return on Assets (ROA) ROA is computed as the ratio of the company's net income by the book value of its total assets. 
Price to Earnings Price to earnings is calculated as the share price four weeks before the announcement divided by earnings per 
share excluding extraordinary items. 
Cash Flow to Assets Cash flow to assets is a ratio of cash flow over total assets. Cash flow is operating income before extraordinary 
items, adding depreciation and subtracting dividends paid to shareholders. 
Target 52-week High The target 52-week high is defined as the log percentage difference of the target highest price during the 52 weeks 
before the date announced over the target share price four weeks before the M&A deal announcement (Baker et 
al., 2012). 
Panel D: Deal characteristics 
Transaction Value (USD millions)  Transaction value refers to the total value of consideration paid by the acquirer in order to obtain the target. We 
report the total dollar value as reported by Thomson One.  
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Premium (%)  Premium is defined as the offer price, as the log percentage difference from target's share price four weeks before 
the M&A deal announcement (Baker et al., 2012). 
Relative Deal Size Relative deal size is computed as the transaction value divided by the market capitalisation of the acquirer four 
weeks before the official deal announcement.  
Hostile Takeover Dummy variable that equals 1 if the M&A deal is reported as hostile. 
Tender Offer Dummy variable that equals 1 when the acquisition is reported as a tender offer. 
Toehold Dummy variable that equals 1 when bidder owns target shares before takeover transaction. 
Competing Bid Dummy variable that equals 1 if the M&A deal involves multiple bidders.  
Cash Dummy variable that equals 1 if the M&A deal is paid fully with cash. 
Stock Dummy variable that equals 1 if the M&A deal is paid fully with stock. 
Diversification 
Dummy variable that equals 1 when the first two digits of the acquirer SIC are different from the first two digits of 
the target SIC. 
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Chapter 3: Social Connections, Reference Points and 
Acquisition Premium 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter introduces the social network theory into M&A studies and investigates 
the impact of social connections on takeover activities. Specifically, this chapter 
examines whether and how acquisition premium is affected by social linkage 
between acquirers and targets. 
Social network studies have attracted considerable interest from researchers and are 
increasingly applied to the area of corporate finance. Previous literature shows that 
social connections matter for firm performance and corporate decisions (Cohen et al., 
2008; Cooney et al., 2015; Engelberg et al., 2012; Hochberg et al., 2007; Mol, 2001; 
Myers & Majluf, 1984; Schoorman et al., 1981; Uzzi, 1999; Wasserman & Faust, 
1994). Firms with social connections mainly benefit from improvement in 
information. Social connection facilitates information-transferring between 
connected partners, and therefore reduces the cost of obtaining and processing 
information. In addition, social connections build trust beyond transactions and lead 
to familiarity bias as well as social conformity (Ishii & Xuan, 2014). As a 
consequence, firms tend to involve connected partners in their business. On the one 
hand, social connection improves firm performance and investment decisions due to 
enhanced information advantage. On the other hand, firms may lock connected 
partners in and neglect more favourable opportunities and outcomes. 
Recently, a growing body of literature has introduced the social network theory into 
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M&A studies and explored the impact of social connection on takeover outcomes. 
These studies emphasise the social ties between acquirers and targets and find mixed 
results in terms of the effects of social connection. On the one hand, acquirers with a 
social connection benefit from an information advantage and are better able to 
determine their targets’ true value. Therefore, acquirers connected with target firms 
have greater bargaining power and can therefore negotiate better deal items in 
takeover bids (Cai & Sevilir, 2012; Mol, 2001; Myers & Majluf, 1984; Schoorman et 
al., 1981). On the other hand, social connection could raise issues (Ishii & Xuan, 
2014), such as overtrust or familiarity bias (Cao, Han, Hirshleifer, & Zhang, 2009), 
social conformity (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004) and overconfidence of acquirer 
management (Roll, 1986), therefore increasing the likelihood of overpayment and 
leading to inefficient and unprofitable transactions. 
Motivated by the conflicting results, this chapter re-examines the social linkage 
between acquirers and targets and provides further evidence for the role of social 
connection in the takeover process and in acquisition performance. Specifically, this 
study concentrates on the relationship between acquirer-target connection and 
acquisition premium, which is defined as the offer price, as the log percentage 
difference from the target's share price four weeks before the M&A deal 
announcement (Baker et al., 2012). Additionally, this study investigates acquisition 
timing and the medium of payment as alternative evidence to explain the relationship 
between acquisition premium and social connection.  
Previous studies indicate that a premium is not only an important measurement for 
the market to evaluate takeover transactions for bidders and targets but also strongly 
influences merging firms’ financial situations and post-acquisition performance in 
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the short and even the long term (Alexandridis et al., 2013; Alexandridis, Mavrovitis, 
& Travlos, 2012; Ayers, Lefanowicz, & Robinson, 2003; Holmén, Nivorozhkin, & 
Rana, 2014; Schwert, 1996). More importantly, acquisition premium is directly and 
largely affected by the acquirer-target connection among the indicators for takeover 
outcomes since the premium best reflects the information advantage and bargaining 
power in the negotiations between acquirers and their targets. Hence, premium 
analysis could better verify the information hypothesis of social network studies. 
In addition, this chapter introduces a psychological reference point (Baker et al., 
2012) to examine what plays a determining role in target valuation and bid premium. 
According to Baker et al. (2012), both acquirers and targets regard a target’s 52-week 
high as a psychological reference point for target valuation and rely heavily on this 
psychological anchor when negotiating their offer premium. The target 52-week high 
is defined as the target’s highest stock price over the period from 365 days before to 
30 days before the takeover announcement, denoted as the log percentage difference 
of the target stock price 30 days before the takeover announcement. A higher target 
52-week high implies a higher bid premium, therefore increasing the possibility of 
overpayment. Such a significant and positive relationship has been widely confirmed 
by recent studies (Alexandridis et al., 2013; Betton et al., 2014). The target 52-week 
high is an important anchor for acquisition partners to value target firms and 
negotiate offer prices while acquirers with social connection may better acknowledge 
the true value of their target firm through personal networks and therefore have 
larger bargaining power during negotiations. By involving the reference point theory 
(Baker et al., 2012) as an additional testing framework, this study could better 
investigate whether acquisition premium is more affected by the acquirer’s social 
network or a psychological anchor. 
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In this chapter, two types of cross-firm connections are defined based on the 
BoardEx database: first-degree and second-degree connection. A first-degree 
connection refers to a situation in which a board director or executive serves on both 
acquiring and target firm boards during the deal announcement period, while a 
second-degree connection is defined when two individuals, respectively from the 
acquirer and the target firm, have social ties through past experience (such as 
employment history or educational background). 
To test the impact of social connection, this chapter uses a sample of 1,072 US M&A 
deals announced between January 1, 2001, and December 31, 2012, among which 
11.94% of all takeover transactions are connected on either a first-degree or 
second-degree basis, or both. In the univariate analysis, the existence of social 
connection reduces the premium by 5.54% relative to non-connected transactions. 
Especially in first-degree connected deals, acquiring firms pay on average 25.59% to 
targets, which is 16.98% less than the premium paid in takeovers with no connection. 
Next, this study introduces a reference point – target 52-week high – in the premium 
analysis. The average target 52-week high reference point is 2.40% higher in deals 
with a first-degree connection than in non-connected acquisitions. According to the 
reference point theory (Baker et al., 2012), a higher target 52-week high point 
implies a higher bid premium. Therefore, theoretically, first-degree connected deals 
are associated with a higher premium. In fact, however, the acquisition premium is 
16.98% less in first-degree connected transactions. Moreover, the full sample is 
divided into three groups based on the target 52-week reference point (low, medium, 
high). In the group with a low target 52-week reference point, acquirers with a 
first-degree connection paid 15.27% less than firms without a connection. The 
difference of premium is 36.64% between first-degree connected deals and 
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non-connected ones. 
These findings are further supported in the multivariate analysis. As a consequence, 
acquisition premium is negatively affected by social connection, particularly 
first-degree connection. The coefficients of first-degree connection are statistically 
significant at the 1% level, even with a target 52-week high controlled. When the 
sample is limited to connected deals, the strong and negative relationship remains 
between first-degree connection and premium while no significant relationship is 
observed between the target 52-week reference point and premium. The empirical 
results provide evidence to support the information hypothesis, which indicates that 
social connection facilitates information exchange and reduces information 
asymmetry between acquirers and targets. Therefore, acquiring firms that are 
socially linked to their targets are better able to estimate such targets’ true value and 
improve their own bargaining power, therefore paying lower acquisition premiums. 
In particular, this information advantage is strengthened for bidders with a 
first-degree connection, since acquirers would have better communication during 
negotiations, helping them to secure a much lower and more favourable offer 
premium. Furthermore, offer premium is not affected by a psychological reference 
point in the deal in which acquirers and targets are closely connected. Therefore, 
information advantage in social connection outweighs the reference point for 
acquisition partners and mainly determines the acquisition premium. 
The empirical results in the premium analysis imply that an acquirer-target 
connection benefits acquirers through a significantly lower premium. In addition, 
target firms with social ties are willing to accept less favourable deal items. This 
chapter then explores why social connection favours acquirers over targets by 
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examining pre-takeover board positions and post-takeover retention of connected 
directors. In first-degree connected deals, all connected directors remain seated in 
combined firms following acquisition. 29.27% of interlocking directors are recruited 
as the CEO or Chairman in acquirers while serving as independent or common 
directors in targets. These directors obtain more benefit and power from acquiring 
firms, therefore serving acquirers’ interests and resulting in significantly lower 
premia (11.49%). Acquisitions (60.98%) in which connected directors hold 
equivalent level positions in both the bidder and the target firm are associated with 
an average 17.62% premium – significantly lower than 88.76% premium in deals 
where directors hold higher positions in targets. This finding can be attributed to the 
larger relative acquirer size in deals where directors serve as same-level board 
members in acquisition partners. According to Ferris et al. (2003), directors in larger 
firms are more likely to receive board seats from outside firms. Meanwhile, external 
directorship provides directors with additional financial benefits, information and 
network sources. Therefore, connected directors have a self-incentive to assist with 
the completion of takeover deals and remain in the combined firm with a larger size. 
In deals with second-degree connections, acquirers that recruit connected target 
directors in the new board are more likely to pay a lower premium as a board seat in 
the combined firm is secured. Moreover, a board seat in combined firms certifies 
target directors’ quality and attracts directorship invitation from outside firms 
(Harford, 2003; H. Wang et al., 2010). Hence, target connected directors have strong 
self-incentive to accelerate the acquisition process and compromise on lower 
acquisition premium, resulting in deviation from target shareholders’ interest. 
For robustness check, social connections are reclassified according to CEO 
connections, in which either the acquirer or target CEOs connect the two merging 
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firms. Based on this definition, CEO connection is subdivided into CEO first-degree 
connection and CEO second-degree connection. Consequently, CEO connection 
(22.50% premium), and especially first-degree CEO connection (17.92% premium), 
significantly reduces the premium paid by acquirers. This finding can be attributed to 
more accurate information provided by target CEOs and their powerful role in 
decision-making, therefore providing further evidence to support the information 
hypothesis of social connection. 
Furthermore, acquirers could benefit from social connections by selecting favourable 
acquisition timing and method of payment as well as paying a lower premium. The 
results show that connected deals are more likely to be undertaken when acquirers’ 
stocks are overvalued. Bidders in connected transactions are prone to finance 
acquisitions with their overvalued stock. To some extent, the choice of takeover 
timing and payment method mitigate the actual value paid to targets. According to 
Fu et al. (2013), targets have an incentive to request a high premium when acquirers 
choose to pay for a deal with overvalued stock. However, targets with social ties are 
more likely to accept a takeover bid that is favourable to their acquirers. Therefore, 
acquisition timing and payment method also reflect the benefit of social connection 
for acquirers. 
This chapter contributes to the current literature in several ways. First, this study 
provides further evidence of social ties between acquirers and targets and verifies the 
information hypothesis in cross-firm connections while previous studies have drawn 
ambivalent conclusions regarding the impact of social connections on takeover 
activities. Unlike Cai and Sevilir (2012), who provide similar evidence, this chapter 
emphasises premium analysis and introduces the target 52-week high point, which is 
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an important psychological anchor for both acquirers and targets to price the target 
during negotiation (Baker et al., 2012). The empirical results show that target 
valuation and offer premium depend on the firm’s previous stock performance, 
operating and financial situation but are also largely affected by the invisible 
relations between acquirers and targets. Especially in first-degree connected deals, 
social connection significantly enhances acquirers’ bargaining power in negotiations 
and has a larger influence on the premium paid than the reference point. The 
information advantage outweighs the psychological reference point and is the main 
determinant of the acquisition premium. 
Another contribution is related to acquisition timing and method of payment. Few 
studies have considered the impact of social connection on the choice of takeover 
timing and payment method. In addition to Rhodes–Kropf, Robinson, and 
Viswanathan (2005) theoretical explanation of why targets accept bidders’ 
overvalued equity, the results show that the close bidder-target relationship plays an 
important role in explaining this fact. Renneboog and Zhao (2014) use a UK sample 
and demonstrate that connected deals are more likely to be paid with stocks, 
attributed to the board effect. This study employs a US sample and enriches the view 
by analysing the pre-announcement stock performance of both acquirers and targets. 
This chapter further contributes to the studies on corporate governance and 
directorship. The empirical results indicate that acquirer-target connections favour 
bidding firms over target firms and connected target firms are willing to accept less 
favourable deal items due to their self-interest. First degree-connected directors offer 
lower premiums if they hold more senior positions in the acquiring firms. In second 
degree-connected deals, a lower premium is offered to target firms if the target 
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director is retained in the new board of the merged entity. These results support the 
previous findings (Harford, 2003; H. Wang et al., 2010) that target directors would 
take priority of self-interest and compromise on acquisition premium at the cost of 
the targets’ shareholders’ interests in order to obtain a directorship in the combined 
firms. 
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the related literature; 
section 3.3 develops our hypotheses; Section 3.4 describes the data and 
methodological approach used; Section 3.5 presents the empirical results and the 
interpretation of the results. Finally, section 3.6 concludes the research. 
3.2 Literature review 
3.2.1 Measurement of Social Connections  
The definition of social connection has varied in recent research, leading to different 
outcomes. El-Khatib, Fogel, and Jandik (2015) adopt the CEO centrality factor to 
study the relationship between acquisitions and within-firm social connection. CEO 
centrality qualifies the strength and importance of the CEO within the top 
management in terms of performance, decision-making and dedication. Higher CEO 
centrality implies that the CEO plays a more essential and powerful role within the 
organisation. El-Khatib et al. (2015) identify that CEO centrality is negatively 
related to acquisition performance. 
Cai and Sevilir (2012) emphasise cross-firm social ties between acquirers and targets. 
They employ the EDGAR database and RiskMetrics Directors database and define 
two types of connections. First-degree connection, defined in this chapter, refers to 
situations where a board member serves on the boards of both the bidder and target 
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firms. A second-degree connection is classified when two individual board directors, 
respectively from acquiring and target firms, serve on the same board of a third party. 
Cai and Sevilir (2012) show that both connection types are associated with lower bid 
premiums and better M&A performance.   
Ishii and Xuan (2014) adopt the BoardEx database and focus on the educational and 
employment background of directors as well as senior executives. Different to Cai 
and Sevilir (2012), Ishii and Xuan (2014) measure social connection with a ratio of 
number of socially connected pairs over the number of total individual pairs between 
acquirers and targets. They find that the existence of an acquirer-target connection 
leads to inferior takeover outcomes and reduces the announcement return for 
acquirers and newly merged firms following acquisition. The advantage of this 
approach is that it accounts for different board sizes. Renneboog and Zhao (2014) 
analyse the influence of cross-firm connection (direct and indirect) in the UK market. 
They find that social connection generates a striking influence on the takeover 
process (for example, time to resolution, probability of success and payment method). 
However, their paper does not show a significant relationship between social 
connection and acquirer announcement return.  
3.2.2 Potential Impact of Social Connections 
Recent studies on social network indicate that the social connection has both a 
positive and a negative impact in corporate performance and investment decisions. 
The main benefit of inter-firm connection is information advantage. The presence of 
social connection facilitates information transfer and exchange via individual 
networks and therefore reduces the information asymmetry between firms. In 
addition, firms with a better social network could spend less in terms of cost and 
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effort to obtain and process information (Myers & Majluf, 1984). A considerable 
number of studies confirms the existence of information advantage in social 
networks. For example, Uzzi (1999) suggests that firms that are socially linked with 
middle-market banking have a lower cost of capital than those without a social 
connection. Engelberg et al. (2012) find that commercial banks deliver more 
favourable financing terms to connected firms due to the improved information and 
monitoring arising from that connection, including a lower interest rate, higher credit 
ratings and better stock performance. 
However, Ishii and Xuan (2014) show that social connection has a negative effect on 
takeover activities due to issues of over-trust, familiarity bias and social conformity. 
Social connection via an individual network builds trust beyond single business 
transactions and has a longer duration. Yet, over-trust leads to inefficient 
decision-making, resulting in inferior firm performance. Additionally, management 
(senior executives or directors) may over-trust the information they obtain through 
their personal network and overestimate the information quality as well as their 
power of control. Therefore, social connection may lead to the CEO hubris problem 
(Roll, 1986) and therefore negatively affect deal outcomes. Moreover, social 
connection may raise the issue of familiarity bias, which refers to the situation where 
individuals prefer to maintain the status quo and select familiar firms in terms of 
their investment decisions. Therefore, firm management with social connections may 
give priority to familiar partners and neglect better business opportunities beyond 
their individual networks, therefore resulting in less favourable investment decisions. 
Another issue raised in social connections is social conformity, which implies that 
individuals prefer to follow the decisions of the group rather than put forward their 
personal opinions (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004). Similarly, social conformity may 
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lead to inefficient decision-making and poor firm performance.  
3.2.3 Social Connections and M&A 
Recently, the impact of social connection in mergers and acquisitions has attracted 
considerable attention from researchers. Cai and Sevilir (2012) address the board 
connection between acquiring firms and target firms and investigate its impact on 
acquisition performance. Social connection is divided into first-degree connection 
and second-degree connection. A first-degree connection is defined as a director 
having overlapping seats concurrently on the board of the acquirer and of the target 
before the takeover announcement. A second-degree connection refers to two 
individual board members, respectively from the bidder and the target, serving on the 
same board of a third entity before the takeover announcement. The findings show 
that social connection significantly increases the announcement return for acquirers 
and the combined entity. Moreover, bidders with a first-degree connection pay a 
lower acquisition premium and transaction cost, measured by total investment bank 
fees. Second-degree connection improves the operating performance of combined 
firms in the long run. The results confirm the information advantage hypothesis that 
social connection facilitates information exchange and reduces information 
asymmetry as well as agency conflicts between connected firms, therefore leading to 
value-created and favourable deals. Acquirers benefit from social connections with 
targets and have better access to target true value and have an information advantage 
over the potential competitors for the takeover bid. However, Cai and Sevilir (2012) 
do not explain why connections between bidders and targets only benefit bidding 
firms. One therefore asks if only acquirers benefit from board connections, why are 
target firms willing to accept less favourable deal items? 
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Ishii and Xuan (2014) provide opposite evidence and indicate that social connections 
have a negative impact on takeover outcomes. In their research, connections are built 
on the same educational or employment background of board directors and 
executives between acquirers and targets. Social connection is measured with a ratio 
of the number of socially connected pairs over the number of total individual pairs 
between acquirers and targets. Contrary to Cai and Sevilir (2012), the findings show 
that socially linked deals do not maximise shareholders’ value of merging parties. 
Social ties, especially extensive connections, reduce the announcement return of 
acquiring firms and combined entities. However, social connection benefits acquirers’ 
and targets’ management. The existence of social connection significantly increases 
the retention probability of the target CEO, board director and connected individuals 
while acquirer CEOs are rewarded based on the successful takeover of connected 
targets. Moreover, acquisitions are more likely to occur between socially connected 
acquisition partners. Due to their inferior performance, these transactions with social 
ties are more likely to be divested. Overall, the results reveal that social ties between 
acquirers and targets worsen agency problems (between management and 
shareholders) in merger parties and weaken the disciplinary role of takeover activity, 
leading to inferior takeover decisions and underperformance in short run. 
Renneboog and Zhao (2014) use the sample of UK acquisitions and investigate the 
impact of board connection, which is defined when acquirers and targets share 
overlapping directors. The results do not show a strong relationship between social 
connection and short-run acquisition performance. However, acquirers with a better 
board network are more likely to initiate acquisition attempts for connected targets. 
Social connections between merger parties are associated with a higher probability 
of deal completion, shorter deal duration and stock used as the payment method. 
109 
Moreover, social ties increase the retention rate of target directors who do not have 
seats on the acquirers’ board prior to the takeover announcement. These findings 
support the information hypothesis in social network theory and indicate that social 
connection facilitates negotiations between acquisition partners and improves the 
efficiency of the takeover process by increasing the probability of deal 
consummation and reducing the time required to complete transactions. 
3.3 Hypotheses 
In this section, hypotheses are developed based on the main theory of social 
networks and M&A studies. Previous studies show that social connections have 
different effects on takeover outcomes. The social connection enables information 
transfer through personal networks and reduces information asymmetry between 
merging firms. Acquirers connected with targets have an information advantage and 
have better access (Mol, 2001) to the target’s information, including non-public 
information. Therefore, social connection enables bidders to better acknowledge the 
true value of targets and therefore enhances acquirers’ bargaining power in the 
negotiation process (Cai & Sevilir, 2012; Schoorman et al., 1981). Acquirers with 
connections are more likely to pay a lower acquisition premium due to information 
advantages (Myers & Majluf, 1984). Therefore, this chapter formulates the following 
hypothesis that: 
H1: Acquirers in connected deals pay lower premiums than acquirers in 
non-connected deals. 
According to Baker et al. (2012), both acquiring and target firms regard the target 
52-week high as a reference for the premium paid or received in the negotiation. In 
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general, the settlement of a takeover deal should be approved by target shareholders, 
management and bidding firms. For the majority of target shareholders, calculating 
firm valuation is a complex and time-consuming task, which requires detailed 
information and accurate forecast of targets. Therefore, target shareholders would 
search for an easily available benchmark for pricing the target. Target 52-week high 
price is a recent peak price that the target firm has achieved before the takeover 
announcement and may be attained or exceeded in the future. Target 52-week high is 
easily obtained and widely cited in the financial media, and therefore can be used as 
a reference point for target valuation. For target managements, using target 52-week 
high price as a negotiation anchor would save time and effort in estimating firm 
valuation and communicating with shareholders. For acquiring firms, information 
shortage makes it more difficult to value and negotiate with target firms; therefore, 
acquirers would anchor target recent peak price in order to settle the M&A 
transaction. 
However, social connection could alter the target valuation and negotiation for 
acquisition partners. The presence of inter-firm connection facilitates information 
transfer and exchange via individual networks and therefore reduces the information 
asymmetry between firms (Myers & Majluf, 1984). In M&A deals, social connection, 
especially first-degree connection, brings a major information advantage to the 
acquiring firm. Connected acquirers have better access (Mol, 2001) to the target’s 
information, which is more detailed, accurate and current information than the target 
52-week high
17
 for valuing the target firm. Since information is the main driver of 
                                                 
17 By definition, 52-week high is the peak price that the target reached at least 1 month before acquisition. Target 
valuation at takeover announcement may derive from the peak price. Therefore, target value estimated on the 
basis of peak price (target 52-week high) may not be accurate. 
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lower premiums paid to target firms, closely connected bidders are more likely to 
pay lower premiums. Moreover, bidder-acquirer connection greatly improves the 
acquirers’ bargaining power (Cai & Sevilir, 2012; Schoorman et al., 1981) and 
weakens the effect of target reference point on premium. Therefore, we hypothesise 
that 
H2: After controlling for the 52-week high reference point, first-degree connected 
bidders pay lower premiums than non-connected bidders. 
Following Baker et al. (2012), target 52-week high reference point is computed as 
the log percentage difference of the target's 52-week high share price over the share 
price four weeks before the M&A deal announcement. Higher target reference point 
indicates a larger gap between target peak price and recent stock price prior to 
takeover announcement, therefore implying a higher likelihood of overpayment. 
Therefore, by anchoring high reference points (peak price of target firms), bidders 
are more likely to pay a higher premium and are more likely to deviate from the 
target’s true value. Acquirers with first-degree connections have better access to 
target true value and better bargaining power in the negotiation, therefore pay 
reasonable lower offer price in deals with higher target reference point. However, a 
lower target 52-week high represents a smaller difference between peak price in the 
last 52 weeks and recent share price. Anchoring low quantile of target 52-week high 
for premium is associated with low premium and less likelihood of overpayment. 
The additional information brought by connection may have less influence in 
reducing the amount of premium. Therefore, we expected that  
H3: The lower premiums paid by connected bidders should be more pronounced 
when the target 52-week reference point is high. 
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First-degree connections should have a stronger impact. Evidently, a first-degree 
connection is a much closer and tighter social tie for merging firms than a 
second-degree connection. A first-degree connection represents a more direct and 
efficient linkage between acquisition partners since acquirers and targets share the 
same directors or executives. Therefore, the closer connection magnifies the 
information advantage that acquirers obtain, resulting in more discounted premiums. 
Therefore, this chapter formulates the hypothesis that: 
H4: Acquirers in first-degree connected deals pay lower premiums than bidding 
firms in second-degree connected deals. 
CEO connection is more efficient in affecting acquisition premium than board 
connection. The information provided by target CEOs is more accurate, since they 
have better access to their firm’s state of operation and financial situation. Therefore, 
acquirers with social ties with target CEOs have a greater information advantage and 
bargaining power during negotiations. Due to CEOs’ more powerful and more 
essential role in decision-making (El-Khatib et al., 2015), the impact of CEO 
connection is expected to be more pronounced. Hence, this chapter establishes the 
hypothesis as follows: 
H5: Acquirers with CEO connections, especially a CEO first-degree connection, pay 
lower premiums than acquirers with a board connection. 
Shleifer and Vishny (2003) argue that bidders benefit when they use their overvalued 
equity as a method of payment. The question is, why are targets willing to accept 
bidders’ overvalued equity? Rhodes–Kropf et al. (2005) develop a theoretical model 
based on market, industry and firm-specific misevaluations to explain why targets 
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accept bidders’ overvalued equity. The close bidder-target relationship could help 
explain this phenomenon from a different perspective. In connected deals, a target’s 
management is likely to accept less favourable items and promote deal completion 
due to their self-interest, such as retaining their seat on the board of the newly 
merged firm. A board seat in a combined firm certifies the director’s quality and 
brings financial and non-financial benefits for them (Harford, 2003; H. Wang et al., 
2010). Therefore, connected directors or executives may derive the interest of target 
firms and accept less favourable deal items. We therefore establish the following 
hypothesis:   
H6: Acquirers in connected deals are more likely to finance acquisitions with stock. 
3.4 Data 
3.4.1 Data and selection criteria 
The data is gathered from different sources. This study collects US takeover deal 
information over the period from 1
st
 January 2001 to 31
st
 December 2012 from the 
Thomson One database. The reason why the timeframe starts from 2001 is because 
there is insufficient data on US firms before 2000 in the BoardEx database. The 
original sample contains 83,438 deals. Due to the data available, this chapter focuses 
on public transactions where both acquirers and targets are quoted, leaving 3,610 
observations. Moreover, this study only includes deals of at least $10 million, which 
narrows the sample to 2,810 deals. In addition, this study only considers takeover 
deals with a transfer of control, which therefore limits the sample to transactions in 
which the acquirer obtained more than 50% ownership of the target. A further 842 
observations were excluded due to missing information in the COMPUSTAT and 
114 
CRSP databases, which gave a final full sample of 1,072 takeover transactions. 
Next, this chapter adopts social connection information from BoardEx, which 
provides the biographical information, individual network and relationship data of 
board directors and executives. Recently, the BoardEx database has been widely 
employed in studies on social network (for example, (Engelberg et al., 2012; Ishii & 
Xuan, 2014; Renneboog & Zhao, 2014). The connection between acquisition 
partners is manually checked and collected with the Point-to-Point tool in BoardEx. 
The classification of social connections is based on BoardEx, including first-degree 
connection and second-degree connection. A first-degree connection is defined when 
executives or directors serve in both the acquirer’s and the target’s board at takeover 
announcement while a second-degree connection refers to a situation where two 
individuals, respectively from the acquirer and target firms, share the same past 
experience, such as educational background or employment history. 
As a consequence, the full sample consists of 128 deals with a social connection and 
944 deals with no connection. The connected deals include 41 first degree-connected 
deals, where a first-degree connection exists between merging firms, and 87 second 
degree-connected deals, in which only second-degree connected transactions are 
included. Furthermore, the socially connected deals are reclassified into 53 
CEO-connected deals, in which either the acquirer CEO or the target CEO links the 
bidding and target firms, and 111 board-connected deals, in which an acquirer board 
member is the connection between the merging firms. Specifically, there are 24 
first-degree CEO-connected deals where the CEO in the bidding or target firm serves 
as an executive, and 29 second-degree CEO-connected deals, in which the acquirer 
or target CEOs share the same past experience with board members or executives in 
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the other merging firm. Likewise, deals with a board connection include 30 
first-degree board-connected deals, in which acquirer board members also serve on 
the target’s board, and 81 second-degree board-connected deals, in which the 
acquirer board members have social ties with target board members through past 
experience. 
3.4.2 Sample 
[Insert Table 3.1About Here] 
The sample consists of 1,072 US takeover deals announced between 2001 and 2012. 
Table 3.1 presents the distribution of takeover deals by year (Panel A) and by 
industry of the acquiring firms (Panel B) for the full sample, connected deals and 
non-connected deals. In Panel A, the number of takeover deals gradually decreases 
from 2001 to 2012. The highest proportion of connected deals in the full sample fall 
within 2007 to 2009 during the financial crisis (17.20% for 2007; 16.44% for 2008; 
20.63% for 2009). Panel B shows the number and percentage of takeover deals 
classified by industry of acquiring firms. Industries are classified using the 12 
Fama-French classifications. In general, the majority of takeover deals occur in the 
finance, business equipment and healthcare industries. In the chemicals and utilities 
industries, the percentage of connected deals is 35.71% and 39.13%, respectively, 
which is the highest among all of the industries. 
[Insert Table 3.2 About Here] 
Table 3.2 reports the descriptive statistics for the firm and deal characteristics of the 
full sample, the connected deals and the non-connected transactions. The variable 
definitions and data sources are listed in Appendix A. In the deals where acquirers 
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and targets are socially connected, bidding firms have a higher return on assets 
(ROA) than acquirers in non-connected deals, implying that acquirers in connected 
deals have higher pre-takeover profitability. In addition, the acquirers and targets are 
significantly larger in size in connected deals, leading to a larger transaction value. 
More importantly, connected deals are associated with significantly lower premiums 
and stock being used as the medium of payment, which preliminarily supports the 
information hypothesis. 
3.5 Empirical Results 
3.5.1 Impact of Social Connections and Target 52-week Reference Point on 
Acquisition Premiums 
The presence of cross-firm connections has a two-fold impact on acquisition 
premiums. On the one hand, the information hypothesis illustrates that bidders could 
benefit from social connections by paying lower premiums due to their better 
understanding of their targets’ true value and improved bargaining power during 
negotiations. On the other hand, social connection between merging firms could lead 
to overpayment on account of acquirer CEOs’ overconfidence, overtrust, familiarity 
bias and social conformity. Due to the ambiguous influence on the premium, this 
chapter re-examines the relationship between social connections and acquisition 
premiums. More importantly, this study introduces the reference point theory (Baker 
et al., 2012), which states that both acquiring and target firms determine and adjust 
acquisition premiums by being anchored by the target’s past price as a reference 
point. Therefore, this study adopts the reference point – target 52-week high – in the 
premium analysis to explore whether the premium is more sensitive to cross-firm 
connections than to the reference point. 
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3.5.1.1 Univariate analysis 
In Table 3.3, the offer premium for connected deals is on average 37.02%, -5.54% 
less than the premium paid in non-connected deals. Bidding firms with first-degree 
connections pay the lowest premiums (25.59%) at 16.98% less than the premium in 
non-connected deals. In second-degree connected transactions, bidding firms still 
pay 0.15% less than firms in non-connected deals. The findings preliminarily 
illustrate that the existence of a social connection reduces the bid premium paid to 
the target. 
[Insert Table 3.3 About Here] 
Remarkably, the target 52-week high in first-degree connected deals is 84.98% – the 
second highest value in the entire sample and 29.80% larger than in deals with a 
second-degree connection. According to Baker et al. (2012), target 52-week high is 
significantly and positively associated with bid premiums; therefore, acquirers with a 
first-degree connection should have paid higher premiums to their targets. However, 
acquirers in first-degree connected deals pay the lowest premium at 25.59%, which 
is 16.83% less than in second-degree connected deals. The findings so far suggest 
that first-degree connection seems to have a large impact on premium and is not 
affected by the target 52-week high. 
[Insert Table 3.4 About Here] 
In Table 3.4, the full sample is split into three quantiles (low, medium, high) on the 
basis of target 52-week high. The takeover deals in the high quantile are related with 
a higher level of target 52-week high and are expected to involve a higher offer 
premium, therefore implying a higher possibility of overpayment (Baker et al., 2012). 
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By contrast, acquirers in the low quantile of target 52-week high are expected to pay 
a lower premium and therefore be less likely to overpay for deals. In each quantile, 
the acquisition sample is further divided into the non-connected and connected deal 
subsamples (including first-degree and second-degree connected deals). 
Except for the first-degree connected deals, the acquisition premium increases 
progressively from the low quantile to the high quantile, which indicates an 
incremental potential of overpayment (Baker et al., 2012). For each quantile, 
connected deals have lower average premiums than non-connected deals, and the 
difference is -8.98% in the low quantile and -6.22% in the high. Moreover, the 
premium paid in the highly connected deals (first-degree connection) is 36.64% less 
than the premium in non-connected deals, in the highest quantile of the target 
52-week high. Overall, connected acquirers pay less, and acquiring firms with a 
close connection (first-degree connection) spend less than bidders with weak 
connections (second-degree connection). These findings are consistent with the 
hypothesis, indicating that social connection, especially first-degree connection, 
reduces the acquisition premium due to acquirers’ information advantage in socially 
connected deals, and does not seem to be affected by the target’s 52-week high 
reference point. The premium paid in first-degree connected deals is reduced as the 
target 52-week high increases, suggesting that the reference point is not the main 
determinant of the premium in first-degree connected deals. 
3.5.1.2 Multivariate analysis 
This chapter further proceeds with multivariate premium analysis to test the 
robustness of the previous finding. In Table 3.5, acquisition premium is regressed 
against connection dummy variables (including variables for any connection, 
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first-degree connection and second-degree connection) which equal one if the 
acquirers and targets are socially connected, and zero otherwise. Moreover, the target 
52-week high is introduced to signify the psychological anchor and detect potential 
overpayment in transactions. Following Baker et al. (2012), target 52-week high is 
computed as the log percentage difference of the targets’ 52-week high and their 
target price 30 days before the announcement. The study also controls common 
variables in previous M&A studies, such as Tobin’s Q (Officer, 2003; Schwert, 2000), 
leverage (Schwert, 2000), return on assets, and size of acquirer (Moeller et al., 2004) 
in terms of firm characteristics. Variables for deal characteristics consist of relative 
size of deal (Moeller et al., 2004), payment method, deal attitude (Schwert, 2000), 
and whether the bid involves multiple bidders (Walkling & Edmister, 1985). 
Additionally, both year and industry fixed effects are included in the regressions. 
[Insert Table 3.5 About Here] 
In Models 1 and 2, connection, and in Models 5 and 6, first-degree connection is 
significantly and negatively associated with acquisition premiums. Consistent with 
the hypothesis, the result shows that social connection, particularly first-degree 
connection, facilitates information exchange, reduces the information asymmetry 
between merging firms and enhances the bargaining power of acquirers, therefore 
leading to lower premiums. In addition, the strong negative relation between 
premiums and connections, especially for first-degree connections, remains robust in 
Models 3, 4, 7 and 8, even after controlling for the target 52-week high. Model 4 
shows that acquirers with a social connection pay 15.06% lower premiums than 
those with no connection (the coefficient is -0.1506, significant at 10%). In particular, 
the coefficient for the first-degree connection is -0.6006 in Model 8, significantly 
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different from zero at the 1% level. These findings demonstrate that the negative 
impact of first-degree connection is not weakened by the anchoring effect (target 
52-week high reference point) in terms of acquisition premium. Social connection, 
especially first-degree connection, greatly improves the information advantage for 
acquirers and transfers both public and private information via individual networks. 
Acquirers that are socially linked with targets obtain more information and rely less 
on target 52-week high to value target firms and negotiate acquisition premium.  
However, the relationship between second-degree connection and premium is 
insignificant in all models. These findings are in accordance with Cai and Sevilir 
(2012), who suggest that targets in higher-connection deals obtain lower premiums. 
The results can be explained by the greater information advantage associated with 
first-degree connections. Having a close connection with a target means that 
acquirers benefit from more accurate target information and enhance their bargaining 
power in the negotiation process. 
Consistent with Baker et al. (2012), 52-week high is shown to carry significant and 
positive coefficients in all the regression models. The findings confirm that higher 
target 52-week highs result in higher acquisition premiums paid to targets. Moreover, 
the increase in relative deal size decreases acquisition premium, in line with 
Alexandridis et al. (2013). The negative relation could be attributed to lower 
competition for large takeover transactions (Gorton, Kahl, & Rosen, 2009), leading 
to a less pronounced “winner’s curse” (Alexandridis, Petmezas, & Travlos, 2010) 
and less overpayment to targets (Alexandridis et al., 2013). 
To further disentangle the effect between connections and the target 52-week 
reference point, the full sample is divided into three quantiles (low, medium, high) 
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according to the target 52-week reference points. The study then re-examines the 
relationship between acquisition premium and social connection in the subsample of 
low/high target 52-week high in Table 3.6. In Models 1 and 2, the dependent variable 
is the connection variable. In Models 3 and 4, the acquisition premium is regressed 
against first-degree and second-degree connection. 
[Insert Table 3.6 About Here] 
In Table 3.6, the relationship between premium and connection, especially 
first-degree connection, is more negative and significant in the subsample of high 
target 52-week highs than in the group with low target 52-week highs. In Model 4, 
the coefficient for first-degree connection is -0.7753 in the high quantile and 
significant at the 1% level, while the coefficient in the low quantile is -0.4770 and 
statistically insignificant. As expected in the third hypothesis, first-degree connection 
has more pronounced effects in the deals with higher target 52-week high reference 
points. Higher target 52-week high
18
 represents a larger gap between the peak price 
and recent price of target firms. Compared with low target 52-week high, high 
52-week high is more likely to deviate from target true value, resulting in higher 
premium being paid. However, acquirers with social connection, particularly 
first-degree connection, could estimate firm value more accurately and negotiate a 
reasonable price due to the information advantage. Therefore, the negative impact of 
connection, particularly first-degree connection, is more pronounced and stronger in 
deals with a high reference point. In the low quantile of reference points, target 
52-week high deviates less from target true valuation. Acquirers are less likely to 
                                                 
18 Following Baker et al. (2012), target 52-week high is computed as the log percentage difference 
between 52-week high price, the recent peak price that target firms achieved, and target price at 4 
weeks before the takeover announcement. 
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overpay by anchoring a low target 52-week high. Therefore, information advantage 
brought by the first-degree connection has the limited effect of further reducing the 
acquisition premium. Therefore, social connection, particularly first-degree 
connection, has more pronounced effects in premium when the target 52-week high 
reference point is higher. Hence, information is the main driver for the acquisition 
premium relative to anchoring, as captured by the reference point of the target 
52-week high. 
3.5.1.3 Why do director connections favour acquirers, and why do targets accept 
lower premiums? 
The findings presented so far indicate that acquiring firms take over connected 
targets at a lower premium, especially when the acquirer and target boards share the 
same directors. According to the agency theory, directors are recruited to represent 
shareholders’ interests and act as a monitoring device. While directors are in general 
influenced by the target 52-week high, in socially connected deals, managers are less 
influenced by the reference point and accept a significantly lower acquisition 
premium. In this section, this research explores the incentive of why directors are 
more likely to favour the acquirer and why target boards are willing to be acquired 
with a low offer premium. 
[Insert Table 3.7 About Here] 
In first-degree connected deals, Table 3.7 shows that all interlocking directors who 
served in both the acquirer and the target firm continue to stay in the new board of 
combined firms after the acquisition, since interlocking directors have better 
acknowledgement and understanding in both acquirers and targets and therefore 
could facilitate and accelerate the post-merger integration process (Y. Li & Aguilera, 
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2008). In first-degree connected deals, the chapter classifies interlocking directors’ 
board positions both in the acquirer and target firm into the following categories: 
CEO, Chairman, independent director or common director. According to the 
importance and influence in corporate decisions of these positions, two levels of 
importance are defined. The first level includes the CEO and Chairman roles while 
the second refers to the common director and independent director. Higher-level 
positions for acquirers (targets) indicate that the interlocking director holds a more 
important position in the acquirer (target) than in the target (acquirer) respectively 
while the same level position indicates that directors serve at the same level in both 
acquisition partners. The empirical results show that 29.27% of connected directors 
hold higher positions and have more power in the acquiring firms than in the targets, 
and 60.98% of interlocking directors have the same board position level in the 
acquirer and target. Only around 10% of the interlocking directors were found to 
hold more important positions in the target firm than in the acquirer. Panel A of Table 
3.7 shows that on average the acquisition premium is 11.49% when the director 
holds a higher and more powerful position in the acquirer while the acquisition 
premium is 88.76% when directors hold a higher-level board seat in the target, 
indicating that directors favour the firms in which they dominate. The acquisition 
premium is on average 17.62% in takeover deals in which a director acts at the same 
level of board position in both acquisition partners, indicating that directors are 
prone to protecting acquirers’ interests. The multivariate analysis results in Panel C 
of Table 3.7 further enhance this conclusion. 
In second-degree connected deals, target directors share the same experience 
(education, employment, others) with acquirer directors. In general, few target 
directors can continue to serve in the new board after takeovers are completed 
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(Harford, 2003). However, in second-degree connected deals, 42.53% (37/87) of 
target connected directors are retained in the board of the combined firm following 
takeover deals, implying that social connections with the acquirer’s board play an 
essential role in determining whether target directors stay or leave. Moreover, 
acquirers which retain target connected directors pay a lower acquisition premium 
(39.72%), implying that target directors may put their personal interests above those 
of their firms’ shareholders. These results are presented in Panel B of Table 3.7. 
Harford (2003) documents that target boards would resist a takeover bid or charge a 
high acquisition premium to compensate them for any financial, information or 
network loss due to the loss of a directorship. Similarly, H. Wang et al. (2010) 
provide evidence that target directors sacrifice shareholders’ interest and accept a 
lower acquisition premium in exchange for a directorship in the combined firms. 
Moving to the board of the combined firm would signal the high quality and 
expertise of that director, resulting in more job opportunities in the labour market. 
For retained directors, accepting a low acquisition premium can be regarded as 
protecting future shareholders’ interest. The multivariate analysis results in Panel C 
further support our finding that retaining connected directors is associated with a low 
acquisition premium and confirm that connected board directors in target firms have 
a strong self-incentive to complete acquisitions even at the cost of shareholder 
interest.  
3.5.2 Endogeneity test  
In this section, the two-stage-least-square (2SLS) procedure is adopted to address 
possible endogeneity problems concerning bid premium. In order to avoid 
correlation between independent variables and the residuals in OLS regressions, the 
125 
instrumental variables (IVs) are associated with the explanatory variables and not 
affected by error components in the models. Specifically, this instrument determines 
whether a social connection existed between acquirers and targets three years before 
the announcement as merging parties generally do not prepare takeover bids three 
years in advance. However, a social connection built previously may have been 
ongoing for years. Therefore, connection formed previously may be related to a 
social network during takeover announcement, but have no direct effect on takeover 
transactions. 
[Insert Table 3.8 About Here] 
Herein, this study employs connections three years before the announcement as the 
instrumental variable for connection in previous OLS regressions, first-degree 
connections built three years before the announcement and second-degree 
connections built three years before the announcement. Table 3.8 presents both the 
first and second stages for the endogeneity test. Year and industry fixed effects are 
controlled in all models. Target 52-week high is included in Models 2 and 4. The 
endogeneity results lead to similar conclusions as the previous sections. Table 3.8 
shows a negative impact of social connection, especially first-degree connection, on 
acquisition premium. The coefficient for first-degree connection is negative and 
statistically significant at 1%, even with the target 52-week high controlled in Model 
4. Moreover, the research proceeds with the Hausman test to further check the 
endogeneity when the independent variable is connection (any connection), 
first-degree connection and second-degree connection. The null hypothesis for the 
Hausman test is that the connection variable is exogenous. The p-value of the 
Hausman test is 0.5299 when connection (any connection) is the regressor, while the 
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p-value is 0.1681 when first-degree connection and second-degree connection are the 
independent variables. Therefore, the study cannot reject the null hypothesis that 
connection variables are exogenous. 
3.5.3 Alternative Proxy for Social Connection 
El-Khatib et al. (2015) look at CEO centrality to study the relationship between 
acquisitions and within-firm social connections; they show that takeover activities 
are strongly influenced by CEO centrality. CEOs with higher centrality negatively 
affect acquisition performance. CEO centrality qualifies the strength and importance 
of a CEO within top management in terms of their performance, decision-making 
power and dedication. Higher CEO centrality implies that a CEO plays a more 
essential and powerful role within their organisation. Therefore, this chapter employs 
an alternative proxy related to CEO for connectedness between acquirers and targets 
as a robustness analysis for takeover premium. The cross-firm connection is 
reclassified into only CEO connections. Specifically, CEO connections refer to 
instances when the acquirer or target CEO acts as a go-between for the bidding firms 
and targets. CEO connections are further split into CEO first-degree connections, in 
which the acquirer (target) CEO also works as a target (acquirer) board or 
management member, and CEO second-degree connections where the acquirer or 
target CEO shares the same past experience with board members or executives in the 
counterparty. 
Table 3.9 reports the relationship between acquisition premium and CEO connection, 
including first-degree and second-degree connection. The reference point – target 
52-week high is included in Models 2 and 4. In Models 5 and 6, the full sample is 
split into three quantiles (low, medium, high) to analyse the impact of CEO 
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connection on acquisition premium in the subsample of low/high target 52-week 
highs. Both year and industry fixed effects are controlled in all models. This study 
also tests all models without year and industry effects and finds the same results; the 
results remain robust. 
[Insert Table 3.9 About Here] 
In Table 3.9, the coefficient for CEO connection is -0.3543, significant at 5%, while 
the coefficient for CEO first-degree connection is -0.7545, significant at 1% with 
target 52-week high controlled. The findings suggest that acquisition premium is 
markedly reduced by CEO connection, especially first-degree connection. In Models 
5 and 6, the coefficients for the CEO connection variable are more negative and 
significant when the takeover deals are in the high quantile of target 52-week high. 
The coefficient for CEO first-degree connection is -0.5519 (insignificant) in the 
subsample of low target 52-week highs, while the coefficient is -1.0470 (significant 
at 1%) in the subsample of high target 52-week highs. The results reveal that CEO 
connection, especially first degree, is more pronounced in the high reference point 
subsample. This indicates that CEOs with connections, especially first-degree 
connections, are not anchored by the target’s reference point and indeed pay lower 
premiums. 
3.5.4 Acquisition Timing and the Method of Payment 
Previous findings indicate that acquirers could benefit from social connections and 
the consequent higher information advantage they provide by paying lower 
premiums to targets. In this section, the chapter further explores whether bidders 
could exploit this information advantage and the close relationships they have with 
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target firms in other aspects. This study investigates whether connected bidders 
attempt to time their acquisition, and whether this would have an effect on the 
method of payment.  
3.5.4.1  Acquisition Timing 
The study first analyses the takeover timing from the perspective of 
pre-announcement stock movements of bidders. Acquirer stock run-up is defined as 
the bidders’ buy-and-hold returns over the period starting 200 trading days and 
ending 2 months prior to the deal announcement (Cai & Sevilir, 2012). 
[Insert Table 3.10 About Here] 
Table 3.10 tabulates the average acquirer stock run-up in non-connected deals and 
connected deals, including first-degree and second-degree connections. The acquirer 
pre-announcement run-up is positive and salient in all samples. The acquirers in 
connected deals have, on average, 16.43% run-up, while the acquirer run-up is 8.88% 
in non-connected deals. Moreover, the difference in price run-up is 7.55% and 
significantly different from zero. In first-degree connected deals, the acquirer run-up 
reaches 28.44% – far greater than the run-up in the rest of the samples. The 
difference in run-up in non-connected deals is 19.56%, significant at the 1% level. 
However, the acquirers’ run-up in second-degree connected deals is slightly larger 
than the run-up in non-connected takeovers. The findings show that acquirers with 
social connections are more likely to take over targets when their pre-announcement 
stock value is higher, and particularly bidders with a first-degree connection. High 
acquirer run-up is an indicator of overvaluation. This indicates that connected 
acquirers are likely to time their acquisitions and proceed when their stock is 
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overvalued. The natural question that arises, and is explored in the following section, 
is whether connected acquirers are more likely to finance their deals using their 
stock. 
3.5.4.2 Method of Payment 
The previous section demonstrates that acquirer pre-announcement run-up is higher 
when acquiring firms are socially connected with their targets. According to previous 
research, acquirers are more likely to finance takeovers with stock when their stock 
is overvalued. In this section, this chapter employs logit regression and examines the 
payment method in deals with a social connection. The dependent variable is a stock 
dummy, which is equal to one if deals are fully paid using stock. The explanatory 
variables include connection (any type), first-degree connection and second-degree 
connection. The models also include the other control variables: year fixed effect and 
industry fixed effect. 
In Table 3.11, all of the models show a marked relationship between the medium of 
payment and the variables representing connection. The first three models explore 
the influence of connection on payment method. The coefficients for connection are 
all positive and salient, implying that bidders in connected deals are prone to 
financing their bids with their own stock. The second and third groups illustrate that 
stock deals are positively related to first- and second-degree connections, significant 
at the 1% level. Moreover, the coefficients for first-degree connection are greater 
than those for second-degree connections, indicating that a closer connection has a 
bigger impact on the choice of payment medium. Therefore, acquirers with a 
first-degree connection tend to choose stock to pay for takeover activities. 
130 
[Insert Table 3.11 About Here] 
As a consequence, acquirers with a social connection are prone to take over targets 
using stock when their stock is overvalued. Fu et al. (2013) indicate that targets have 
an incentive to request higher premiums when acquirers pay for takeover deals with 
overvalued shares. However, targets with a cross-firm connection are likely to accept 
a low premium from the acquirers, indicating that the social connection enhances 
acquirers’ bargaining power and smooths the communication and negotiation 
processes. Besides a low premium paid, acquirers also benefit from social 
connection by selecting favourable acquisition timing and payment methods. 
Likewise, the target 52-week high generates a positive influence on payment method. 
A higher target 52-week high implies a higher bid premium, and stock payment 
could save acquirers more when their equity is overvalued. Therefore, target 
52-week high is positively associated with acquisition premium. Consistent with 
Renneboog and Zhao (2014), the findings show that smaller-sized bidders tend to 
finance takeover bids with stocks. 
3.6 Conclusion 
With a US sample from 2001 to 2012, this chapter examines the influence of 
cross-firm social connections on acquisition premium during takeover activities. The 
empirical findings support the view that bidding firms with social connections with 
targets pay lower acquisition premiums. The savings in premiums would be larger 
when the two merging firms share the same board member or executives (that is, a 
first-degree social connection). To disentangle whether social connections are more 
related to better information flow or a familiarity bias, this study introduces the 
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reference point theory (Baker et al., 2012) as an additional testing framework. 
Acquirers in first-degree connected deals would rely more on information 
advantages to value a target rather than psychological reference point — the target 
52-week high. The impact of first-degree connection is more pronounced when 
target 52-week high reference point is higher. Moreover, connected directors who are 
invited to participate in the new board of the new combined firm have stronger 
personal incentives to compromise on a low acquisition premium at the cost of the 
target shareholders’ interest. After reclassifying social connection into CEO 
connection, the findings show that bid premiums are largely reduced when either the 
target or acquirer CEO links the two merging firms. The results indicate that CEO 
connection is more efficient and valuable than board connection in affecting takeover 
activities. 
Furthermore, a favourable acquisition timing and payment method for acquirers 
could partially explain the negative relationship between social connection and 
acquisition premium. Consequently, acquirers in connected deals tend to take over 
targets when their own shares are highly valued and the target’s recent share price is 
far lower than its highest price over the previous year. Therefore, acquirers are prone 
to finance acquisitions with equity when their stock is overvalued. 
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Table 3.1 – Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3.1 presents the distribution of takeover deals across the year (Panel A) and industry of 
acquiring firms (Panel B) for the full sample, connected deals and non-connected deals. The 
percentage of connected deals (non-connected deals) is computed as the number of connected deals 
(non-connected deals) divided by the number of full takeover deals. Connected deals refers to 
takeover transactions in which the acquiring firm and target firm are socially tied with either 
first-degree or second-degree connections. A first-degree connection refers to a situation in which a 
board director or executive serves on both the acquiring and target firm boards during the deal 
announcement, while a second-degree connection is defined when two individuals, respectively from 
the acquirer and target firm, have social ties through past experience (such as employment history or 
educational background). Non-connected deals are takeover transactions with no acquirer-target 
connection found in the BoardEx database. The industry classifications are according to the 
Fama-French 12 industry classifications. 
 
Panel A: Distribution of takeover deals across year 
Year  
Full sample Connected deals Non-connected deals 
Number Number Percentage Number Percentage 
2001 144 14 9.72% 130 90.28% 
2002 88 11 12.50% 77 87.50% 
2003 124 13 10.48% 111 89.52% 
2004 120 8 6.67% 112 93.33% 
2005 102 12 11.76% 90 88.24% 
2006 107 9 8.41% 98 91.59% 
2007 93 16 17.20% 77 82.80% 
2008 73 12 16.44% 61 83.56% 
2009 63 13 20.63% 50 79.37% 
2010 73 9 12.33% 64 87.67% 
2011 47 8 17.02% 39 82.98% 
2012 38 3 7.89% 35 92.11% 





Panel B: Distribution of takeover deals across industry 
Industry 
Full sample Connected deals Non-connected deals 
Number Number Percentage Number Percentage 
Consumer Nondurables  25 1 4.00% 24 96.00% 
Consumer Durables  8 2 25.00% 6 75.00% 
Manufacturing  50 7 14.00% 43 86.00% 
Energy, Oil, Gas and Coal 47 12 25.53% 35 74.47% 
Chemicals  14 5 35.71% 9 64.29% 
Business Equipment  281 38 13.52% 243 86.48% 
Telephone and Television  23 2 8.70% 21 91.30% 
Utilities  23 9 39.13% 14 60.87% 
Wholesale and Retail  45 6 13.33% 39 86.67% 
Healthcare and Med. Equip 123 18 14.63% 105 85.37% 
Finance 349 22 6.30% 327 93.70% 
Other 84 6 7.14% 78 92.86% 
Total  1072 128 11.94% 944 88.06% 
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Table 3.2 – Summary statistics 
Table 3.2 reports the descriptive statistics for the firm and deal characteristics of the full sample of connected deals and non-connected transactions. Connected deals 
refers to takeover transactions in which the acquiring firm and target firm are socially tied with either first-degree or second-degree connections. A first-degree 
connection refers to a situation in which a board director or executive serves on both the acquiring and target firm boards during the deal announcement, while a 
second-degree connection is defined when two individuals, respectively from the acquirer and target firm, have social ties through past experience (such as 
employment history or educational background). Non-connected deals are takeover transactions with no acquirer-target connection found in the BoardEx database. 




Variables Full sample (1) Connected deals (2) Non-connected deals (3) Connected – 
Non-connected deals 
 
Mean Standard deviation Mean Standard deviation Mean Standard deviation Differe ce (2) - (3) 
Panel A: Acquirer related  
       Tobin's Q  3.19 12.20 4.22 14.51 3.05 11.86 1.17 
Market Value  8.01 2.14 8.37 2.17 7.96 2.13 0.40** 
Leverage  37.25% 0.28 34.12% 0.2624 37.68% 0.2864 -3.56% 
Return on Assets (ROA) 2.46% 15.15% 3.69% 0.1270 2.29% 0.1546 1.40%** 
Panel B: Target related  
        Tobin's Q  2.62 9.92 2.75 7.33 2.60 10.21 0.15* 
Market Value  5.51 1.82 6.36 1.9 5.39 1.76 0.97*** 
Leverage  37.92% 1.26 34.87% 0.3402 38.32% 1.329 -3.45% 
Return on Assets (ROA) -5.57% 0.28 -3.03% 0.2307 -5.90% 0.28 2.87% 
Panel C: Deal-related 
        Transaction value (USD millions)  1,958.88 6,244.67 4,126.12 10,088.48 1,665.02 5,464.25 2461.10*** 
Premium (%) 41.09% 0.75 37.02% 1.07 42.56% 0.70 -0.056*** 
Hostile Takeover 1.31% 0.11 1.56% 0.02 1.27% 0.11 0.00 
Competing Bid 4.19% 0.20 3.13% 0.17 4.34% 0.20 -0.01 
Pure Cash Deal  38.81% 0.49 33.59% 0.47 39.51% 0.40 -0.06 
Pure Stock Deal  24.62% 0.43 39.06% 0.49 22.67% 0.42 0.16*** 
52-week High (%)  33.72% 0.39 35.42% 0.37 33.49% 0.40 0.02 
Relative Deal Size  0.32 0.44 0.38 0.42 0.31 0.45 0.064* 
Number of Observations 1072 128 944 
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Table 3.3 – Acquisition Premium Analysis 
Table 3.3 reports the univariate analysis for target 52-week high and acquisition premium for the full sample of connected deals (first-degree and second-degree 
connected deals) and non-connected deals. The difference of target 52-week high and premium is shown between connected deals (first-degree and second-degree 
connected deals) and non-connected deals. Connected deals refers to takeover transactions in which the acquiring firm and target firm are socially tied with either 
first-degree or second-degree connections. A first-degree connection refers to a situation in which a board director or executive serves on both the acquiring and target 
firm boards during the deal announcement, while a second-degree connection is defined when two individuals, respectively from the acquirer and target firm, have 
social ties through past experience (such as employment history or educational background). Non-connected deals are takeover transactions with no acquirer-target 
connection found in the BoardEx database. Target 52-week high is defined as the target’s highest stock price over the period from 365 days before to 30 days before 
the takeover announcement, denoted as the log percentage difference of target stock price 30 days before the takeover announcement (Baker et al., 2012). ***, ** 
and * represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
 










(2) - (5) (3) - (5) (4) - (5) (3) - (4) 
Premium 0.4190*** 0.3702*** 0.2559*** 0.4241*** 0.4256*** -0.0554*** -0.1698*** -0.0015 ** -0.1683* 
Target 52-week High 0.8465*** 0.6470*** 0.8498*** 0.5517*** 0.8737*** -0.2267* -0.0240** -0.3220** 0.2980** 
          Observations 1072 128 41 87 944 




Table 3.4 – Acquisition Premium Analysis and Reference Point 
Table 3.4 compares the impact of social connections and reference point hypothesis on acquisition premiums and shows the acquisition premium for the full sample, 
connected deals (first-degree and second-degree connected deals) and non-connected deals. Furthermore, the full sample is split into three quantiles (low, medium, 
high) on the basis of target 52-week high. The difference of premium is shown between connected deals (first-degree and second-degree connected deals) and 
non-connected deals. Connected deals refers to the takeover transactions in which acquiring firm and target firm are socially tied with either first-degree or 
second-degree connections. A first-degree connection refers to a situation in which a board director or executive serves on both the acquiring and target firm boards 
during the deal announcement, while a second-degree connection is defined when two individuals, respectively from the acquirer and target firm, have social ties 
through past experience (such as employment history or educational background). Non-connected deals are takeover transactions with no acquirer-target connection 
found in the BoardEx database. Target 52-week high is defined as the target’s highest stock price over the period from 365 days before to 30 days before the 
takeover announcement, denoted as the log percentage difference of target stock price 30 days before the takeover announcement (Baker et al., 2012). ***, ** and * 
represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 









(2) - (5) (3) - (5) (4) - (5) 
52-Week high 
        
Low 0.2519 0.1729 0.11 0.1767 0.2627 -0.0898** -0.1527** -0.0860** 
Medium 0.3794 0.3158 0.3508 0.2992 0.3861 -0.0702* -0.0353 -0.0869** 
High 0.6262 0.5729 0.2687 0.6442 0.6351 -0.0622** -0.3664*** 0.0091* 
  
        
Observations 1072 128 41 87 944 
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Table 3.5 – Determinants of the acquisition premium 
Table 3.5 reports the results of OLS regressions for acquisition premium. In all models, the acquisition premium is regressed against dummy variables for social 
connection. The acquisition premium is defined as the offer price, as the log percentage difference from the target's share price four weeks before the M&A deal 
announcement (Baker et al., 2012). The independent variable in Models 1, 2, 3 and 4 is connection, which is equal to one if acquirers are socially connected with 
targets. The dependent variables in Models 5, 6, 7 and 8 are first-degree and second-degree connections. A first-degree connection refers to a situation in which a 
board director or executive serves on both the acquiring and target firm boards during the deal announcement, while a second-degree connection is defined when two 
individuals, respectively from the acquirer and target firm, have social ties through past experience (such as employment history or educational background). 
Moreover, the target 52-week high reference point is included in Models 3, 4, 7 and 8. Target 52-week high is defined as the target’s highest stock price over the 
period from 365 days before to 30 days before the takeover announcement, denoted as the log percentage difference of target stock price 30 days before the 
takeover announcement (Baker et al., 2012). Models 1, 3, 5 and 7 are specified without industry and year fixed effects. In Models 2, 4, 6 and 8, industry and year 
fixed effects are controlled. For brevity, results for the industry and year dummies are not reported. Definitions of variables are listed in Appendix A. t-statistics are 
listed. ***, ** and * represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
Acquisition Premium Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
         
Connection -0.2073** -0.1619* -0.2025** -0.1506* 
    
 
(-2.24) (-1.74) (-2.27) (-1.66) 








(-2.88) (-2.66) (-3.06) (-2.75) 








(-0.26) (0.13) (-0.06) (0.40) 











Acquirer Tobin's Q  0.0016 0.0011 0.0008 0.0008 0.0014 0.0010 0.0005 0.0006 
 
(0.72) (0.49) (0.35) (0.37) (0.75) (0.59) (0.48) (0.46) 
Acquirer Market Value  -0.0354** -0.0343** -0.0258* -0.0244 -0.0398** -0.0394** -0.0304* -0.0297 
 
(-2.20) (-2.06) (-1.66) (-1.49) (-2.32) (-2.22) (-1.85) (-1.70) 
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Acquirer Leverage  -0.2634** -0.0128 -0.0716 0.0579 ’-0.2606** -0.0164 -0.0661 0.0552 
 
(-2.36) (-0.10) (-0.65) (0.45) （-2.22） (-0.13） (-0.61) (0.46) 
Acquirer Return on Assets  -0.3915* -0.4164* -0.1350 -0.1983 -0.3576 -0.3843 -0.0951 -0.1599 
 
(-1.69) (-1.81) (-0.60) (-0.87) （-1.10） （-1.23） (-0.32) (-0.54) 
Target Tobin's Q  -0.0046 -0.0045 -0.0040 -0.0038 -0.0043 -0.0042 -0.0036 -0.0035 
 
(-1.63) (-1.62) (-1.47) (-1.42) （-1.13） （-1.32） (-0.84) (-1.01) 
Target Leverage  -0.0540 0.0100 -0.0341 0.0089 -0.0543 0.0095 -0.0342 0.0084 
 
(-0.78) (0.14) (-0.51) (0.13) （-0.76） (0.15） (-0.59) (0.14) 
Target Return on Assets -0.4826*** -0.3769*** -0.1379 -0.1132 -0.4870* -0.3794 -0.1383 -0.1114 
 
(-4.27) (-3.26) (-1.19) (-0.96) （-1.80） (-1.49) (-0.58) (-0.49) 
Relative Deal Size  -0.2799*** -0.2671*** -0.2591*** -0.2456*** -0.2950*** -0.2846*** -0.2752*** -0.2641*** 
 
(-3.85) (-3.59) (-3.70) (-3.39) (-3.62) (-3.29) (-3.69) (-3.29) 
Pure Stock Deal  -0.0439 -0.0308 -0.1169* -0.0932 -0.0378 -0.0271 -0.1112 -0.0903 
 
(-0.62) (-0.43) (-1.70) (-1.33) (-0.52) (-0.36) (-1.56) (-1.21) 
Hostile Takeover -0.1765 -0.2599 -0.2258 -0.2770 -0.1563 -0.2394 -0.2046 -0.2553 
 
(-0.68) (-1.01) (-0.90) (-1.11) (-0.62) (-0.88) (-0.76) (-0.93) 
Competing Bid -0.0946 -0.1085 -0.1253 -0.1175 -0.0904 -0.1082 -0.1213 -0.1174 
 
(-0.63) (-0.73) (-0.87) (-0.82) (-0.50) (-0.57) (-0.68) (-0.63) 
Diversification 0.0112 -0.0036 -0.0028 -0.0101 0.0135 0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0059 
 
(0.18) (-0.06) (-0.05) (-0.16) (0.21) (0.01) (-0.01) (-0.09) 
Constant -0.6721*** -0.3845* -1.0312*** -0.7376*** -0.6373*** -0.3460 -0.9982*** -0.7021*** 
 
(-4.61) (-1.68) (-7.05) (-3.23) (-4.08) (-1.23) (-6.33) (-2.50) 
        
         
Year-fixed-effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Industry-fixed-effects  No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 1072 1072 1072 1072 1072 1072 1072 1072 
Adjusted R2 0.065 0.110 0.133 0.156 0.074 0.119 0.144 0.166 
139 
Table 3.6 – Acquisition premium analysis in subsamples of low/high target 52-week 
high 
Table 3.6 reports the multivariate analysis for the acquisition premium in the subsamples of low/high 
target 52-week high. Target 52-week high is defined as the target’s highest stock price over the period 
from 365 days before to 30 days before the takeover announcement, denoted as the log percentage 
difference of target stock price 30 days before the takeover announcement (Baker et al., 2012). The 
full sample is split into three groups based on the target 52-week high. The low group in each model 
refers to the subsample in which the deals have the lowest target 52-week high (in Model 1 and Model 
3), while the high group is the subsample in which the deals have the highest target 52-week high (in 
Model 2 and Model 4). In all models, acquisition premium is regressed against a dummy variable 
indicating if the acquirer and target firm are socially connected. The acquisition premium is defined as 
the offer price, as the log percentage difference from target's share price four weeks before the M&A 
deal announcement (Baker et al., 2012). The independent variable in Models 1 and 2 is connection, 
which is equal to one if acquirers are socially connected with targets. The dependent variables in 
Models 3 and 4 are first-degree and second-degree connection. A first-degree connection refers to a 
situation in which a board director or executive serves on both the acquiring and target firm boards 
during the deal announcement, while a second-degree connection is defined when two individuals, 
respectively from the acquirer and target firm, have social ties through past experience (such as 
employment history or educational background). In all models, industry and year fixed effects are 
controlled. For brevity, results for the industry and year dummies are not reported. Definitions of 
variables are listed in Appendix A. t-statistics are listed. ***, ** and * represent significance at 1%, 5% 






Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Low High Low High 
     




  First-degree Connection 
  
-0.4770 -0.7753*** 
   
(-1.16) (-2.96) 
Second-degree Connection  
  
0.0262 0.0306 
   
(0.14) (0.16) 
Acquirer Tobin's Q  0.0149* 0.0047 0.0142 0.0003 
 
(1.65) (0.86) (0.86) (0.06) 
Acquirer Market Value  0.0402 -0.0252 0.0345 -0.0500 
 
(1.38) (-0.82) (1.10) (-1.63) 
Acquirer Leverage  0.0135 -0.0294 0.0358 0.1768 
 
(0.06) (-0.14) (0.17) (0.74) 
Acquirer Return on Assets  -0.6879 -0.3453 -0.6992* -0.2464 
 
(-1.23) (-1.14) (-1.88) (-0.83) 
Target Tobin's Q  -0.0023 -0.0070 -0.0022 -0.0041 
 
(-0.70) (-1.02) (-1.16) (-0.60) 
Target Leverage  0.0256 0.0601 0.0343 0.1259 
 
(0.17) (0.43) (0.22) (0.90) 
Target Return on Assets -1.1117** -0.1511 -1.0954*** -0.0957 
 
(-2.46) (-1.10) (-2.67) (-0.70) 
Relative Deal Size  -0.1611 -0.0948 -0.1763 -0.1453 
 
(-1.64) (-0.62) (-1.45) (-0.94) 
Pure Stock Deal  -0.0665 -0.0621 -0.0660 0.0093 
 
(-0.56) (-0.47) (-0.46) (0.07) 
Hostile Takeover 0.2598 -0.4402 0.2522 -0.4897 
 
(0.43) (-1.15) (0.67) (-1.28) 
Competing Bid -0.1631 -0.4524* -0.1584 -0.3178 
 
(-0.66) (-1.73) (-0.47) (-1.20) 
Diversification -0.1701 0.0182 -0.1565 0.0377 
 
(-1.49) (0.16) (-1.21) (0.32) 
Constant -1.3494*** -0.4633 -1.3174** 0.5743 
 
(-3.63) (-1.58) (-2.32) (1.14) 
    
     
Year-fixed-effects yes yes yes yes 
Industry-fixed-effects  yes yes yes yes 
Observations 341 341 341 341 
Adjusted R2 0.074 0.037 0.083 0.068 
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Table 3.7 – Explanation of low premium for connected deals 
Table 3.7 explores the reasons why acquisition premium is associated with social connection with 
three panels. Panel A shows univariate analysis for low premium in first-degree connected deals, 
which are further classified by directors having a position on the board of the acquisition partner. The 
board position is further divided into first-level (CEO; Chairman) and second-level (common director; 
independent director). A_higher position refers to interlocking directors that have a higher position on 
the acquirer board than on target board. A_same level position is defined as the interlocking director 
being the CEO/Chairman of both the acquirer and the target or being hired as a common director or 
independent director of both acquisition partners. T_higher position indicates that the interlocking 
director has a higher position (CEO/Chairman) in the acquirer than in the target. Panel B limits the 
sample to second-degree connected deals. In Panel B, the sample is classified by whether the target 
director is retained on the board of the combined firm after acquisition. Panel C lists multivariate 
analysis for low premium. Models 1 and 2 report regressions for deals with first-degree connections. 
The dependent variables are acquisition premium, defined as the offer price, as the log percentage 
difference from the target's share price four weeks before the M&A deal announcement (Baker et al., 
2012). A_higher position is a dummy variable which equals one when the interlocking director has a 
higher board position in the acquirer than in the target, and is zero otherwise. A_same position is a 
dummy variable, which equals one when the interlocking director has the same level position in the 
acquirer as in the target, and is zero otherwise. Models 3 and 4 limit the sample to deals with 
second-degree connections. The independent variable is T_retain – a dummy variable which equals 
one when the target director is offered a board seat on the board of the combined firm. Models 2 and 4 
control both year and industry fixed-effects. For brevity, the results of the industry and year dummies 
are not reported. Definitions of variables are listed in Appendix A. t-statistics are listed. ***, ** and * 




Panel A: Univariate Analysis for Premium in First-degree Connected Deals 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (2) - (4) (3) - (4) (2) - (3) 
  First-degree connected A_higher position A_same level position T_higher position 
   
premium  0.2559*** 0.1149 *** 0.1762*** 0.8876*** -0.7726*** -0.7113*** -0.0613 
Observations 41 12 25 4 
    
Panel B: Univariate analysis for Premium in Second-degree Connected Deals 
  (1) (2) (3) (2) - (3) 
  Second-degree connected Retain Non-retain 
 premium  0.4241*** 0.3972*** 0.6696*** -0.2724** 




Panel C: Multivariate analysis for low premium 
Acquisition Premium Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 








  T_retain 
  
-0.3980*** -0.3781** 
   
(-3.02) (-2.39) 
Target 52-week High 0.3268* -0.6231*** 0.0526 0.0619 
 
(1.83) (-3.49) (0.62) (0.66) 
Acquirer Tobin's Q 0.0222 -0.0368 -0.0013 -0.0011 
 
(0.55) (-0.77) (0.695) (-0.3) 
Acquirer Market Value -0.0144 -0.0248 -0.0431 -0.0608 
 
(-0.35) (-0.61) (-1.15) (-1.38) 
Acquirer Leverage -0.5022 -0.4940 0.1691 0.1573 
 
(-1.51) (-1.27) (0.64) (0.47) 
Acquirer Return on Assets 0.9297 1.5851 0.4046 0.5474 
 
(0.66) (0.9) (0.82) (0.87) 
Target Tobin's Q -0.0153 0.0110 -0.0049 -0.0052 
 
(-0.71) (0.5) (-0.67) (-0.62) 
Target Leverage 0.1819 0.4672 -1.3009*** -1.3595*** 
 
(0.66) (1.8) (-5.76) (-5.07) 
Target Return on Assets -0.6417* -0.8316** -2.7506*** -2.8399*** 
 
(-1.74) (-2.37) (-7.85) (-7.21) 
Relative Deal Size -0.27914 -2.4865** -0.0595 -0.0486 
 
(-0.62) (-2.64) (-0.35) (-0.24) 
Pure Stock Deal 0.2563* 0.5962*** -0.2836* -0.2975* 
 
(1.84) (3.71) (-1.95) (-1.79) 
Hostile Takeover -0.0181 -0.008 0.3084 0.5726 
 




   
(0.01) (-0.28) 
Diversification -0.1076 -0.1718 0.1469 0.1804 
 
(-0.76) (-1.29) (1.1) (1.11) 
Constant 1.2351*** 1.8769*** 1.4868*** 2.0921*** 
 
(3.04) (3.68) (3.89) (2.82) 
          
Year-fixed-effects No Yes No Yes 
Industry-fixed-effects No Yes No Yes 
Observations 41 41 87 87 
Adjusted R2 0.420 0.6473 0.601 0.650 
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Table 3.8 – Endogeneity test 
Table 3.8 reports the endogeneity test – two stages least square (2sls) – for acquisition premium 
analysis. The instrument variable for social connection in Models 1 and 2 is previous social 
connection, which refers to a situation where acquirers and targets are socially connected three years 
before the takeover announcement. Similarly, the instrument variable for first-degree connection in 
Models 3 and 4 is previous first-degree connection, which describes whether a director 
simultaneously served on the acquirer and target boards three years before the announcement of the 
M&A deal. The instrument variable for second-degree connection in Model 3 and 4 is previous 
second-degree connection, which describes whether two individual board members, respectively from 
the acquirer and target, had social ties three years prior to the deal announcement. The acquisition 
premium is defined as the offer price, as the log percentage difference from the target's share price four 
weeks before the M&A deal announcement (Baker et al., 2012). Target 52-week high is defined as the 
target’s highest stock price over the period from 365 days before to 30 days before the takeover 
announcement, denoted as the log percentage difference of the target stock price 30 days before the 
takeover announcement (Baker et al., 2012). A first-degree connection refers to a situation in which a 
board director or executive serves on both the acquiring and target firm boards during the deal 
announcement, while a second-degree connection is defined when two individuals, respectively from 
the acquirer and target firm, have social ties through past experience (such as employment history or 
educational background). Industry and year fixed effects are controlled. For brevity, the results for the 
industry and year dummies are not reported. Definitions of variables are listed in Appendix A. 




Model 1 Model 2 
First-stage Second-stage First-stage Second-stage 











    
     Second-degree connection  
    
     Target 52-week High  
  
-0.0063 0.7090*** 
   
(-0.35) (8.72) 
Acquirer Tobin's Q  -0.0001 0.0016 -0.0001 0.0007 
 
(-0.17) ( 0.77) (-0.15) (0.34) 
Acquirer Market Value  0.0046 -0.0345** 0.0046 -0.0266* 
 
(1.36) (-2.25) (1.33) (-1.72) 
Acquirer Leverage  -0.06212*** -0.2618** -0.0638*** -0.0673 
 
(-2.62) (-2.46) (-2.64) (-0.62) 
Acquirer Return on Assets  0.0311 -0.3825* 0.0288 -0.1365 
 
(0.63) (-1.74) (0.58) (-0.61) 
Target Tobin's Q  -0.0002 -0.0044** -0.0002 -0.0040 
 
(-0.25) (-1.65) (-0.26) (-1.48) 
Target Leverage  -0.0089 -0.0535 -0.0090 -0.0342 
 
(-0.60) (-0.82) (-0.62) (-0.52) 
Target Return on Assets 0.0078 -0.4113*** 0.0048 -0.1385 
 
(0.33) (-3.84) (0.19) (-1.21) 
Relative Deal Size  0.0026 -0.2886*** 0.0024 -0.2609*** 
 
(0.17) (-4.18) (0.15) (-3.75) 
Pure Stock Deal  0.0255* -0.0548 0.0262* -0.1203* 
 
(1.70) (-0.81) (1.72） (-1.76) 
Hostile Takeover 0.0530 -0.1818 0.0535 -0.2290 
 
(0.96) (-0.73) (0.96） (-0.92) 
Competing Bid -0.0213 -0.0690 -0.0210 -0.1231 
 
(-0.67) (-0.49) (-0.66) (-0.86) 
Diversification 0.0002 0.0123 0.0003 -0.0025 
 
(0.01) (0.20) (0.02) (-0.04) 








 Previous First-degree  
connection (IV) 
    
     Previous Second-degree 
connection (IV) 
   
     Constant 0.0223 -0.6770*** 0.0254 -1.0298*** 
 
(0.72) (-4.89) (0.79) (-4.09) 
     
     Year-fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-fixed-effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1072 1072 1072 1072 











       
Connection  
      


















Target 52-week High  
   
0.0043 -0.0192 0.6307*** 
    
(0.41) (-1.00) (7.40) 
Acquirer Tobin's Q  0.0001 -0.0002 0.0010 0.0001 -0.0002 0.0006 
 
(0.10) (-0.39） (0.44) (0.10) (-0.37) (0.30) 
Acquirer Market Value  -0.0037* 0.0081** -0.0389** -0.0036* 0.0078** -0.0291* 
 
(-1.89) (2.27) (-2.36) (-1.85) (2.17) (-1.81) 
Acquirer Leverage  -0.0068 -0.0337 -0.0128 -0.0064 -0.0359 0.0585 
 
(-0.45) (-1.21) (-0.10) (-0.41) (-1.28) (0.47) 
Acquirer Return on Assets  0.0349 -0.0018 -0.3948* 0.0364 -0.0086 -0.1713 
 
(1.29) (-0.04) (-1.75) (1.33) (-0.17) (-0.77) 
Target Tobin's Q  0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0042 0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0036 
 
(0.42) (-0.45) (-1.57) (0.43) (-0.49) (-1.36) 
Target Leverage  -0.0014 -0.0044 0.0085 -0.0014 -0.0044 0.0075 
 
(-0.17) (-0.30) (0.13) (-0.17) (-0.29) (0.11) 
Target Return on Assets -0.0042 0.0189 -0.3809*** -0.0024 0.0108 -0.1135 
 
(-0.31) (0.76) (-3.38) (-0.17) (0.41) (-0.98) 
Relative Deal Size  -0.0073 0.0091 -0.2813*** -0.0072 0.0085 -0.2605*** 
 
(-0.84) (0.57) (-3.85) (-0.82) (0.53) (-3.67) 
Pure Stock Deal  0.0149* 0.0147 -0.0358 0.0145* 0.0166 -0.0982 
 
(1.78) (0.96) (-0.51) (1.72) (1.08) (-1.43) 
Hostile Takeover 0.0612** -0.0153 -0.2503 0.0611** -0.0148 -0.2660 
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(2.03) (-0.28) (-1.00) (2.02) (-0.27) (-1.09) 
Competing Bid 0.0134 -0.0367 -0.1038 0.0134 -0.0364 -0.1133 
 
(0.77) (-1.16) (-0.72) (0.77) (-1.15) (-0.81) 
Diversification 0.0080 -0.0166 0.0002 0.0080 -0.0164 -0.0062 
 
(1.06) (-1.21) (0.00) (1.06) (-1.19) (-0.10) 
Previous Connection (IV) 
      
       Previous First-degree  








 Previous Second-degree 








 Constant 0.0172 -0.0290 -0.3517 0.0148 -0.0181 -0.7077*** 
 
(0.64) (-0.59) (-1.57) (0.54) (-0.36) (-3.17) 
       
       Year-fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-fixed-effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1072 1072 1072 1072 1072 1072 
Adjusted R2 0.675 0.523 0.117 0.675 0.523 0.164 
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Table 3.9 – Determinants of acquisition premium in CEO connections 
Table 3.9 examines acquisition premium by adopting an alternative proxy – CEO connection. In all models, acquisition premium is regressed against dummy 
variables for social connection. Acquisition premium is defined as the offer price, as the log percentage difference from the target's share price four weeks before the 
M&A deal announcement (Baker et al., 2012). The independent variable in Models 1, 2 and 5 is CEO connection, which is equal to one if either the acquirer or target 
CEO connects the two merging firms. The dependent variables in Models 3, 4 and 6 are CEO first-degree connection and CEO second-degree connection. A CEO 
first-degree connection is defined as when an acquirer CEO (target CEO) also serves on the board of the target (acquirer board member) or as an executive. CEO 
second-degree connection happens when acquirer or target CEOs share past experience with board members or executives in the counterpart firm. Furthermore, the 
target’s 52-week high reference point (Baker et al., 2012) in Models 2 and 4 is defined as the target’s highest stock price over the period from 365 days before to 30 
days before the takeover announcement, denoted as the log percentage difference of target stock price 30 days before the takeover announcement (Baker et al., 
2012). In Models 5 and 6, the full sample is split into three groups (low, medium, high) based on the target 52-week high and shows the multivariate analysis of 
premiums in the low/high target 52-week high subsample. For brevity, results for the industry and year dummies are not reported. Definitions of variables are listed 
in Appendix A. t-statistics are listed. ***, ** and * represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
Acquisition Premium Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Model 5 Model 6 
Low High Low High 




































    Acquirer Tobin's Q  0.0009 0.0006 0.0010 0.0007 0.0158* -0.0002 0.0152* -0.0001 
 
(0.90) (0.65) (0.98) (0.74) (1.71) (-0.08) (1.67) (-0.06) 
Acquirer Market Value  -0.0347** -0.0246 -0.0382** -0.0284* 0.0439 -0.0459 0.0379 -0.0487 
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(-2.03) (-1.46) (-2.26) (-1.70) (1.44) (-1.48) (1.25) (-1.57) 
Acquirer Leverage  -0.0149 0.0557 -0.0300 0.0399 0.0284 0.1673 0.0304 0.1531 
 
(-0.12) (0.47) (-0.24) (0.34) (0.14) (0.68) (0.15) (0.62) 
Acquirer Return on Assets  -0.4065 -0.1879 -0.4041 -0.1830 -0.8728** -0.2236 -0.8608** -0.2189 
 
(-1.45) (-0.71) (-1.44) (-0.69) (-2.19) (-0.63) (-2.17) (-0.61) 
Target Tobin's Q  -0.0044** -0.0038* -0.0043** -0.0036* -0.0025** -0.0057 -0.0024* -0.0056 
 
(-2.38) (-1.93) (-2.33) (-1.88) (-1.91) (-1.59) (-1.90) (-1.58) 
Target Leverage  0.0097 0.0087 0.0110 0.0102 0.0493 0.1080 0.0637 0.1097 
 
(0.17) (0.17) (0.19) (0.19) (0.36) (0.69) (0.46) (0.70) 
Target Return on Assets -0.3731* -0.1088 -0.3779* -0.1112 -1.2677*** -0.1572 -1.3082*** -0.1557 
 
(-1.75) (-0.56) (-1.75) (-0.57) (-2.93) (-0.71) (-3.00) (-0.70) 
Relative Deal Size  -0.2715*** -0.2497*** -0.2827*** -0.2617*** -0.1523 -0.1194 -0.1684 -0.1254 
 
(-3.34) (-3.29) (-3.47) (-3.44) (-1.40) (-0.81) (-1.54) (-0.84) 
Pure Stock Deal  -0.0222 -0.0841 -0.0257 -0.0886 -0.0821 0.0620 -0.0790 0.0587 
 
(-0.31) (-1.18) (-0.36) (-1.24) (-0.59) (0.44) (-0.57) (0.42) 
Hostile Takeover -0.2502 -0.2671 -0.2716 -0.2907 0.3078 -0.4836 0.2986 -0.5233 
 
(-1.05) (-1.11) (-1.18) (-1.24) (1.03) (-0.90) (1.04) (-0.99) 
Competing Bid -0.1127 -0.1221 -0.1100 -0.1193 -0.1888 -0.3630 -0.1893 -0.3576 
 
(-0.64) (-0.70) (-0.62) (-0.68) (-0.60) (-1.16) (-0.61) (-1.15) 
Diversification -0.0053 -0.0118 -0.0060 -0.0126 -0.1509 0.0170 -0.1488 0.0136 
 
(-0.08) (-0.19) (-0.09) (-0.20) (-1.19) (0.13) (-1.18) (0.10) 
Constant -0.3841 -0.7384*** -0.3563 -0.7117*** -1.4344*** 0.5364* -1.3863** 0.5588* 
 
(-1.44) (-2.76) (-1.34) (-2.66) (-2.62) (1.80) (-2.56) (1.85) 
        
         
Year-fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ind.-fixed-effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1072 1072 1072 1072 341 341 341 341 
Adjusted R2 0.113 0.159 0.117 0.163 0.087 0.059 0.094 0.058 
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Table 3.10 – Takeover Timing Analysis 
Table 3.10 tabulates the average acquirer stock run-up in non-connected deals and connected deals, including first-degree and second-degree connected deals. A 
first-degree connection refers to a situation in which a board director or executive serves on both acquiring and target firm boards during the deal announcement, 
while a second-degree connection is defined when two individuals, respectively from the acquirer and target firm, have social ties through past experience (such as 
employment history or educational background). Acquirer stock run-up is defined as the bidders’ buy-and-hold returns over the period starting 200 trading days and 
ending 2 months prior to the deal announcement (Cai & Sevilir, 2012). ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 









(2) - (5) (3) - (5) (4) - (5) (3) - (4) 
Acquirer run-up  0.0976*** 0.1643*** 0.2844** 0.1078*** 0.0888*** 0.07553** 0.1956*** 0.0190843 0.1766* 
          Observations 1072 128 41 116 944 
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Table 3.11 –Method of Payment 
Table 3.11 reports the logit regression on the method of payment. The dependent variable in all models is the stock dummy, which is equal to one if the takeover 
transaction is fully financed with stock. The independent variable in Models 1, 2 and 3 is connection, which is equal to one if the acquirers are socially connected with 
targets. The dependent variable in Models 4, 5 and 6 is first-degree connection. The dependent variable in Models 7, 8 and 9 is second-degree connection. A 
first-degree connection refers to a situation in which a board director or executive serves on both the acquiring and target firm boards during the deal announcement, 
while a second-degree connection is defined when two individuals, respectively from the acquirer and target firm, have social ties through past experience (such as 
employment history or educational background). Further, industry and year fixed effects are controlled in Model 3, 6 and 9. For brevity, results for the industry and 




Payment method – Stock Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
          
Connection 0.7824*** 0.9119*** 1.2383*** 
        (3.97) (4.27) (5.25) 
      First-degree connection 
   
1.0191*** 0.9121*** 1.1559*** 
     
   
(3.17) (2.63) (3.14) 
   Second-degree connection  
      
0.5803** 0.8268*** 1.1299*** 
  
      
(2.46) (3.23) (4.00) 









































(-4.99) ( -3.42) 























( -1.13) ( -0.23) 
 
( -1.19) ( -0.27) 
 










( -1.11) (-0.88) 
 
( -1.11) ( -0.94) 
 
( -1.06) (-0.78) 
Constant -1.2271*** 0.0228 -1.6098* -1.1657*** -0.0850 -1.7778** -1.1717*** 0.0568 -1.5973* 
  (-15.79) (0.06) (-1.89) (-15.93) ( -0.24) (-2.09) (-15.63) (0.16) (-1.88) 
  
                   
Year-fixed-effects No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Industry-fixed-effects  No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 1072 1072 1072 1072 1072 1072 1072 1072 1072 
Adjusted R2 0.013 0.073 0.149 0.008 0.064 0.134 0.005 0.067 0.149 
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3.7 Appendix A 
Variables Definitions Source 
Panel A: Dependent Variables 
Acquisition premium 
Acquisition premium is defined as the offer price, as the log percentage difference from target's share 
price four weeks before the M&A deal announcement (Baker et al., 2012). 
CRSP/Thomson 
ONE 
Panel B: Key independent variables 
Connection  





Dummy variable that equals 1 if board director or executive serves on both acquiring and target firm 




Dummy variable that equals 1 if two individuals, respectively from the acquirer and target firm, have 
social ties through past experience (such as employment history or educational background). 
BoardEx 
CEO connection  Dummy variable that equals 1 if either acquirer or target CEO connects the two merging firms.  BoardEx 
CEO first-degree 
connection  
Dummy variable that equals 1 if acquirer CEO (target CEO) also serves as a target board member 




Dummy variable that equals 1 if acquirer or target CEO shares past experience with board members or 
executives in the counterpart firm.  
BoardEx 
Board connection Dummy variable that equals 1 if board members connect bidder with target. BoardEx 
Board first-degree 
connection 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if bidding firm and target share same board member.  BoardEx 
Board second-degree 
connection 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if two individuals respectively from acquirer and target boards have social 





Dummy variable that equals 1 if interlocking director holds a more important position in acquirer (target) 
than in target (acquirer) respectively while same level position indicates that directors serve as same level 
position in both acquisition partners 
BoardEx 
T_retain Dummy variable that equals 1 if target director is offered a board seat in combined firm after acquisition.  BoardEx 
Panel C: Firm characteristics 
Tobin's Q  
Tobin's Q is computed as the ratio of market value four weeks before takeover announcement over book 
value of the company's assets. 
COMPUSTAT 
Market Value (MV) 
The market value is calculated as the number of shares outstanding multiplied by the respective stock 





Leverage ratio is total debt, which is the sum of long-term debt and short-term debt, divided by firm's 
total asset. 
COMPUSTAT 
Return on Assets 
(ROA) 
ROA is computed as ratio of company's net income by book value of total assets. COMPUSTAT 
Panel D: Deal characteristics 
Transaction value 
(USD millions)  
Transaction value is total value paid by acquirer in order to obtain target, which is denoted in total dollar 
value as reported by Thomson ONE. 
Thomson ONE 
Relative Deal Size  
Relative deal size is calculated as transaction value divided by market capitalisation of the acquirer, four 
weeks before takeover announcement.  
Thomson ONE 
Hostile Takeover Dummy variable that equals 1 if M&A deal is reported as hostile. Thomson ONE 
Competing Bid Dummy variable that equals 1 if M&A deal involves multiple bidding firms.  Thomson ONE 
Pure Cash Deal 
(Cash) 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if M&A deal is paid fully by cash. Thomson ONE 
Pure Stock Deal 
(Stock) 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if M&A deal is paid fully by stocks. Thomson ONE 
Target 52-week High 
(%)  
Target 52-week high is defined as target’s highest stock price over period from 365 days before to 30 days 
before takeover announcement, denoted as log percentage difference of target stock price 30 days before 
takeover announcement (Baker et al., 2012). 
CRSP 
Acquirer Stock Price 
Run-up 
Acquirer stock price run-up is bidders’ buy-and-hold returns over period starting 200 trading days and 




Chapter 4: Investment banking friends 
4.1 Introduction 
Boutique advisors are non-full-service advisors, providing expertise in certain 
industries (such as technology or healthcare) or corporate finance (such as mergers 
and acquisition or restructuring). In recent years, boutique investment banks have 
burgeoned in the global M&A advisory market to capture more than 40% of global 





 such as Lazard, Evercore Partners Inc and Centerview 
Partners, were among the top 10 M&A advisors
21
 based on total deal value advised 
in the US market in 2015 and 2016. The development of boutique advisors has 
attracted the considerable attention of media, investors and potential clients. 
However, few academic have studied the role of boutique banks as M&A advisors. 
To the best of the author’s knowledge, Song et al. (2013) were first to shed light on 
boutique advisors and examine acquisition performance when either full-service
22
 or 
boutique investment banks are involved. However, Song et al. (2013) examine 
preliminary differences between full-service and boutique banks and do not explore 
the reasons why acquiring firms choose boutique advisors. This chapter introduces 
the social network theory and re-evaluates the in-depth differences between 
full-service and boutique banks in the advisor-selection process and takeover 
                                                 
19
 See Financial Times, Jan 24
th
 2017, “Boutique advisors maintain appeal despite big bank 
criticism”. 
20
 Global boutique advisors are identified if the boutique investment banks provide international 
services and describe their business scale as being global on their official website, while domestic 
boutique advisors focus on the US and regional markets. 
21
 See Investment banking scorecard, released by the Wall Street Journal; data provided by Dealogic. 
22
 Consistent with Song et al. (2013), a full-service advisor refers to an investment banker who engages 





In fact, hundreds of financial advisors
23
 exist in this competitive investment banking 
market, where full-service banks account for a small proportion. The rest – a large 
number of competitors – are boutique advisors, among which global boutique 
advisors have a great advantage in resources and reputation over regional boutique 
banks. The fierce competition for M&A advisory business is not equal due to the gap 
in resources and abilities between full-service banks and boutique banks, especially 
domestic boutique advisors. Investment banks have various channels and incentives 
to “win” and negotiate takeover deals. As the report “Battle for dominance in M&A 
advisory business bulge-brackets vs. the boutique” stated, “M&A advisory is a 
relationship-driven business – one that thrives on trust and longstanding ties.” This 
shows that takeover transactions are driven by the relationship between client firm 
and banks. Social network plays a vital role in pursuing M&A business also and 
affects the acquisition process as well as performance. Therefore, the combination of 
investment bank studies and social network theory deserves more emphasis. 
This chapter explores the impact of acquirer-advisor connection on takeover deals 
advised by either boutique investment banks or full-service banks. By introducing 
social connection, this study provides a new perspective to examine the difference 
between boutique and full-service advisors. Specifically, the full acquisition sample 
is divided into takeover deals involved with full-service banks and deals advised by 
boutique banks. This chapter investigates the role of social connection in the 
advisor-selection process, acquisition premium, announcement return and long-run 
                                                 
23
 The number of investment banks covered in the Thomson One database is more than 120, checked 
with customer service in Thomson One database. 
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post-acquisition performance by comparing the connection effect in deals involved 
with full-service banks and deals advised by boutique banks. Herein, social 
connection refers to a direct board connection between acquirers and investment 
banks, which are classified as either first-degree or second-degree connections based 
on the data from the BoardEx database. First-degree connection, known as board 
interlock, is defined as board members in bidding firms also serving on the board of 
their M&A advisors during the announcement period. Second-degree connection 
refers to two individuals, respectively from an acquirer and an advisor, working 
together on a third board during the takeover announcement period. 
Previous literature on social network shows that interfirm social ties positively affect 
business activities and corporate decisions in two ways: information advantage and 
enhanced monitoring. On one hand, social connection improves the information flow 
transferred between firms, reduces information asymmetry and saves on costs 
obtaining information, especially when intra-firm connection via personal links is 
much closer and more high-quality (Cohen et al., 2008; Engelberg et al., 2012; 
Hochberg et al., 2007; Mol, 2001; Schonlau & Singh, 2009; Uzzi, 1999). On the 
other hand, connected directors may play a monitoring role in investment decisions 
attributed to directors’ responsibilities, which maximises shareholder value. Strict 
monitoring from connected directors could alleviate concerns around agency 
conflicts (Engelberg et al., 2012). However, social connection may cause issues, such 
as familiarity bias and social conformity, leading to mixed results from performance 
and investment decisions (Cao et al., 2009; Chen et al., 2014; Cialdini & Goldstein, 
2004; Cooney et al., 2015; Gaspar & Massa, 2007); Chen et al., 2014). For example, 
firms are more likely to do business with people they know (Chen et al., 2014; 
Cooney et al., 2015). 
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This chapter then analyses the distinction between boutique and full-service M&A 
advisors and develops a hypothesis by incorporating the social connection theory. 
According to Song et al. (2013), full-service advisor refers to investment bankers 
who engage in full-line financial services including trading, underwriting, M&A 
advisory, security and debt services. Boutique advisors are non-full-service advisors, 
providing expertise in certain industries (such as technology, healthcare, etc.) or 
corporate finance (such as mergers and acquisition, restructuring, etc.) There are 
three major differences between boutique and full-service banks: size and popularity; 
independence; and experience and expertise (Song et al., 2013). 
First, compared with full-service banks, the majority of boutique advisors are small 
and relatively unknown, except for few global boutique advisors (for example, 
Lazard, Evercore, Rothschild, etc.). Competition is fierce and intense in the 
investment banking market due to the existence of a larger number of rivals, the 
similar services provided, endogenous entry and the existence of “soft” 
competition.
24
 Therefore, investment banks have a strong incentive to establish and 
maintain firm-banking relationships in order to get business, especially profitable 
M&A deals (Anand & Galetovic, 2006). Domestic boutique banks, who focus on US 
and regional markets, may rely more on relationships built via social networks to 
pursue M&A business. Domestic boutique advisors are generally not known by most 
potential clients and may not be able to afford large marketing and advertising 
expenses. Hence, social network through personal linkage becomes an important 
channel for domestic advisors to win M&A business. Moreover, the social network 
theory indicates that firms are willing to bring a “friend” or “someone they know” 
                                                 
24
 “Soft” competition refers to non-price competition.  
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into the business due to familiarity. Therefore, our “friends in business” hypothesis is 
that acquirers are more likely to hire connected boutique banks, and especially 
domestic boutique banks, as their M&A advisors. 
Second, boutique advisors label themselves as independent banks, therefore resulting 
in fewer agency problems between acquisition partners and boutique banks. Kosnik 
and Shapiro (1997) indicate that firm-banking agency conflicts are caused by 
information asymmetry between acquisition partners and investment banks, as well 
as the duration of the relationship. The agency problem is more severe when deals 
involve greater information asymmetry and a shorter duration of firm-banking 
relationship. Investment banks, especially full-service banks, have great advantages 
in terms of information, experience, and social network and therefore have more 
power over acquisition partners in identifying targets or acquirer candidates and 
negotiating during the bidding process. The imbalance of information and power 
leads to potential agency conflicts. Hence, bidding firms who hire full-service 
advisors are expected to suffer more information asymmetry and conflicts of interest 
than firms who appoint boutique M&A advisors. Since full-service investment banks 
have a large and diverse social network, acquirers’ full-service advisors may also 
have relation with target firms. In deals with target “friends,” full-service banks may 
serve the interests of the combined entity of acquirers and targets rather than solely 
maximise acquirers’ interests. Therefore, this chapter expects that social connection 
with full-service banks may result in more agency problems between acquirers and 
full-service advisors, leading to less favourable outcomes for acquiring firms 
(agency conflict hypothesis part 1). 
According to Kosnik and Shapiro (1997), agency problems could be alleviated by 
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reducing information asymmetry and building the firm-banking relationships beyond 
single transactions. Previous studies on social network have shown that the presence 
of social connection could enhance information transfer and reduce information 
asymmetry between connected firms. Moreover, the duration of the personal network 
is not confined to the acquisition period and could extend beyond deal completion. 
Therefore, this chapter conjectures that connection with investment banks could 
efficiently improve agency problems and therefore deliver better takeover 
transactions, especially in deals advised by boutique banks (agency conflict 
hypothesis part 2). Moreover, boutique advisors, especially domestic boutique banks, 
have a stronger incentive to negotiate more favourable deal terms for their client 
firms in order to maintain long-run relationships and obtain more business in the 
future. 
Third, boutique advisors generally specialise in M&A advisory business or services 
in certain industries (such as technology, healthcare, media, etc.) while full-service 
banks provide full-line financial services, including equity issuance, debt issuance, 
M&A advisory, and trading. Therefore, full-service banks which are socially 
connected with acquirers may also have relations with target firms through previous 
business. According to Fernando, May, and Megginson (2012), firm-banking 
relationships built via equity and debt issuance are more valuable to investment 
banks than relationships generated in M&A, since the information obtained in the 
M&A transactions may lose value after takeover deals are completed. Therefore, 
connected full-service banks may act against the interest of bidding firms. The issue 
of multiple firm-banking relations is less likely to occur in deals with boutique 
advisors. Therefore, boutique advisors would value the existing network and serve 
the interests of bidding firms; acquirers who have a social connection with boutique 
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advisors are expected to achieve better acquisition performance than acquirers 
without social linkage in deals involving boutique banks. 
To check the expectations of social connection effects on deals advised by 
full-service or boutique advisors, this study uses the full sample of US acquisitions 
announced in the last ten years ranging from 2005 to 2016. The status of sample 
deals is either completed or withdrawn. Due to the specialty of the financial industry, 
both bidders and targets are non-financial companies in our sample. This chapter also 
requires all bidding firms to be publicly listed, and to hire financial advisors in their 
takeover transactions. 
To ensure that the empirical evidence on social connection is not biased by the 
previous business connection between firms and investment banks, this chapter 
excludes deals in which acquirers retain IPO underwriters, debt issuers, SEO issuers 
and advisors in previous takeover transactions. The final sample consists of 1,565 
deals, of which 471 are public transactions and 1,094 are private acquisitions.
25
 
Some 625 acquirers (39.94%) invite boutique banks to be their advisors (hereinafter 
referred to as boutique deals) while 940 deals involve full-service banks (hereinafter 
referred to as full-service deals). In 625 boutique deals, 9.44% are connected deals in 
which the bidders and boutique banks have a social connection. In 30 boutique 
connected deals, acquirers are linked with boutique bankers by first-degree 
connections in which a board member in the acquirer concurrently works on the 
board of the boutique advisor during the takeover announcement. There are 29 deals 
with second-degree connections, in which two individuals, respectively from the 
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 In public acquisitions, both bidders and targets are publicly listed firms while in private acquisitions 
the target can be either public or private. 
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acquirer and the boutique advisor, serve together on a third board when the takeover 
bid is announced. In contrast, in the subsample of full-service deals, there are 41 
(4.37%) observations in which investment bankers have board ties with acquiring 
firms. Among the full-service sample, 19 transactions are first-degree connected 
deals, and 21 deals involve second-degree connections. 
This study first analyses how social connection with boutique banks (full-service 
banks) affects acquirers’ advisor selection process. This chapter follows Bouwman 
(2011) and revises the director-selection logit model to adjust for our 
advisor-selection analysis. For each takeover deal, a list of potential advisor 
candidates is formed, including both the M&A advisors selected and the top 100 
most active investment banks
26
 (including full-service and boutique banks) ranked 
by number of deals and total transaction value advised over the sample period from 
2005 to 2016. Consistent with our hypothesis, a first-degree connection between 
acquirers and boutique advisors, especially domestic boutique banks, significantly 
increases the likelihood of being chosen. The probability of acquirers hiring 
connected domestic boutique advisors is 4.76 times the probability of not being 
chosen, suggesting that social connections help domestic boutique banks to secure 
M&A business. Moreover, acquirers are found to consider connection when selecting 
M&A advisors. However, second-degree connections between boutique banks and 
bidders are significantly and negatively associated with the probability of being 
selected, which can be explained by the independent board position of connected 
directors in acquiring firms and (or) in boutique banks. However, in full-service 
deals, bidding firms are less likely to hire socially connected full-service banks, 
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 Following Q. Huang, Jiang, Lie, and Yang (2014), the top 100 most active advisors are ranked by the 
number of deals and aggregate transaction value over the sample period.  
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regardless of the connection types. The strong and negative relationship in 
full-service deals can be explained by two reasons. First, the majority of connected 
directors serve as independent board directors in acquirers and (or) full-service banks. 
Second, bidding firms may recognise that there are more agency conflicts between 
themselves and connected full-service banks and therefore avoid hiring connected 
full-service banks. 
Next, this study examines the relationship between social connection and acquisition 
premium in boutique deals and full-service transactions. The acquisition premium 
for public deals is obtained from Thomson One while the premium for private 
takeover is calculated by following Officer (2007). The results show that in the 
sample of boutique deals, the coefficient for first-degree connection is negative and 
is statistically significant at 1%. In full-service acquisitions, both first-degree 
connection and second-degree connection are significantly and positively associated 
with acquisition premium. The findings support the “agency conflict hypothesis” that 
connected boutique advisors may serve in the acquirers’ interest and negotiate lower 
acquisition premiums than non-connected boutique banks. However, acquirers 
connected with full-service banks pay a higher premium than firms with 
non-connected ones. A possible explanation is that connected full-service advisors 
know target firms and therefore act against the interest of bidding firms. 
Then, this chapter investigates the effect of social connection on short-run 
performance with the sample of deals advised by either boutique banks or 
full-service advisors. Short-run performance is estimated using the five-day 
announcement return of bidding firms (ACAR (-2, +2)), targets (TCAR (-2, +2)) and 
the combined entity of bidders and targets (CCAR (-2, +2)). This study finds no 
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strong relationship between social connection and acquirers’ announcement return in 
either boutique deals or full-service deals. However, the first-degree connection 
between bidders and full-service advisors significantly increase targets’ 
announcement return and the announcement return of the combined entity. The 
positive relationship with targets’ announcement performance may be attributed to 
the prior client relation with target firms. The announcement return of combined 
firms is the value-weighted average of acquirers’ announcement return and targets’ 
announcement return. Therefore, first-degree connection with full-service banks 
delivers acquisition synergies for combined entities, implying that connected 
full-service banks may consider the interests of both acquirers and targets rather than 
just the acquirers’ own interests. These findings support our “agency conflicts” that 
connected full-service banks may act against the acquirers’ interest while domestic 
boutique advisors closely connected with bidders serve the interests of client firms. 
Additionally, this study evaluates the role of social connection with boutique 
advisors or full-service banks by analysing bidders’ long-run stock and operating 
performance, measured by buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR), industry-adjusted 
return on assets (IAROA) and cash flow performance. The results indicate that 
acquirers who have a first-degree connection show a higher stock return in boutique 
deals when the buy-and-holding period is less than 12 months. Moreover, bidders 
closely connected with boutique advisors outperform non-connected firms in 
post-acquisition operating and cash flow performance. However, the effect of social 
connection is negative and significant on buy-and-hold return in full-service deals. 
The negative influence on stock performance lasts for as long as 36 months after 
takeover announcement. No significant relationship is observed between social 
connection and acquirers’ operating performance, gauged by industry-adjusted ROA. 
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Moreover, acquirers' cash flow performance is improved in deals in which the 
acquiring firms are socially connected with boutique advisors while a social 
connection with full-service banks reduces the cash flow return for the fiscal year 
following the acquisition. Overall, acquirers benefit from social connection, 
especially first-degree connections, with boutique advisors in terms of 
post-acquisition performance while the presence of a close relationship reduces deal 
quality in deals advised by full-service banks. The long-run performance analysis 
provides further evidence that connected boutique advisors maximise acquirers’ 
interests and deliver more favourable deals to connected bidding firms. Additionally, 
this study confirms the “boutique skill” hypothesis that connected boutique banks 
offer better takeover deals to acquirers than non-connected ones. 
This chapter contributes to the current M&A literature in the following ways. First, 
the study adds a dimension of sociology regarding firm-banking relationships and 
provides new evidence on the choice of an advisor from the bankers’ perspective. In 
past M&A studies, the firm-banking relationship has generally emerged from 
previous equity/debt issuance or takeover transactions and affects whether previous 
advisors are retained in the current deal. M&A studies on former business 
relationships assume that the selection of advisors is determined by acquisition 
partners and neglects the endeavours undertaken by banks to promote and win M&A 
advisory business. In particular, a previous business relationship presents an 
insufficient explanation for deals involving boutique investment banks, which are 
generally smaller, more independent and less well known. This chapter is the first to 
interpret acquirers’ choice of M&A advisor by introducing social ties between 
bidders and investment banks and certifies that personal linkage does assist these 
boutique advisors in gaining M&A advisory business. 
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Second, this chapter contributes to current M&A studies by addressing boutique 
advisors. Currently, the rise of boutique investment banks has attracted the 
significant attention of corporations and media, especially after the 2007 financial 
crisis. Boutique advisors
27
 have captured a large market share of M&A advisory 
revenue, and more than 40% of advisory revenue in the global market. Additionally, 
many large firms – both acquirers and targets – choose to employ boutique 
investment banks for their acquisition attempts. For example, in Kraft Foods’ 
acquisition of H.J Heinz (value at $36.6 billion) in 2015, Kraft Foods (the acquirer) 
hired Centerview Partners LLC (boutique) while H.J Heinz’s advisor was Lazard 
(boutique). Boutique investment banks also appeared in the advisory team in the 
Shell Oil – BG group deal and Verizon’s acquisition of Yahoo. Therefore, research 
on boutique advisors deserves great emphasis and provides valuable findings for 
both theory and practice. However, few academic studies have shed light on the 
choice of boutique advisor in acquisitions, especially for large takeover deals. Song 
et al. (2013) investigate the influence of boutique investment banks on acquisition 
performance and analyse the choice of boutique advisors by examining deal 
characteristics. However, Song et al. (2013) address the preliminary and general 
differences between boutique and full-service investment banks and do not analyse 
the incentive for firms to select boutique advisors. This chapter revisits this 
difference in-depth by introducing social network and corporate governance and 
provides complementary evidence to previous studies on boutique investment banks. 
This chapter also contributes to the literature by examining the role of social 
connection in determining corporate investment and economic outcomes. Previous 
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studies have explored the relationship between firms and financial institutions, such 
as commercial banks and venture capital firms, suggesting that social connection in 
important for firm performance. Investment banks, as professional financial 
intermediaries, have significant effects on identifying acquisition candidates and 
negotiating takeover premiums. However, social connection between firms and 
investment banks is ignored in the current literature. This chapter fills this research 
gap by concentrating on mergers and acquisitions (M&As) performance when 
acquirers have social ties with investment banks, especially boutique advisors 
(Anand & Galetovic, 2006). 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 2 summarises the 
previous literature relating to this chapter; Section 3 develops the hypotheses; 
Section 4 describes the data used in this study, the measurement of social connection, 
the classification of boutique and full-service investment bankers and descriptive 
statistics; Section 5 presents the empirical results; and Section 6 concludes the 
research. 
4.2 Literature review 
4.2.1 Boutique banks vs. Full-service banks 
Song et al. (2013) are the first to devote their attention to boutique M&A advisors 
and compare the impact of boutique and full-service advisors in takeover deals 
announced between 1995 and 2006. Their findings indicate that acquisition partners 
are more likely to appoint boutique investment banks as M&A advisors in complex 
deals, suggesting that boutique banks are superior in terms of M&A expertise and 
skills in particular industries. Moreover, acquirers benefit from boutique advisors by 
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paying a lower acquisition premium. Deals involving boutique advisors take a longer 
time to complete, indicating that boutique advisors make more effort to negotiate 
better takeover terms. Golubov, Petmezas, and Travlos (2012) examine the effect of 
boutique investment banks in mergers and acquisitions and find no strong 
relationship with acquirers’ announcement return, advisory fees and the probability 
of deal completion. 
4.2.2 Agency conflicts between firms and investment banks 
Kosnik and Shapiro (1997) show that third-party representation raises agency 
conflict issues. In order to gain commission and publicity, financial advisors may 
promote the completion of deals rather than negotiate favourable deal items for 
clients. M&A account for a large portion of investment banking revenues and can 
often feature agency problems between investment banks and acquisition partners. 
Kosnik and Shapiro (1997) indicate that agency conflicts arise due to information 
asymmetry and the duration of the relationship between investment banks and 
acquisition partners. Investment banks have a significant advantage in terms of 
information, experience, and expertise, as well as network. Investment banks have 
more power over firms in identifying target/acquirer candidates and the bidding 
process, resulting in possible conflicts of interests. As the investment banking market 
is more competitive, it becomes harder to maintain long-term single firm-banking 
relationships. Therefore, investment banks are more likely to pursue their 
self-interests and push for the successful completion of takeover transactions 





 of conflicts, Kosnik and Shapiro (1997) propose four methods to mitigate 
agency problems. The first and main way is to reduce information asymmetry 
between firms and advisors by increasing in-house M&A experience and network 
resources, etc. Agency conflicts can also be reduced by building a long-run 
firm-advisor relationship, increasing discipline and public disclosure of advisors’ 
performance, and designing contracts based on long-run takeover outcomes as well 
as improving the accountability of M&A advisors. 
4.2.3 Firm-banking relationship 
Firm-banking relationships can vary greatly depending on how each relationship is 
established. In previous M&A literature, the client-banking relationship is built on 
previous equity or debt issuance and takeover transactions. These studies emphasise 
whether acquirers/targets retain their previous M&A advisor from recent deals and 
its impact (Becher, Gordon, & Juergens, 2015; Forte, Iannotta, & Navone, 2010; 
Francis, Hasan, & Sun, 2014; French, Yan, & Yasuda, 2016; Saunders & Srinivasan, 
2001). 
Relationship banking is widely explored in the literature on commercial banks 
(lending/credit relationship) and underwriters (IPO). Boot (2000) summarises the 
previous literature on relationship banking and provide a brief overview of the 
definition, advantage, and disadvantage of firm-banking relationships. Commercial 
banks or investment banks establish relationships with corporate clients by offering 
financial services or advising transactions over time. Due to multiple interactions 
with firms, banks usually capture confidential, reusable and high-quality information, 
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which is unavailable to markets. Organisations could benefit from banking 
relationships by mitigating the information asymmetry and agency conflicts that can 
occur in financial transactions, and by receiving monitoring and certification from 
their banking partner. However, banking relationships raise two issues: the 
“soft-budget” problem and the “locked-in” problem. The soft-budget problem refers 
to the situation where relationship banks may keep providing loan or credit to firms 
which are not qualified or even potentially default, resulting in a loss for banks. A 
“locked-in” single firm-banking relationship may lead to worse deal terms (such as 
higher advisory/underwriting fees, or higher loan interest), attributed to banks’ 
information monopoly. 
Fernando, May, and Megginson (2012) shed light on the advisor relationship by 
examining the effect of Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy on debt, equity underwriting 
and takeover clients. Firms with an equity underwriting relationship suffered a 
greater loss from the collapse of Lehman Brothers than the clients of other 
investment banks, as measured by abnormal returns around the announcement. The 
response of equity underwriting clients advised by Lehman Brothers is more 
negative. Firms that offer a variety of financial services earn more negative abnormal 
returns than clients with a single type of banking relationship. The results indicate 
that a stronger and broader banking relationship generates a greater influence on 
clients. 
Becher et al. (2015) investigate the value of firm-advisor relationship and the 
consequence of retaining advisors who previously served in firms’ debt, equity or 
takeover deals. The results reveal that firms perceive no benefits from maintaining 
long-term relationships, especially with IPO underwriters and merger advisors. 
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Compared with multiple banking relationships, firms that keep single advisors for 
entire transactions face an increase in advisory fees, reduced analyst coverage and 
deterioration in terms of deal contracts. However, due to concerns over information 
leakage to rivals, corporates are prone to maintain relationships with particular 
advisors over the long run. 
Saunders and Srinivasan (2001) devote their attention to the role of investment 
banking relationships in advisory fees with a sample of successful US acquisitions 
announcing and completing between 1985 and 1998. The banking relationship is 
defined when the current merger advisor is involved in the acquirers’ previous debt, 
equity or takeover transactions. Compared with advisors with no banking 
relationship, investment banks with previous business connections charge acquirers a 
higher advisory fee but do not deliver higher bidder announcement return. The paper 
infers that acquiring firms may be compensated by indirect no-fees benefits from a 
banking relationship. Switching costs may also be taken into account when an 
acquirer chooses to retain their previous advisor. This paper is among the first to 
relate banking relationship to M&A researchers. However, the results do not clearly 
identify the reason why bidders are willing to retain previously connected advisors. 
The measurement of a banking relationship is restricted to past transactions. 
Moreover, merger fees are only part of M&A studies. 
Forte et al. (2010) use a sample of European acquisitions from 1994 to 2003 and 
investigate the choice of investment bankers from the targets’ perspective. 
Specifically, they examine whether prior client relationships between targets and 
advisors affect a target’s choice of banker and announcement return. The results 
show that target firms are more likely to retain financial advisors when the 
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relationship is established through previous business, such as stock, bond issuance 
and M&As. A closer banking relationship would increase the probability of that 
particular advisor being chosen. Moreover, deal complexity and the prestige of 
acquirers’ advisors also play a role in determining the decision to hire investment 
bankers for targets. 
French et al. (2016) explore the impact of firm-investment banking relationship 
using a sample of Japanese takeovers during the period 2000 to 2015. The results 
suggest that firms are motivated to initiate acquisition attempts by relationship banks. 
The significant increase in M&A activities in the 2000s can be attributed to the 
information advantage brought by investment banks. Closer bank-firm relationships 
are associated with a higher probability of acquisition attempt and larger deal volume. 
However, M&A decisions are negatively affected when investment banks also act as 
a lender or shareholder within the firm. The findings imply that banks play a major 
role in corporate governance and control rights. 
4.2.4 Social network with financial firms  
Recently, the personal network between firms and financial firms, especially 
director-to-director ties, have attracted considerable interest from academic 
researchers. Previous literature shows that social network positively affects business 
activities and performance in two ways: information advantage and enhanced 
monitoring. Firstly, social connection improves the information flow between firms, 
reduces information asymmetry and saves on the costs of obtaining information, 
especially when the cross-firm linkage is much closer and more high quality. 
Secondly, connected directors may play a monitoring role in investment decisions as 
directors’ responsibility is to maximise shareholders’ value. Additionally, strict 
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monitoring from connected directors could alleviate concerns around agency 
conflicts. Engelberg et al. (2012) explore the effect of social ties between firms and 
commercial banks linked through educational background and find that personal 
connections deliver better financing terms for connected firms, including lower loan 
interest rates, higher credit ratings and better stock performance due to 
improvements in terms of information flow and monitoring effectiveness. Uzzi 
(1999) shows that the cost of capital is reduced when firms have social ties with 
middle-market banking representatives. 
Furthermore, social connection significantly affects investment decisions and 
provides channels for connected firms to acknowledge the real value and information 
of connected firms. Cohen et al. (2008) indicate that managers of mutual funds are 
more likely to place higher portfolio weight in firms with a social connection. 
Strikingly, investments in connected partners deliver higher returns than holdings in 
companies without social ties. Hochberg et al. (2007) document that venture capital 
firms with better networks have better access to public and private information, 
leading to higher return and more profit. Cooney et al. (2015) find that underwriting 
firms are more likely to invite investment banks who are socially linked through 
personal networks for IPO equity issuance. Moreover, hiring connected underwriters 
is a “win-win” choice. The results show that the shareholders of pre-IPO firms have 
net wealth gain while connected investment banks are compensated by high 
underwriting fees, senior roles and better share allocation in IPOs. Chen et al. (2014) 
investigate the interpersonal relationship between customers and suppliers and 




4.2.5 Choice of advisors 
Most M&A studies investigate how acquisition partners (bidders/targets) select 
investment bankers by addressing bank reputation. Bowers and Miller (1990) study 
advisor choice and shareholders’ wealth effect on both bidders and targets. In this 
paper, financial advisors are classified as first-tier and second-tier based on the 
prestige of advisors. The results indicate that first-tier bankers could identify 
acquisition candidates efficiently for bidders or targets, therefore leading to better 
deals and higher combined abnormal return and holding-period return. Golubov et al. 
(2012) provide new evidence on the positive relationship between bank reputation 
and bidders’ acquisition performance. Bidders could benefit from employing top-tier 
investment banks in public transactions by earning higher announcement return and 
a larger share of synergies. This better deal performance and shorter time to 
complete transactions can be explained by the fact that top-tier advisors possess a 
better ability to identify target and negotiation strategies. However, Hunter and 
Jagtiani (2003) fail to find a positive impact of financial advisor reputation on 
bidders’ acquisition performance. Tier-1 investment banks cannot deliver a high 
announcement return for bidding firms but are associated with a high probability of 
deal completion and less time required completing takeover transactions. Ismail 
(2010) also finds no positive effect of top-tier investment banks on bidders’ gain 
while targets could earn higher wealth gain when top-tier advisors are involved.  
Different from the M&A literature on advisor reputation, Kale, Kini, and Ryan (2003) 
use a measurement of the relative reputation of acquirers’ advisor to targets’ 
investment bank by considering the bargaining strategy used in the negotiation 
process. Bidders with relatively prestigious advisors achieve larger shareholder 
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wealth gain, a higher proportion of synergies and revoke value-destructive 
acquisition attempts. Rau (2000) employs market share as a proxy of advisor 
reputation and re-examines the impact of investment bank market share on 
contingent fee structure and bidders’ acquisition performance. Investment bankers 
are split into first-tier, second-tier, and third-tier banks by market share. The results 
reveal that investment bank market share is positively affected by the number of 
previous deals completed and does not depend on acquirers’ post-acquisition 
performance in the past. First-tier investment banks charge higher contingent fees, 
leading to a higher probability that deals will succeed but no better announcement 
return for the bidding firms. The evidence supports the deal-completion hypothesis 
that investment banks are hired to complete acquisitions. 
A few kinds of literature also adopt different classifications of investment banks and 
investigate their effect on advisor-selection. Sibilkov and McConnell (2014) study 
the choice of investment bankers by examining the previous acquisition performance 
of advisors’ clients. The findings indicate that acquirers are more likely to choose 
investment bankers whose former clients show higher cumulative abnormal returns 
during takeover announcement. Moreover, the probability of retaining previous 
advisors is positively and significantly associated with clients’ prior takeover 
performance. Furthermore, higher client announcement return would increase market 
value of advisors in the investment banking market.  
C. Wang and Xie (2011) focus on cross-border acquisitions with US bidders and 
examine the choice between local and foreign advisors. The results show that local 
advisors are more likely to be hired in deals with greater information asymmetry 
existing between acquirers and targets. Moreover, bidders are more likely to employ 
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foreign financial advisors in deals with relatively larger transaction value. The 
findings could be explained by the fact that local advisors have an information 
advantage in the larger social network and lower cost to obtain targets’ information 
and target’s true value while foreign bankers could provide acquiring firms with 
professional experience, knowledge, and expertise. Moreover, acquirers benefit from 
local advisors by earning higher announcement returns in deals with greater 
information asymmetry and uncertainties. In addition, acquiring firms are less likely 
to adopt stock as the medium of exchange in deals where local advisors are hired. X. 
Chang, Shekhar, Tam, and Yao (2016) revisit the issue by considering the industry 
expertise of investment banks, as measured by the percentage of takeover deals 
involved in the same industry as the acquirers’ or targets’ industry in the past five 
years. Concerned with information leakage, acquirers avoid hiring investment banks 
which advise their rivals in the same industry. Acquisition partners tend to choose 
financial advisors who have takeover experience in their own industry due to 
information advantage. Advisors with industry expertise do charge higher advisory 
payment fees and complete deals in shorter times but fail to improve merger 
outcomes, including the announcement return of bidders and targets, the premium 
paid and the post-acquisition return of bidders. 
Francis et al. (2014) investigate acquirers’ M&A decisions on advisor and its impact 
on acquisition performance, as measured by acquirers’ announcement return. The 
author only considers firm-advisor relationships formed in previous equity issuance 
and takeover activities. The evidence suggests that banking relationships have a 
finite impact on the choice of M&A advisors and are affected by acquirers’ previous 
takeover experience. Acquirers are more likely to hire their underwriter for previous 
equity issuance as the investment bank for their first takeover bid. A higher 
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probability of holding up equity-issuing underwriters is positively associated with 
stronger advisor relationships and more optimistic analyst recommendations for 
underwriters. Additionally, acquirers earn significantly lower announcement returns 
when retaining equity advisors than when employing a new investment bank, 
especially in acquisitions paid with stock. For acquirers with takeover experience, 
bidders are more likely to retain previous M&A advisors who delivered a good 
announcement return in preceding M&A deals, and are therefore more likely to 
achieve better acquisition performance. 
4.3 Hypotheses 
In this section, this chapter develops hypotheses on the basis of social network 
theory and the difference between full-service advisors and boutique investment 
banks. Overall, this study constructs “friend in business”, “agency conflicts” and 
“boutique skill” hypotheses. 
4.3.1 Friends in business 
Boutique investment banks, especially domestic boutique advisors, are generally 
small and not known by most of their potential client firms. In the investment 
banking industry, thousands of competitors deliver similar financial services, are all 
subject to endogenous entry, and all face both price and non-price competition 
(Anand & Galetovic, 2006). Therefore, from the standpoint of banks, investment 
banks are motivated to establish and maintain long-run relationships with 
corporations to obtain business in the future. In particular, it is difficult for domestic 
boutique banks, mostly relatively unknown banks, to attract clients solely through 
their reputation and popularity. Moreover, large investment banks, and generally 
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full-service banks, can more easily afford large marketing and relationship-building 
costs than small ones. Therefore, social connection through directors’ personal 
networks plays an important role in pursuing business, especially M&A business, 
which contributes a large amount of advisory fees to banks’ profit. Boutique banks 
rely more on social network than full-service banks. Moreover, the majority of 
overlapping directors (those who concurrently work at an acquiring firm and its 
investment bank) serve as independent directors in full-service banks, which may 
negatively affect full-service banks to get business from connected firms. 
From the standpoint of clients, bidding firms are willing to select investment banks 
that are closely linked as their financial advisors. Building on the social network 
literature, social ties boost the exchange of financial and non-financial resources, 
improve interactions between socially connected firms, and facilitate transactions 
which may otherwise be difficult or even impossible to complete. Connected firms 
can also capture information advantage at a lower transactions cost (Ingram & Zou, 
2008). Mol (2001) shows that well-connected firms have better access to information 
on other firms’ experience, and therefore could learn from those firms and increase 
firm value by avoiding mistakes. Schonlau and Singh (2009) propose that firms with 
social ties can enjoy high-quality information but save on the costs of acquiring it. 
Moreover, the previous literature confirm that firms are more likely to choose 
“friends” as business partners. Cooney et al. (2015) find that underwriting firms are 
more likely to invite investment banks who are socially linked through personal 
networks for IPO equity issuance. Moreover, hiring connected underwriters is a 
“win-win” choice. Chen et al. (2014) investigate the inter-personal relationship 
between customers and suppliers and provide further evidence that firms take social 
connections into account in the supplier-selection process. Therefore, this chapter 
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established the following hypothesis: 
H1: Acquirers are more likely to employ closely connected boutique investment 
banks as M&A advisors, especially domestic boutique investment banks. 
4.3.2 Agency conflict hypothesis  
Another feature of boutique investment banks is their independence. Song et al. 
(2013) cite the description of global boutique advisor Lazard and document that 
boutique investment banks may be free of some agency conflicts due to having fewer 
business lines than full-service banks. Kosnik and Shapiro (1997) provide another 
explanation for agency problems between firms and investment banks and also 
support that boutique investment banks are related to fewer agency conflicts. The 
authors indicate that firm-banking agency conflicts are caused by information 
asymmetry between acquisition partners and investment banks, as well as the 
duration of the relationship. Larger information asymmetry and a shorter-duration of 
relationship leads to agency problems even worse. Full-service investment banks 
have far greater advantages over acquiring firms in terms of information, experience, 
network, and expertise. Therefore, full-service banks have more power to identify 
target candidates and negotiate, therefore leading to more agency conflicts than 
boutique banks. Due to their large network, full-service banks may know both the 
target and acquiring firms in deals. In this case, full-service banks may consider the 
interests of both acquirers and targets even if they are the M&A advisors to the 
acquirer. 
Regarding the causes of agency problems, Kosnik and Shapiro (1997) indicate that 
agency problems could be improved by reducing information asymmetry and 
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strengthening the firm-banking relationship beyond single transactions. Previous 
studies on social network confirm that the existence of social connections facilitates 
information exchange and save the time and costs involved with obtaining 
information, therefore significantly reducing information asymmetry. Moreover, 
social connections through personal linkages are built beyond single deals and are 
long-lasting. Therefore, social connections with boutique advisors would further 
reduce agency conflicts between firms and investment banks. Moreover, connected 
boutique banks have a stronger incentive to maintain the “friendship” for future 
business, therefore maximising the interest of acquiring firms. However, the effect of 
social connection may be negative in full-service deals. Boot (2000) summarises the 
previous literature on relationship banking and point out that banking relationships 
raise “locked-in” problems. A “locked-in” single firm-banking relationship may lead 
to worse deal terms (such as higher advisory/underwriting fees, or higher loan 
interest) attributed to the bank’s information monopoly. Information monopoly is 
more likely to occur in connected full-service deals as the imbalance in information 
and negotiation power is more severe in full-service deals. Moreover, acquiring firms 
hiring full-service banks are generally larger in size and involved in larger takeover 
deals. Large bidding firms may first consider large connected banks to save time and 
cost in finding and negotiating with M&A advisors. Therefore, bidding firms 
connected with full-service banks may face information monopoly and miss 
opportunities to hire better ones who deliver more favourable M&A services. 
Furthermore, investment banks may initiate acquisition attempts and persuade 
acquirers to take over targets. Due to familiarity bias, connected bidding firms would 
be the preferred potential candidates for full-service banks. In this case, investment 




Boutique advisors generally specialise in M&A advisory business or services in 
certain industries (such as technology, healthcare or media) while full-service banks 
provide full-line financial services, including equity issuance, debt issuance, M&A 
advisory and trading. Therefore, full-service banks which are socially connected with 
acquirers may also have relationships with target firms through previous business. 
According to Fernando, May, and Megginson (2012), firm-banking relationships 
built via equity and debt issuance are more valuable to investment banks than 
relationships generated in M&A, since the information obtained in the M&A 
transactions may lose value after takeover deals are completed. Therefore, connected 
full-service banks may act against the interest of bidding firms. The issue of multiple 
firm-banking relations is less likely to occur in deals with boutique advisors, which 
would therefore value the existing network and serve the interests of bidding firms. 
Overall, boutique banks linked with acquirers tend to serve the interest of bidding 
firms and negotiate better terms such as acquisition premiums while connected 
full-service banks may act against the bidders’ interests. Therefore, this chapter 
fomulates the following hypotheses: 
H2.1: Acquirers pay lower acquisition premium when bidding firms have a 
first-degree connection with boutique advisors than acquirers without connection. 
H2.2: Acquirers connected with full-service banks pay higher acquisition premium 
than acquirers with no connection. 
Previous studies on M&A indicate that acquisition premium positively affects target 
announcement return. On the basis of hypothesis 2 and hypothesis 3, first-degree 
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connection with boutique advisors may decrease target announcement return while 
the close connection with full-service banks may increase target announcement 
return. Therefore, this chapter develops the following hypotheses: 
H3.1: Boutique advisors with first-degree connection are associated with lower 
target announcement return than those with no connection. 
H3.2: Full-service advisors with first-degree connection are associated with higher 
target announcement return than those with no connection. 
Moreover, boutique investment banks specialise in M&A advisory services and 
certain industries while full-service businesses may be distracted in terms of their 
attention and effort. Therefore boutique banks may provide better takeover services 
to acquisition partners. Song et al. (2013) provide empirical evidence and support 
that boutique M&A advisors deliver favourable deal outcomes. Combining with the 
“agency conflict hypothesis”, connected boutique advisors act in acquirers’ interests, 
identify better targets and negotiate better deal terms, resulting in more valuable and 
profitable transactions for acquiring firms. Therefore, acquirers with connected 
boutique advisors outperform non-connected acquirers in the long term. However, 
agency conflicts in connected full-service deals decrease long-run post-acquisition 
performance. First-degree connections are considered to be closer, better-quality 
relationships between acquiring firms and investment banks. Hence, the existence of 
first-degree connections with boutique advisors delivers better deal outcomes in the 
long run. Therefore, this study formulates the following hypotheses: 
H4.1: Boutique advisors with first-degree connection are associated with better 
long-run performance than those with no connection. 
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H4.2: Full-service advisors with first-degree connection are associated with worse 
long-run performance than those with no connection. 
4.4 Data and sample selection 
4.4.1 Sample selection criteria  
The analysis requires data from various sources. The study employs a sample of US 
takeover deals announced between 1st January 2005 and 31st December 2016. The 
deal information and characteristics are collected from the Thomson One Banker 
database. Deal status must be either completed or withdrawn. All the acquirers are 
publicly listed while targets include public and private firms. Deals in regulated 
industries (such as financial and utility firms) are excluded. The original sample 
contains 21,911 observations. The study further cleans the sample by removing those 
deals with a transaction value of less than $1 million, leaving 10,748 observations. 
Since the research focuses on social connection between acquirers and their M&A 
advisors, the sample drops in-house deals, which are defined as deals with no 
advisors employed according to Servaes and Zenner (1996) and M&A deals with no 
advisors reported in Thomson One, yielding 2,979 observations. In order to fully 
differentiate the connection effect between full-service advisors and boutique 
advisors, the study drops those deals with mixed investment banks, in which 
acquiring firms hire concurrently full-service banks and boutique investment banks. 
To eliminate the “previous business” bias, the sample also excludes transactions in 
which acquirers have selected their previous IPO underwriter, debt issuer or M&A 
advisor and limits the sample to acquisitions advised by newly appointed investment 
bankers. Finally, the study requires acquirers’ stock price information and accounting 
information to be reported in the CRSP and COMPUSTAT databases, respectively. 
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The final sample consists of 1,565 takeover deals, including 471 public transactions 
and 1,094 private ones. Among the full sample, 625 deals (39.94%) are involved 
with boutique investment banks while 940 deals are advised by full-service advisors. 
Of the final sample (1,565 deals), there are only two unsuccessful deals, in which 
both acquisition partners are publicly listed. Additionally, these two incomplete 
transactions were advised by non-connected full-service banks. Therefore, in this 
study, all connected deals are successfully completed, regardless of advisor type. 
The social connection between acquirers and advisors are manually collected and 
filtered using the BoardEx database, which provides data on the social network of 
board members and senior executives. For the identification of social connection, 
this chapter follows Cai and Sevilir (2012) and defines two types: first-degree 
connection and second-degree connection. First-degree connection refers to the 
situation where acquirers and their selected advisory firm shared the same board 
member when the acquisition was announced. Second-degree connection means that 
two individual board members, respectively from the bidder and the investment 
banks, both worked on the board of a third firm during the takeover period. In the 
full sample, 6.39% of acquisition deals (100 deals) are socially connected by either a 
first-degree connection (49 deals) or a second-degree connection (51 deals). In the 
deals advised by boutique banks (625 deals), there are 9.44% deals (59 deals) with 
social connection. In 30 boutique deals (4.8%), acquirers have a first-degree 
connection with boutique advisors. However, the percentage of connected 
transactions is lower in the full-service deal segment, in which 4.37% are socially 




4.4.2 Boutique investment banks vs. full-service banks  
Acquirers’ advisors are classified into full service and boutique investment bankers. 
Consistent with Song et al. (2013), a full-service advisor refers to an investment 
banker who engage in full-line financial services including trading, underwriting, 
M&A advisory, security and debt services, etc. Boutique advisors are 
non-full-service advisors, providing expertise in certain industries (such as 
technology, healthcare, etc.) or corporate finance (such as mergers and acquisition, 
restructuring, etc.). Compared with full-service advisors, boutique investment 
bankers are smaller in size and independent. The types of acquirer advisor are 
identified by examining the business line description on the official website for each 
advisor. Furthermore, boutique advisors are divided into global boutique investment 
banks and domestic boutique investment banks based on the scope of their business. 
Global boutique advisors are identified if the investment banks provide international 
services and describe their business scale as being global on their official website 
while domestic boutique advisors focus on the US and regional markets. 
4.4.3 Descriptive statistics 
[Insert Table 4.1 About Here] 
Table 4.1 presents the summary statistics for the sample of takeover deals from 2005 
to 2016 and reports the mean values and standard deviations (or the number and 
percentage of dummy variables for deal characteristics) for firm characteristics 
(bidding firms and target firms) and deal characteristics. The descriptive statistics are 
listed for full samples, deals advised by full-service banks and transactions involving 
boutique advisors in Panel A, Panel B, and Panel C, respectively. In each panel, the 
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sample is further split into deals with a social connection and transactions with no 
connection. Descriptive statistics for deals with first-degree connections are also 
reported in the table. 
In Table 4.1, the market value of the bidding firms is larger in connected deals in the 
full sample (Panel A) and in acquisitions advised by full-service banks (Panel B).  
However, no significant difference in terms of acquirer firm size is observed between 
first-degree connected deals and transactions without connection, indicating that 
larger bidders are more likely to appoint connected banks as their M&A advisors, 
especially second-degree-connected banks. Additionally, the difference in transaction 
value is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level between connected and 
non-connected deals in all three panels regardless of advisor types. The findings 
imply that bidding firms tend to hire “friend” advisors in larger deals. Social 
connection reduces information asymmetry and increases the sense of trust between 
acquirers and investment bankers. Larger M&A deals are more complicated and 
therefore require more effort and time to negotiate contract terms. Bidding firms in 
larger M&A transactions may suffer more agency conflicts, resulting in less 
favourable deal outcomes. Therefore, bidders are more likely to invite connected 
banks to be their M&A advisors due to trust, familiarity bias, and better information 
transfer. In addition, investment banks are willing to advise on connected deals as 
they have higher transaction value and the bank therefore charges higher advisory 
fees, which is confirmed in the summary statistics. Moreover, advising connected 
firms can save M&A advisors a great deal of time and effort in terms of 
acknowledging client companies, obtaining information and discussing deal terms. 
Larger deals should take longer for takeover transactions to be completed. However, 
Table 4.1 does not show that socially connected deals with a larger size take longer 
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to complete than non-connected transactions. 
Furthermore, in Panel B, the target firm can be seen to be larger in size in the 
connected full-service sample than in the non-connected ones, which is attributed to 
deal complexity and the advantage of social connection. Panel C shows that the 
Tobin’s Q ratio of target firms is significantly higher in M&A deals advised by 
connected boutiques. 
4.5 Empirical results 
To better understand the influence of social connection on advisor-selection, this 
chapter undertakes multivariate analysis and reports its empirical results in this 
section. The study first investigates how the choice of M&A advisor is affected by 
social ties between acquirers and investment bankers and then analyses takeover 
outcomes when deals are advised by connected and non-connected investment banks. 
Specifically, this study examines the impact of connection on acquisition premium, 
advisory fee and announcement return, stock, operating and cash flow performance 
in the long run. 
4.5.1 Advisor selection 
This section examines the role of social connection between acquirers and 
investment bankers in the advisor selection process by using models developed in 
Bouwman (2011). To fully evaluate the impact of social ties with various types of 
advisor, the acquisition sample is classified into deals advised by full-service 
investment bank and boutique advisors. The boutique investment banks are further 
divided into global boutique banks and domestic boutique advisors based on the 
scale of their business. 
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Bouwman (2011) studies the determinants of direct selection and examines whether 
firms are prone to appointing directors who previously worked in companies with a 
similar corporate governance structure. Bouwman develops a logit model and 
includes both selected directors and potential director candidates who were not 
appointed to examine the familiarity effect in firms’ direct-selection process.  
Following Bouwman (2011), this chapter employs logit regressions in the 
advisor-selection process and also includes bank and deal characteristic that could 
affect acquirers’ choice of advisor. In addition, the study excludes deals advised by 
equity or debt underwriters, and former M&A advisors to ensure that the empirical 
results are not biased by the previous business linkage between acquirers and 
investment bankers. Furthermore, this study takes extra care and excludes bidders 
who initiate multiple acquisition attempts for the same target firm in one year and 
keep the deals with the earliest announcement date. To improve the accuracy of 
direct-selection analysis, for each takeover deal, the study not only considers the 
advisors employed in the acquisition but also includes the 100 most active 
investment bankers as potential advisors who were likely to have been picked by the 
acquirers. Following Q. Huang et al. (2014), the top 100 most active advisors are 
ranked by the number of deals and aggregate transaction value of deals they have 
advised on over the sample period from 2005 to 2016. The top 100 M&A advisors, 
including both full-service and boutique banks, engaged in at least 15 M&A deals 
from 2005 to 2016. To make the list of the top 100 most active investment bankers, 
this study excludes deals advised by various investment banks and pays closer 
attention to advisors with multiple names (for example, Morgan Stanley, Morgan 
Stanley & Co). The issue of the same firm having multiple names is a common 
problem in the BoardEx database. Therefore, there are more than 100 banks in the 
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list of choice of M&A advisor. Finally, in advisor selection analysis, each acquirer is 
matched with 111 potential investment bankers (or 110 if the advisor selected is 
among the top 100 banks), which leads to 237,807 bidder-advisor pairs.  
This study then manually scrutinises the social ties between bidders and the sample 
of 111 (or 110) investment bankers in the BoardEx database. The first-degree 
connection is defined as acquirer and advisor firms sharing the same board member 
or top executives (CEO/CFO/President) during the acquisition period. 
Second-degree connection refers to two individual board members, respectively from 
the acquirer and the bank, serving on the same third board during the takeover 
announcement. Next, the logit (logistic) model is specified to analyse whether an 
acquirer-advisor pair is selected due to the connection between firms and banks. The 
logit regression function is defined as follows: 
prob(𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑠 𝑀&𝐴 𝑎𝑑𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟) = 𝑓(𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛, 𝑋 ) 
logit (𝑝(𝑠𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖






=  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡𝐷𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 +  𝛽2
∗ 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝐷𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 +  𝛽𝑖 ∗ 𝑋𝑖 + 𝜏𝑖 
where 𝑝(𝑠𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖
𝑘 ) is the probability that in the 𝑖𝑡ℎ deal, bidding firm employs 
investment banker 𝑘 as M&A advisor; 𝑋𝑖  refers to control variables including 
bank and deal characteristic; 𝜏𝑖 is year and industry fixed-effects for acquiring 
firm 𝑖 
In the logit regression, the dependent variable is the dummy variable, which equals 
one if advisor 𝑘 pair is selected in the 𝑖𝑡ℎ takeover transaction; zero otherwise. The 
 
190 
independent variable is social connection dummy variables, including first-degree 
connection dummy variable (which equals one when acquirers have first-degree 
connection with banks; zero otherwise) and second-degree connection dummy 
variable (which equals one when second-degree connection exists; zero otherwise). 
The bank and deal characteristics are also included as control variables. Year and 
industry fixed effects and firm-cluster effects are considered in the regressions. Table 
4.2 presents both coefficients and odds ratios to interpret the regression results. The 
odds ratio in a logit model is a ratio of the probability of success over the probability 
of failure. In the context of social connection, the odds ratio is defined as the 
probability of a certain bank being selected as M&A advisor divided by the 
probability of it not being selected. It ranges from 0 to positive infinity. 
[Insert Table 4.2 about here] 
Panel A of Table 4.2 reports the full sample where an acquirer appoints a particular 
investment bank as its advisor. The independent variable is the dummy variable for 
first-degree connection and second-degree connection between bidders and advisor 
candidates. The advisor characteristics are controlled in Models 2 and 3 of the 
advisor-selection analysis, including dummy variables for top-tier, full service and 
M&A advisory service. 
Additionally, the investment bankers are classified by their advisor reputation in 
accordance with Golubov et al. (2012). The financial advisors rank (top 25) comes 
from the Thomson One database ranked by the total deal value advised over the 
period from 2005 to 2016. The top 8 advisors are defined as the top tier, all of which 
are full-service investment banks in this study. The dummy variable of top tier 
advisor equals one if the bank is listed among the top 8 financial advisors; zero 
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otherwise. The full-service advisor dummy variable has a value of one if the 
investment bank provides full-line financial services. The M&A advisory dummy 
equals one if the investment bank emphasises M&A advisory service in his official 
web (usually boutique advisor). The coefficient for second-degree connection is 
significant and negative, indicating that acquirers are less likely to employ advisors 
who are linked by a second-degree connection. The finding can be explained by the 
board position of the connected directors, the majority of which serve as independent 
directors in acquirers’ or/and banks’ board. Independent directors do not engage in 
firms’ daily business and have less power deciding M&A advisors. Moreover, to 
avoid potential conflicts of interest and to ensure the independence of outside 
directors, acquirers’ management may not select advisors who are socially linked 
with them. In Models 2 and 3 with the year and industry fixed-effects, the 
explanatory variables for investment bank characteristics show a strong and positive 
relationship with acquirers’ choice of M&A advisor. Bidding firms are prone to 
appointing top-tier investment banks as M&A advisors. Full-service investment 
banks are more likely to be selected by acquiring firms. Additionally, bidders are 
highly likely to consider M&A advisory experts when initiating acquisition attempts. 
Next, the chapter examines the effect of social connection on acquirers’ decision to 
hire full-service investment banks in Panel B. The dependent variable is a dummy 
variable which equals one if a paricular investment bank is hired as M&A advisor 
with the subsample of full-service advisor candidates. Both first-degree connection 
and second-degree connection take a negative sign and are statistically significant at 
the 1% level. The findings indicate that social connection generates negative impacts 
on advisors’ decision. Güner, Malmendier, and Tate (2008) find that acquirers’ board 
directors who concurrently sit on the board of the M&A advisor would favour their 
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own investment banks and act against the interests of the acquirers’ shareholders, 
therefore negatively affecting acquisition performance. Therefore, acquiring firms 
avoid employing socially linked full-service advisors due to conflicts of interest. The 
takeover deal characteristics are controlled in Models 2 and 3, which may affect the 
advisor-selection process. Moreover, both the year and industry fixed effects are 
included in Model 3. The coefficient of deal size is positive and significant, 
suggesting that acquirers are more likely to choose full-service banks in deals of a 
larger transaction value. In addition, tender offers increase the likelihood of a 
full-service advisor been selected. Our findings support the scale hypothesis in Song 
et al. (2013) that acquiring firms take into account the deal size when choosing M&A 
advisors and that full-service investment banks are more likely to be chosen in 
takeover deals of a larger size.  
Panel C of Table 4.2 analyses how social ties with boutique investment banks 
influence acquirer-advisor selection. The dummy dependent variable equals one if 
particular boutique banks are selected to advise takeover deals from the subsample of 
boutique advisor candidates. Similar to the findings in Panel A and Panel B, 
second-degree connection remains negative and significant at the 1% level. However, 
the first-degree connection is positively associated with advisors’ choice, suggesting 
that acquirers are more likely to pick boutique banks who share a board director. 
Furthermore, boutique advisors are classified as global boutique advisors and 
domestic boutique banks according to the business scope. The results in Panel D and 
Panel E show that first-degree connections between domestic boutique advisors and 
acquirers highly and significantly increase the probability of banks being appointed. 
The odds ratio of first-degree connection is as high as 4.27 with deal characteristics 
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and fixed-effects controlled. This indicates that with first-degree connections, the 
probability of boutique investment banks being selected is four times the probability 
of not being picked in the subsample of domestic boutique advisor. This finding is 
consistent with Hypothesis 1. According to Anand and Galetovic (2006), the 
investment banking market is highly competitive. Most bank competitors provide 
similar financial services to clients. M&A advisory service contributes a great share 
to banks’ profit. In general, top-ranked advisors, usually full-service banks, occupy 
the majority of market share of takeover services. Compared with boutique banks, 
full-service advisors have a sizeable advantage in terms of information, experience 
and external resources. Their valuable resources and reputation attract potential 
clients who proactively choose full-service banks as financial advisors. After the 
2007 financial crisis, elite boutique banks, which deliver global financial services, 
started to grab M&A market share from the “bulge bracket” full-service banks. 
However, the competition for smaller boutique banks that focus on US and regional 
markets is still fierce. Therefore, domestic boutique advisors have a strong incentive 
to establish social connections with firms for business. Firms are willing to select 
connected banks as their advisors due to the information advantage and familiarity 
effects in social connection as well as similar services provided in the advisory 
market. Our findings in Panel E provide empirical evidence that first-degree 
connections help domestic boutique advisors to “win” M&A advisory service and 
bidding firms are willing to select closely connected banks.  
Advisor and takeover deal characteristics are controlled in Model 2 of Panel D, and 
Panel E. Model 3 includes the additional year and industry fixed effects. The 
acquirer-clustering effect is considered in all models. Smaller deal size and hostile 
deal type increase the likelihood of an acquirer hiring a boutique bank, including 
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both global and domestic boutique investment banks, as their M&A advisor. 
Moreover, bidding firms are more likely to consider a global boutique advisor in 
private transactions while a toehold deal type reduces the probability of a global 
boutique bank being appointed. Consistent with Song et al. (2013), boutique advisors 
are more likely to be involved in smaller-sized deals and complex transactions due to 
their skill and independence. Hostile, tender offer and non-toehold deals increase the 
difficulty and complexity of takeover transactions. Compared with domestic 
boutique advisors, global boutique investment banks have more advantage in terms 
of their expertise and independence and are therefore more likely to be appointed in 
complicated takeover deals, including hostile, tender offer, non-toehold, and private 
acquisitions. 
4.5.2 Acquisition premium 
Acquisition premium reflects the negotiation power between acquirers and targets 
and has a substantial impact on post-acquisition performance. Advisors connected 
with bidders, especially domestic boutique advisors, have a strong incentive to 
negotiate a low acquisition premium in order to maintain a long-run relationship and 
gain future business. This section classifies the acquisition sample by types of 
advisors and examines the relationship between a social connection and takeover 
premium. Since the private deals account for 68.69% of the full sample, the 
acquisition premium is calculated for both public deals and private transactions to 
improve data availability. Public acquisitions refer to transactions in which acquirers 
and targets are publicly listed while private acquisitions are deals in which public 
acquirers take over private target firms. The offer premium in public deals is 
measured as the log percentage difference between offer price (from Thomson One) 
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and target stock price four weeks before the takeover announcement (from CRSP). 
For private acquisitions, the premium is obtained by constructing a comparable 
portfolio with public transactions and calculating an acquisition discount for each 
private deal (Officer, 2007). According to Officer (2007), acquisition discounts are 
due to illiquidity in selling private targets. Private targets are not able to sell their 
firms quickly and easily, unlike public firms. Therefore, private target firms would 
accept a discount in terms of acquisition premium relative to comparable public 
firms. 
Following the procedures in Officer (2007), this study first constructs a comparable 
portfolio with public transactions for each private takeover deal. The targets in the 
corresponding public deals are required to operate in the same industry as the private 
targets. That is, private targets must have the same two-digit SIC code as the public 
targets in the comparable portfolio. The deal value excluding liabilities assumed 
(from Thomson One) for comparable transactions is allowed to range from 80% to 
120% of that of the private acquisitions. Furthermore, the corresponding sample is 
required to announce over the period from one-and-half-years before to 
one-and-half-years after the takeover announcement of private deals. The discount in 
the acquisition premium is calculated as the percentage difference between the 
acquisition multiple of the private target and an average multiple of the public deals 
in the comparable portfolio. Consistent with Officer (2007), four types of acquisition 
multiple are adopted, including the ratio of the transaction value to EBITDA, 
transaction value to sales, P/E ratio and price to book value of equity. Finally, the 
premium for target transactions is measured as the product of the corresponding 




[Insert Table 4.3 about here] 
Table 4.3 reports the multivariate regressions for premium analysis. Panel A analyses 
the effect of social connection using the sample of public and private acquisitions 
while Panel B shows results for only public deals. The firm-clustering effects are 
considered in all models. Deal characteristics are controlled in Model 2 and Model 3. 
The additional year and industry fixed-effects are included in Model 3. The 
dependent variables in Table 4.3 are the logarithm of an acquisition premium. In 
deals advised by full-service banks, both first-degree connection and second-degree 
connection are positively associated with premium. However, a first-degree 
connection with a boutique advisor, especially a domestic boutique advisor, 
significantly reduces the acquisition premium paid by acquirers. 
In the deals where acquirers and full-service banks have a first-degree connection, all 
the overlapping directors are appointed as independent directors in the full-service 
investment banks. 90.20% (46/51) of connected directors hold independent 
directorships in full-service investment banks. Independent directors mainly play a 
monitoring role in the corporate governance and financial disclosure. According to 
(Subrahmanyam et al., 1997), independent directors in banks generally lack 
professional knowledge and expertise in investment banking services due to the 
regulation of antitrust and banking laws. Therefore, connection with independent 
directors in full-service banks does not bring large information advantage to bidding 
firms. 
More importantly, full-service banks are more likely to form and maintain 
firm-banking relationships and therefore could establish wider networks. A possible 
explanation is that full-service investment banks provide a full-range business while 
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boutique banks generally offer single or a few service lines. Chapter 4 shows that in 
75% of full-service connected deals, acquirers’ advisors had also built client 
relationships with target firms through previous equity and debt issuance. According 
to Fernando, May, and Megginson (2012), firm-banking relationships built via equity 
and debt issuance are more valuable to investment banks than relationships 
generated in M&A, since the information obtained in the M&A transactions may 
lose value after takeover deals are completed. In addition, first-degree connections 
between acquirers and advisors are established via personal network, mainly the 
network of independent directors. For full-service investment banks, relationships 
with targets are more valuable than connections with acquirers. Moreover, acquirers 
which hire connected full-service banks are more likely to face information 
monopoly and “locked-in” problems, resulting in more agency problems between 
acquirers and connected full-service advisors (Boot, 2000). Therefore, full-service 
investment banks would act against the interest of connected acquirers and negotiate 
higher acquisition premiums. 
In contrast, in connected boutique deals, 83.05% (49/59) of connected directors serve 
as executives in banks and bidders. Connections with top management could bring 
larger information advantage and mitigate the information asymmetry between 
acquirers and boutique advisors, resulting in fewer agency problems (Kosnik and 
Shapiro, 1997). Additionally, the issue of multiple firm-banking relations
29
 is less 
likely to occur in deals advised by boutique investment banks, since boutique 
advisors are more independent and have fewer business lines. Moreover, connected 
boutique advisors have more incentive to take more effort to negotiate a lower 
                                                 
29
 Here, the multiple firm-banking relationships refer to the situation where the acquirers’ advisors also 
have relation with target firms.  
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takeover premium and act in acquirers’ interests to maintain the firm-bank 
relationship. In all, the results indicate that social ties with a full-service advisor may 
lead to conflicts of interest while acquirers benefit from a connection with boutique 
banks by paying a lower premium. 
Moreover, in the subsample of deals with full-service banks, using cash as the 
payment method significantly reduces the acquisition premium (Moeller et al., 2004). 
Tender offers are positively related to premium (Bargeron et al., 2008; Moeller et al., 
2004; Officer, 2003). By excluding private acquisitions, similar findings are shown 
in Panel B that in public deals, acquisition premium is negatively associated with 
social connection with boutique banks and positively related to ties with full-service 
banks. 
4.5.3 Announcement return 
[Insert Table 4.4 about here] 
The study next addresses the valuation effect of social connection in the short run by 
analysing the announcement return of acquirers, targets, and combined firms. 
Short-run performance is measured using cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) with a 
five-day event window centred on the announcement day. Consistent with Brown 
and Warner (1985), the five-day CAR is calculated using the market model. The 
estimation period for parameters in the market model starts 200 trading days before 
the announcement date and ends 20 trading days before. This study then computes 
the daily abnormal return with the parameters and stock information from the CRSP 
database. Five-day CAR is finally obtained by summing up the daily returns over the 
event period (from 2 days before to 2 days after the takeover announcement). To 
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gauge the market reaction to connected and non-connected deals, we examine the 
five-day CAR of acquirers (ACAR(-2, +2)), targets (TCAR(-2, +2)) and combined 
firms (CCAR(-2, +2)). The five-day CAR of the combined entity is the 
value-weighted average of the five-day CAR of the bidding firms and the CAR of 
target firms. Since stock information is only available for publicly listed firms, 
TCAR(-2, +2) and CCAR(-2, +2) are missing in the sample of private acquisitions. 
Table 4.4 reports regression results estimated with the ordinary least square (OLS) 
method. All models control the firm, deal characteristics and acquirers-clustering 
effects. In Model 2, year and industry fixed effects are included.  
In Panel A of Table 4.4, the dependent variable is acquirer announcement return with 
a five-day event window. The coefficient of first-degree connection is insignificant 
regardless of which type of advisor is hired. The study further examines the 
relationship between social connection and acquirer announcement return in public 
deals and private transactions. And the un-tabulated results find similar results of 
acquirers’ short-run performance not being affected by social connection between 
bidding firms and investment banks. The possible explanation could be that the 
market does not recognise the acquirers’ connection with M&A advisors since the 
firm-banking linkage is formed via individual network. In addition, acquirers who 
hire connected full-service advisors are more likely to face information monopoly 
and “locked-in” problems, leading to larger agency problems between acquirers and 
targets. 
Panel B presents the multivariate analysis for target announcement return proxy by 
cumulative abnormal return with a five-day event window of target firms. In the 
sample of deals advised by full-service banks, first-degree connection exhibits a 
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strong (significant at 5% level) and positive relationship with Target CAR(-2, +2), 
consistent with the high acquisition premium received by target firms. In contrast, 
the coefficient of a first-degree connection takes a negative sign and is statistically 
significant at 5% when boutique banks are chosen. A possible explanation could be 
that 75% of connected full-service banks also know target firms via previous 
financial services. Moreover, the firm-banking relationship built via previous equity 
or debt issuance is more valuable as it could bring more knowledge and future 
business to investment banks (Fernando et al., 2012). Therefore, full-service 
investment banks would act against the interest of acquirers, negotiate lower 
premiums and deliver higher announcement return for target firms. In contrast, 
boutique banks are less likely to have a wide network via various business lines; 
connected boutique banks rely more on the social network and would better act in 
the interest of acquirers and negotiate a lower premium when bidding firms share the 
same board director with the banks (first-degree connection). The market reacts 
negatively to low takeover premiums, which is reflected in a lower announcement 
return of the target firms. 
Panel C shows the analysis of the abnormal return of combined firms. The average 
value-weighted CARs are positively and significantly (at 5% with fixed-effects 
controlled) associated with the first-degree connection when acquirers hire 
full-service banks in takeover transactions. In the subsample of boutique banks 
selected as advisors, however, no strong relationship is observed between social ties 
and the stock performance of combined firms. The findings indicate that connected 
full-service investment banks which also know target firms would place the interests 
of the combined entities over the interest of connected acquirers. 
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Consistent with the prior literature, in the full sample, an increase in acquirers’ 
leverage, deals with a hostile attitude and payment with cash (Travlos, 1987) 
improve acquirers’ announcement performance while a diversification deal (Morck, 
Shleifer, & Vishny, 1990) reduces the acquirer's announcement return. In addition, 
the announcement returns of target firms are positively related to the acquirers’ 
Tobin’s q (Dong et al., 2006), cash as the method of payment (Y.-S. Huang & 
Walkling, 1987) and transactions in which acquirers and targets do not operate in the 
same industry. Regarding combined announcement return, acquisitions paid with 
cash have a higher return during the announcement period. The sign and significance 
of the coefficients in the subsample of full-service advisors are similar to the 
coefficients of the explanatory variables in the full sample. When boutique advisors 
are hired, the results show that acquisition with cash used as the payment medium 
exhibit higher acquirers’ return during the announcement period (Travlos, 1987). 
Acquirers’ Tobin’s q and targets Tobin’s q (Dong et al., 2006) have positive effects 
on target announcement return while acquirer leverage shows a negative relation. 
4.5.4 Long-run post-acquisition performance 
Finally, this chapter re-examines the effect of social connection between acquirers 
and investment bankers by studying post-acquisition performance in the long run. To 
be specific, long-run performance is evaluated using buy-and-hold return as a proxy 
for stock performance, industry-adjusted return on assets as a measurement for 
operating performance and cash flow performance. According to the previous 
findings, full-service advisors with a social connection give priority to deal 
completion and sacrifice acquirers’ shareholder interest while connected boutique 
banks negotiate better takeover terms for acquirers in order to maintain firm-bank 
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relationship. Acquirers could benefit from a social linkage with boutique advisors 
and achieve more valuable and profitable acquisitions. Therefore, bidding firms are 
expected to earn better long-run return and performance in deals advised by 
connected boutique advisors. This study undertakes multivariate analysis estimated 
by the ordinary least square (OLS) method and considers acquirer-clustering effects 
in all regressions. Additionally, firm and deal characteristics are included as 
explanatory variables with the year and industry fixed effects controlled. 
4.5.4.1 Buy-and-Hold Return (BHAR) 
In this subsection, long-term stock performance is measured using buy-and-hold 
abnormal return (BHAR). BHAR is computed as the difference between the 
buy-and-hold return of acquirers and buy-and-hold return of reference portfolios. 
Following Bouwman et al. (2007), this study identifies 50 reference portfolios for 
acquiring firms, classified by market valuation and Tobin’s Q ratio. Then, the 
buy-and-hold return of reference portfolios is calculated by compounding the 
average return of each portfolio for the event period. Finally, the size-adjusted 
BHAR is obtained by subtracting the BHAR of the reference portfolio from the 
BHAR of acquiring firms. This study analyses acquirers’ buy-and-hold return for 
3-month, 6-month, 9-month, 12-month, 24-month and 36-month periods. 
[Insert Table 4.5 about here] 
In Table 4.5, Panel A, Panel B and Panel C show acquirers’ long-run stock return for 
the full sample, the sample of deals advised by full-service banks and the sample of 
boutique banks fired as M&A advisors, respectively. In Panel A, first-degree 
connection shows a positive and significant (at 10%) relationship with acquirers’ 
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buy-and-hold return for 3 months after takeover announcement. However, the 
positive relationship does not exist when holding acquirers’ stocks for over 3 months 
in the full sample. In Panel B, the coefficients for first-degree connection in all 
regressions enter take a negative sign and are statistically significant over the holding 
period from 3 months to 36 months after the announcement day when acquirers hire 
full-service investment banks. The longer period over which acquirers’ stocks are 
held, the more negative relationship we find between the acquirers and connected 
full-service advisors. The results indicate that acquirers suffer a loss in 
post-acquisition stock performance in the long term when employing full-service 
investment banks who share the same board member (first-degree connection). 
These findings are consistent with our expectations, which can be explained by the 
fact that full-service banks who are closely linked with acquirers are motivated to 
complete deals since advisory fees are charged based on the completion of 
transactions. 
Panel C of Table 4.5 reports the buy-and-hold return analysis when acquirers select 
boutique banks as M&A advisors. We observe that first-degree connection with 
boutique advisors is positively associated with long-run stock return of acquirers. 
Moreover, first-degree connection significantly increases buy-and-hold return within 
one-year holding period. The strong and positive relationship remains between 
acquirers and boutique advisors even with year and industry fixed effects controlled 
when holding acquirers’ stocks for 3 months, 6 months and 9 months after takeover 
announcement. However, we find no strong relationship if the holding period is 
longer than 9 months, suggesting that the positive effect of connection on 
post-acquisition stock performance can only last for less than one year. The results 
provide evidence that acquirers benefit from closer connection with boutique 
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advisors and achieve significantly better stock return in the long run. 
In addition, buy-and-hold return is reduced in deals with larger transaction value 
relative to acquirers’ firm size, transactions paid with stock method and deals 
involving multiple bidding firms. Moreover, acquirers with a larger market-to-book 
value ratio earn less long-run stock return. 
4.5.4.2 Industry-adjusted Return on Assets (IAROA) 
[Insert Table 4.6 about here] 
Next, this chapter investigates the impact of social connection on long-run operating 
performance. The proxy metric used to study this impact is acquirers’ 
industry-adjusted return on assets (IAROA) for the year after the announcement date. 
The industry-adjusted ROA is that the acquirers’ ROA minus the median ROAs for 
firms operating in the same industry and with the same first two digits of Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) code as the acquirers. Return on assets (ROA) is 
obtained using the yearly net income divided by the total assets from the 
COMPUSTAT database. Due to the availability of the data, this study considers the 
industry-adjusted ROAs of acquirers for one fiscal year after takeover announcement. 
Table 4.6 presents multivariate regression analysis with firm and deal characteristics 
as explanatory variables. In addition, the study controls the firm-clustering effects in 
all models and includes year and industry fixed effects in Model 2. 
In the full sample and the sample with full-service M&A advisors, the effect of 
first-degree connection is insignificant on acquirers’ operating performance in the 
fiscal year following takeover announcement. However, in the sample of deals 
advised by boutique banks, the coefficient of first-degree connection is positive and 
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statistically significant at 5% with additional fixed effects controlled. The findings 
provide further evidence that socially connected boutique advisors deliver better 
takeover deals for acquirers in terms of post-acquisition stock return and operating 
performance while the social connection with full-service banks does not improve 
acquirers’ long-run performance. 
Regarding the explanatory variables, acquirers’ industry-adjusted ROAs are 
positively associated with bidders’ return on equity pre-acquisition, tender offers and 
deals using cash as the medium of payment. Toehold deal type reduces the 
industry-adjusted ROAs. 
4.5.4.3 Cash Flow Performance 
[Insert Table 4.7 about here] 
Furthermore, this chapter analyses cash flow performance as another dimension of 
takeover outcomes in the long term. Following Gao (2011), this study uses acquirers’ 
operating cash flow gauged by total assets as the measurement of post-acquisition 
cash flow performance. Due to the availability of the data, this study adopts 
acquirers’ cash flow for the fiscal year just following the takeover announcement 
from the COMPUSTAT database. Similar to the industry-adjusted ROA, cash flow 
performance is adjusted by subtracting the median cash flow ratio of sample firms 
(excluding acquiring firm itself) who are in the same industry and in the same decile 
of excess cash reserve ratio with acquirers. According to Gao (2011), Healy et al. 
(1992) and Harford (1999), this study undertakes cash flow analysis by regressing 
post-acquisition cash flow on pre-takeover cash flow in various samples. Table 4.7 
presents cash flow analysis in the full sample (Panel A), the sample of full-service 
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advisors (Panel B) and the sample of boutique M&A advisors (Panel C). Due to the 
limited sample size for first-degree connected deals and second-degree connected 
deals
30
, the sample is classified by social connection into subsamples of connected 
deals and non-connected deals in Table 4.7. The dependent variable is the cash flow 
ratio of the acquiring firms one fiscal year after the takeover announcement while the 
independent variable is the cash flow ratio one fiscal year prior to the acquisition. 
The constant term in the regressions signifies the abnormal cash flow return for 
acquirers after acquisition transaction. 
In Panel A, non-connected deals are negatively and significantly related with 
post-acquisition cash flow performance while no abnormal cash flow return is 
observed in the deals with connection. In deals advised by full-service banks (Panel 
B), acquirers who have a social connection with full-service banks earn -1.44% 
abnormal cash flow returns on average in the fiscal year post-acquisition. 
Non-connected deals with full-service banks are negatively related to 
post-acquisition cash flow performance. However, in Panel C, social connection 
between boutique advisors and bidding firms increases the abnormal operating cash 
flow performance by an average of 1.25%. Additionally, acquirers in non-connected 
deals gain 0.26% abnormal return on average – less than the return earned by 
bidding firms in connected boutique deals. The findings suggest that acquirers could 
benefit from social connection with boutique advisors and achieve better 
post-acquisition cash flow performance while connection with full-service advisors 
                                                 
30
 In the full sample, there are 41 deals with first-degree connection and 59 deals with second-degree 
connection. In the sample with full-service advisors, 19 deals are connected with first-degree 
connection, and 22 deals are connected with second-degree connection. In the sample with boutique 
advisors, there are 30 deals with first-degree connection and 29 deals with second-degree connection. 
Small sample size may lead to a small degree of freedom, resulting in inaccurate regression results. 
Therefore, in cash flow analysis, sample is only divided into connected and non-connected deals. 
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reduces cash flow return. Cash flow analysis further supports the agency conflict 
hypothesis that connected boutique advisors would serve in the interest of acquirers 
while full-service banks with social connection may act against acquirers’ interest. 
4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter emphasises the social connection between acquirers and investment 
banks and examines the role of social connection in deals advised by full-service 
banks or deals involving boutique investment banks. Specifically, this chapter 
investigates the connection effect in acquirers’ advisor-selection decisions, 
acquisition premium, takeover announcement return and long-run post-acquisition 
performance. The empirical results show the different or even opposite impact of 
social connection in takeover outcomes, which is attributed to the essential 
difference between full-service investment banks and boutique advisors. Full-service 
banks deliver full-spectrum financial services, including trading, security issuance, 
M&A advisory, etc. In contrast, boutique advisors concentrate on M&A advisory 
services or specialise in particular industries, such as healthcare, technology or 
media, etc. Generally, boutique advisors are small, infamous and independent 
investment banks while full-service ones are bulge-bracket, prestigious banks. 
Combining the social network theory and the investment bank characteristics, the 
findings show that boutique banks rely more on social connection to pursue M&A 
advisory serveries. Moreover, boutique banks, especially domestic boutique advisors, 
negotiate better deal terms and deliver more favourable takeover outcomes to closely 
connected bidding firms. Specifically, the existence of first-degree connection (board 
interlock) significantly increases the likelihood that bidders employ connected 
boutique advisors, particularly domestic boutique banks. However, acquirers are less 
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likely to hire boutique banks with second-degree connection due to independent 
director positions. Moreover, acquirers who share an overlapping director with their 
boutique advisor (first-degree connection) pay significantly lower acquisition 
premiums to target firms, therefore resulting in lower target announcement return. 
No strong relationship is observed between social connection and acquirers’ 
announcement return in boutique deals, implying that the market may not recognise 
the firm-banking relationship and therefore does not reflect it in terms of stock price 
movement. In the long run, acquiring firms who have a closer relationship with 
boutique advisors outperform those bidders without a banking connection in terms of 
their stock performance and operating performance for the year following the 
takeover announcement. 
However, social connection with full-service banks generates a negative influence 
for acquirers. This study shows that bidding firms are less likely to hire connected 
full-service advisors, which can be explained by independent director positions and 
concerns of potential agency conflicts. The empirical findings in deals with 
full-service banks confirm the existence of agency problems between acquiring firms 
and connected full-service banks. Acquirers who are socially linked with full-service 
advisors pay a higher takeover premium. Similarly, this study finds no significant 
difference in terms of acquirer announcement return between connected full-service 
deals and non-connected ones. However, social connection with full-service advisors 
significantly improves the announcement return for targets and combined entities, 
implying that connected full-service banks may prioritise the interests of the 
combined firm rather than those of the bidders. The results could be interpreted that 
full-service investment banks have large and wide social networks with a large 
amount of potential client firms and they know both acquirers and targets. Therefore, 
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even as the advisors of bidding firms, full-service banks may not serve exclusively in 
the interests of bidders. Furthermore, social connection is negatively associated with 
long-run performance, measured by buy-and-hold return and industry-adjusted return 
on assets. However, connection with full-service banks enhances the cash flow 
performance in the year following acquisition. 
In a nutshell, acquiring firms benefit from social connection with boutique banks, 
especially domestic boutique advisors, and achieve better deals. Closely connected 
boutique banks serve in the interests of the bidding firms and negotiate more 
favourable deal terms for acquirers. However, full-service banks with social 
connections act against the interest of bidder clients and do not improve the deal 
quality for acquirers. 
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Table 4.1 – Descriptive statistics 
Table 4.1 reports the descriptive statistics for our takeover sample from 2005 to 2016. The study first presents the summary statistics for the full sample in Panel A. 
Then the full sample is split into deals with full-advisors (Panel B) and deals with boutique advisors (Panel C). In each panel, the sample is classified by social 
connection between acquirers and their M&A advisors. Social connection refers to the social network through personal linkage of board directors, including 
first-degree connection and second-degree connection. First-degree connection (so called board interlock) is defined when bidding firms and investment banks 
share the same board members during the acquisition period while second-degree connection refers to the situation where two individual board members, 
respectively from bidders and banks, serve on the same board of a third firm during the acquisition period. The mean and SD standard deviation (or number of 
observations and percentage for dummy variables) is reported for acquisition partners and deal characteristics. The definition of variables is listed in Appendix A. 
***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%-, 5%- and 10%-level, respectively. 
 
Panel A full sample  
Variables 
Full sample (І) 
Connected deals  
(ΙΙ) 
1st-degree 







Mean SD (or %) Mean SD (or %) Mean SD (or %) Mean SD (or %) (ΙΙ) - (Ⅳ) (ΙΙΙ) - (Ⅳ) 
Panel A: Acquirer related 
Tobin's Q 3.5465 8.7649 2.8265 4.7093 3.8635 4.2563 3.5767 8.8939 -0.7502 0.2868 
Market Value 10929 30098 20448 51149 15410 51382 10593 29046 9855.000*** 4817.0000 
Leverage 0.2082 0.2248 0.2142 0.2092 0.2029 0.1823 0.2080 0.2254 0.0062 -0.0051 
Return on Equity (ROE) 0.08881 0.9777 0.0154 0.4463 -0.0450 0.6474 0.0919 0.9936 -0.0764 -0.1369 
Panel B: Target related 
Tobin's Q 2.8313 8.2405 6.1532 21.603 -0.4238 8.9650 2.7112 7.3388 3.4420* -3.1350 
Market Value 4577.5 18934 12315 15718 9112.5 13731 4371.4 18983 7943.6000 4741.1000 
Leverage 0.1947 0.2667 0.2136 0.1786 0.1696 0.1287 0.1940 0.2695 0.0196 -0.0244 
Return on Equity (ROE) 0.0032 2.3062 -0.0083 0.3051 0.1071 0.1078 0.0036 2.3481 -0.0119 0.1035 
Panel C: Deal related 
Transaction value ($millions) 1333.0 5702.4 5098.0 17430 2692.8 7550.0 1184.5 4623.5 3913.5000*** 1508.3000 
Relative deal size 0.4442 1.1433 0.4600 0.8275 0.4008 0.5477 0.4436 1.1530 0.0164 -0.0428 
Premium (%) 0.2157 5.4301 0.6807 1.8982 0.3793 0.2625 0.1992 5.5137 0.4815 0.1801 
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Hostile takeover 6 0.38% 3 3.00% 3 6.12% 3 0.20% 
  Tender offer 184 11.76% 6 6.00% 2 4.08% 178 12.15% 
  Competing bid 28 1.79% 5 5.00% 3 6.12% 23 1.57% 
  Diversification 768 49.07% 38 38.00% 22 44.90% 730 49.83% 
  Toehold 1506 96.23% 54 54.00% 31 63.27% 1452 99.11% 
  Pure cash deal 902 57.64% 33 33.00% 17 34.69% 869 59.32% 
  Pure stock deal 190 12.14% 9 9.00% 4 8.16% 181 12.35% 
  Time to resolution (in days) 78.465 92.433 96.585 115.09 82.263 85.692 77.750 91.385 18.8350* 4.5130 
Advisory fee (Total $millions) 9.9623 14.026 38.864 34.915 21.933 27.222 9.0080 11.830 29.8560** 12.9250* 
Advisory fee (% Deal value) 1.3104 3.4831 0.4791 0.3022 0.4837 0.3487 1.3378 3.5366 -0.8587 -0.8541 
Number of observations 1565 100 49 1465 
   
 
Panel B full-service sample 
Variables 
Full sample (І) Connected deals  (ΙΙ) 
1st-degree 







Mean SD (or %) Mean SD (or %) Mean SD (or %) Mean SD (or %) (ΙΙ) - (Ⅳ) (ΙΙΙ) - (Ⅳ) 
Panel A: Acquirer related 
        Tobin's Q 3.523 9.0628 1.9036 5.3758 3.1972 2.0946 3.573 9.1503 -1.2936 -0.3757 
Market Value 13978 32360 32240 61889 29271 73935 13492 31106 2969.2654*** 15778.1797 
Leverage 0.222 0.2182 0.2702 0.2490 0.2664 0.2081 0.220 0.2171 0.0038 0.0462 
Return on Equity (ROE) 0.126 0.8900 -0.01510 0.5982 -0.144 0.8966 0.1303 0.8974 0.1291 -0.2745 
Panel B: Target related 
Tobin's Q 2.8672 7.1326 3.2995 2.4967 3.1627 1.6986 2.8579 7.2004 0.1368 0.3048 
Market Value 5596 21111 17472 16529 15325 16025 5321 43.884 2147.5201* 10003.5730 
Leverage 0.2008 0.2414 0.2047 0.1694 0.1657 0.1310 0.2007 0.2430 0.0390 -0.0350 
Return on Equity (ROE) 0.021 1.4133 0.1071 0.1071 0.1490 0.1135 0.0197 1.4295 -0.0419 0.1293 
Panel C: Deal related 
          Transaction value ($millions) 1787.2 5782.5 5802.2971 10173.559 5535.5 10756 1670.4 5567.4 266.7971*** 3,865.1000 
Relative deal size 0.4558 1.2400 0.3201 0.3687 0.4160 0.4311 0.4594 1.2548 -0.0959 -0.0434 
Premium (%) 0.1600 6.1372 0.4101 0.2877 0.5416 0.2100 0.1539 6.2121 -0.1315 0.3877 




Tender offer 143 15.25% 2 4.878% 1 5.26% 141 15.72% 
  Competing bid 22 2.35% 2 4.878% 1 5.26% 20 2.23% 
  Diversification 458 48.83% 20 48.780% 9 47.37% 438 48.83% 
  Toehold 906 96.59% 23 56.098% 9 47.37% 883 98.44% 
  Pure cash deal 619 65.99% 18 43.902% 8 42.11% 601 67.00% 
  Pure stock deal 99 10.55% 1 2.439% 1 5.26% 98 10.93% 
  Time to resolution (in days) 89.545 97.774 129.16 136.45 109.24 97.866 88.393 96.247 19.9200** 20.8470 
Advisory fee (Total $millions) 12.103 13.071 52.500 . 52.500 . 11.836 12.690 
 
40.6640 
Advisory fee (% Deal value) 0.8981 2.4587 0.7190 . 0.7190 . 0.8993 2.4669 
 
-0.1803 
Number of observations 938 41 19 897 
   
 
Panel C boutique sample 
Variables 
Full sample (І) 
Connected deals  
(ΙΙ) 
1st-degree 







Mean SD (or %) Mean SD (or %) Mean SD (or %) Mean SD (or %) (ΙΙ) - (Ⅳ) (ΙΙΙ) - (Ⅳ) 
Panel A: Acquirer related 
          Tobin's Q 3.5869 8.2415 3.6469 3.9226 4.5298 5.6818 3.5832 8.4350 0.0637 0.9466 
Market Value 5337 24489 9061 35575 3281 5522 5144 23805 3916.9669 -1863.0308 
Leverage 0.1854 0.2339 0.1629 0.1507 0.1393 0.1303 0.1868 0.2380 -0.0239 -0.0475 
Return on Equity (ROE) 0.0260 1.1086 0.0435 0.2410 0.0540 0.2133 0.02490 1.1397 0.0186 0.0291 
Panel B: Target related 
          Tobin's Q 2.6969 11.511 8.7474 30.203 -4.0103 12.262 2.1232 7.8746 6.6242 -6.1335 
Market Value 641.33 1722.9 709.37 509.56 828.91 551.12 638.58 1755.4 70.7900 190.3300 
Leverage 0.1717 0.3466 0.2225 0.1952 0.1736 0.1464 0.1669 0.3578 0.0556 0.0067 
Return on Equity (ROE) -0.06730 4.2589 -0.1237 0.3933 0.06519 0.09772 -0.06200 4.4564 -0.0617 0.1272 
Panel C: Deal related 
          Transaction value ($millions) 584.53 5489.9 1555.90 539.3179 391.50 685.12 361.95 2008.2 1,238.1370 29.5500 
Relative deal size 0.4230 0.9411 0.5951 1.0954 0.3875 0.6469 0.4141 0.9326 0.1810 -0.0266 
Premium (%) 0.3989 1.6001 0.9963 2.8089 0.1358 0.03812 0.3554 1.4800 0.6409 -0.2196 
Hostile takeover 3 0.48% 1 1.69% 1 3.33% 2 0.35% 




Competing bid 6 0.96% 3 5.08% 2 6.67% 3 0.53% 
  Diversification 310 49.60% 18 30.51% 12 40.00% 292 51.59% 
  Toehold 600 96.00% 31 52.54% 13 43.33% 569 100.53% 
  Pure cash deal 283 45.28% 15 25.42% 9 30.00% 268 47.35% 
  Pure stock deal 91 14.56% 8 13.56% 3 10.00% 83 14.66% 
  Time to resolution (in days) 60.201 79.639 68.454 84.766 60.429 69.309 59.731 79.370 8.7230 0.6980 
Advisory fee (Total $millions) 5.1053 14.980 36.592 37.676 6.6500 8.9803 2.0083 4.4350 34.5837 4.6417 
Advisory fee (% Deal value) 2.2457 4.9961 0.4392 0.3101 0.3660 0.4002 2.4234 5.2048 -1.9842 -2.0574 





Table 4.2 – Advisor-selection decision 
Table 4.2 analyses the social connection effect in acquirers' advisor-selection decisions using models developed in Bouwman (2011). This study creates a list of 
potential investment banks, including selected advisors and the top 100 investment banks ranked by number of deals advised over the sample period from 2005 to 
2016. Each acquirer-advisor pair is manually checked for social connections in the BoardEx database. Table 4.2 shows both the coefficients and odds ratio for logit 
models. In Panel A, the dependent variable is the dummy variable, which equals one if a certain acquirer-advisor is chosen. In Panel B, the dependent variable is 
the dummy variable, which equals one if a particular investment bank is selected with the subsample of full-service advisor candidates. In Panel C, the dependent 
variable becomes a dummy variable, which equals one if a particular investment bank is selected with the subsample of boutique advisor candidates. In Panel D 
and E, the dependent variable is a dummy variable, which equals one if a particular investment bank is selected with the subsample of global boutique advisor 
candidates and domestic boutique advisors, respectively. In all panels, the independent variables for social connection are dummy variables for first-degree 
connection and second-degree connection. First-degree connection (so called board interlock) is defined when bidding firms and investment banks share the same 
board members during the acquisition period while second-degree connection refers to the situation where two individual board members, respectively from 
bidders and banks, serve on the same board of a third firm during the acquisition period. The deal and investment bank characteristics are controlled in Model 2. In 
addition, year and industry fixed effects are included in Model 3 for each panel. The definition of explanatory variable is reported in Appendix A. In all of the 
models, the firm-clustering effects for acquiring firms are considered. For brevity, the results for the industry and year dummies are not reported. Robust t-statistics 




Panel A full sample  
    
Panel A full sample  
   
Selected as acquirers' advisor 
Coefficient 
 
Selected as acquirers' advisor 
Odds ratio 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
         First-degree connection -0.1076 -0.1051 -0.0720 
 
First-degree connection 0.8980 0.9002 0.9305 
 
(-0.44) (-0.43) (-0.29) 
  
(-0.44) (-0.43) (-0.29) 
Second-degree connection -2.1305*** -2.1281*** -2.1640*** 
 
Second-degree connection 0.1188*** 0.1191*** 0.1149*** 
 
(-11.87) (-11.86) (-11.92) 
  








































Constant -4.4594*** -5.3775*** -5.3575*** 
 
Constant 0.0116*** 0.0046*** 0.0047*** 
 
(-363.60) (-113.49) (-100.37) 
  
(-363.60) (-113.49) (-100.37) 
         Year-fixed-effects No No Yes 
 
Year-fixed-effects No No Yes 
Industry-fixed-effects  No No Yes 
 
Industry-fixed-effects  No No Yes 
Firm-clustering effects Yes Yes Yes 
 
Firm-clustering effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 237,807 237,807 237,807 
 
Observations 237,807 237,807 237,807 
Pseudo R2 0.019 0.065 0.065 
 





Panel B full-service advisors subsample 
 
Panel B full-service advisors subsample 
Selected as acquirers' advisor 
Coefficient 
 
Selected as acquirers' advisor 
Odds ratio 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
         First-degree connection -0.6551** -0.9191*** -1.0031*** 
 
First-degree connection 0.5194** 0.3989*** 0.3667*** 
 
(-2.12) (-2.94) (-3.14) 
  
(-2.12) (-2.94) (-3.14) 
Second-degree connection  -2.2787*** -2.4898*** -2.5080*** 
 
Second-degree connection  0.1024*** 0.0829*** 0.0814*** 
 
(-9.25) (-9.88) (-9.90) 
  




























































































Constant -5.0537*** -6.5367*** -6.2982*** 
 
Constant 0.0064*** 0.0014*** 0.0018*** 
 
(-179.00) (-39.01) (-35.36) 
  
(-179.00) (-39.01) (-35.36) 
         
         Year-fixed-effects No No Yes 
 
Year-fixed-effects No No Yes 
Industry-fixed-effects  No No Yes 
 
Industry-fixed-effects  No No Yes 
Firm-clustering effects Yes Yes Yes 
 
Firm-clustering effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 216,645 216,645 216,645 
 
Observations 216,645 216,645 216,645 
Pseudo R2 0.019 0.032 0.035 
 
Pseudo R2 0.019 0.032 0.035 
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Panel C boutique advisors subsample 
 
Panel C boutique advisors subsample 
Selected as acquirers' advisor 
Coefficient 
 
Selected as acquirers' advisor 
Odds ratio 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
First-degree connection 0.7179** 0.6345* 0.7623** 
 
First-degree connection 2.0501** 1.8861* 2.1433** 
 
(2.24) (1.96) (2.29) 
  
(2.24) (1.96) (2.29) 
Second-degree connection -1.7691*** -1.6030*** -1.6438*** 
 
Second-degree connection  0.1705*** 0.2013*** 0.1933*** 
 
(-6.83) (-6.05) (-6.11) 
  









































































































Constant -4.3525*** -3.2511*** -3.3905*** 
 
Constant 0.0129*** 0.0387*** 0.0337*** 
 
(-172.49) (-22.45) (-21.17) 
  
(-172.49) (-22.45) (-21.17) 
         
         Year-fixed-effects No No Yes 
 
Year-fixed-effects No No Yes 
Industry-fixed-effects  No No Yes 
 
Industry-fixed-effects  No No Yes 
Firm-clustering effects Yes Yes Yes 
 
Firm-clustering effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 133,788 133,788 133,788 
 
Observations 133,788 133,788 133,788 
Pseudo R2 0.013 0.048 0.052 
 
Pseudo R2 0.013 0.048 0.052 
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Panel D  Global boutique advisors subsample 
 
Panel D  Global boutique advisors subsample 
Selected as acquirers' advisor 
Coefficient 
 
Selected as acquirers' 
advisor 
Odds ratio 
Model 1  Model 2 Model 3 
 
Model 1  Model 2 Model 3 
         First-degree connection 0.3644 0.4877 0.7470 
 
First-degree connection 1.4396 1.6285 2.1108 
 
(0.77) (1.01) (1.52) 
  
(0.77) (1.01) (1.52) 
Second-degree connection  -1.8013*** -1.6941*** -1.8011*** 
 
Second-degree connection  0.1651*** 0.1838*** 0.1651*** 
 
(-4.65) (-4.39) (-4.56) 
  
(-4.65) (-4.39) (-4.56) 








































































































Constant -4.5798*** -3.5211*** -3.7546*** 
 
Constant 0.0103*** 0.0296*** 0.0234*** 
 
(-79.19) (-12.56) (-11.94) 
  
(-79.19) (-12.56) (-11.94) 
         Year-fixed-effects No No Yes 
 
Year-fixed-effects No No Yes 
Industry-fixed-effects  No No Yes 
 
Industry-fixed-effects  No No Yes 
Firm-clustering effects Yes Yes Yes 
 
Firm-clustering effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 38,210 38,210 38,210 
 
Observations 38,210 38,210 38,210 
Pseudo R2 0.016 0.026 0.040 
 
Pseudo R2 0.016 0.026 0.040 
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Panel E Domestic boutique advisors subsample 
 
Panel E Domestic boutique advisors subsample 
Selected as acquirers' advisor 
Coefficient 
 
Selected as acquirers' advisor 
Odds ratio 
Model 1  Model 2 Model 3 
 
Model 1  Model 2 Model 3 
         First-degree connection 1.5606*** 1.3947*** 1.4517*** 
 
First-degree connection 4.7617*** 4.0336*** 4.2703*** 
 
(5.98) (4.70) (4.37) 
  
(5.98) (4.70) (4.37) 
Second-degree connection  -1.1612*** -1.3752*** -1.4063*** 
 
Second-degree connection  0.3131*** 0.2528*** 0.2450*** 
 
(-4.51) (-4.19) (-4.24) 
  









































































































Constant -4.6969*** -4.2096*** -4.2555*** 
 
Constant 0.0091*** 0.0149*** 0.0142*** 
 
(-103.05) (-14.05) (-12.76) 
  
(-103.05) (-14.05) (-12.76) 
         Year-fixed-effects No No Yes 
 
Year-fixed-effects No No Yes 
Industry-fixed-effects  No No Yes 
 
Industry-fixed-effects  No No Yes 
Firm-clustering effects Yes Yes Yes 
 
Firm-clustering effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 53,499 53,499 53,499 
 
Observations 53,499 53,499 53,499 
Pseudo R2 0.009 0.025 0.026 
 
Pseudo R2 0.009 0.025 0.026 
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Table 4.3 – Acquisition premium analysis 
Table 4.3 shows the multivariate regression results for acquisition premium analysis. Offer premium is computed for both public and private deals. The premium 
analysis is shown for public and private acquisition in Panel A, and the results for public deals only in Panel B. Acquisition premium in public deals is measured as 
the log percentage difference between offer price and target stock price four weeks before the takeover announcement. The premium for private deals is calculated 
by multiplying the average premium for comparable portfolio by one plus the acquisition discount (Officer, 2007) and then taking the logarithm of the premium. In 
each panel, the full sample is classified by types of advisors. The regression results are reported for the full sample and subsample of deals advised by full-service 
banks, boutique banks and domestic boutique banks, respectively. The independent variables for social connection are dummy variables for first-degree connection 
and second-degree connection. First-degree connection (so called board interlock) is defined when bidding firms and investment banks share the same board 
members during the acquisition period while second-degree connection refers to the situation where two individual board members, respectively from bidders and 
banks, serve on the same board of a third firm during the acquisition period. The deal and investment bank characteristics are controlled in Model 2 for each panel. 
Year and industry fixed effects are included in Model 3 for each panel. The definition for explanatory variable is reported in Appendix A. In all of the models, the 
firm-clustering effects for acquiring firms are considered. For brevity, the results for the industry and year dummies are not reported. Robust t-statistics are reported 




Panel A Public and Private deals  
       
Acquisition Premium 
Full sample Full service subsample Boutique subsample 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
          First-degree connection 0.0562 0.0382 0.2340 0.7102*** 0.7839*** 0.7896*** -0.8971*** -0.9744*** -0.8705** 
 
(0.22) (0.14) (1.01) (4.41) (4.27) (3.70) (-5.78) (-4.50) (-2.54) 
Second-degree connection  0.5339* 0.7885*** 0.7326** 0.5246*** 0.5980*** 0.5788*** 0.2480 0.8715 0.6783 
 
(1.78) (2.81) (2.47) (3.35) (3.16) (2.62) (0.46) (1.24) (0.81) 

































































Constant -1.3365*** -0.9480*** -1.3141*** -1.3912*** -0.9761*** -1.1051*** -1.1271*** -0.9556** -1.2746** 
 
(-29.38) (-3.90) (-4.60) (-29.33) (-3.46) (-3.78) (-11.00) (-2.10) (-2.03) 
          
          Year-fixed effects No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Industry fixed effects  No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Firm-clustering effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 729 729 729 515 515 515 214 214 214 





Panel A Public and Private deals (Continued) 
Acquisition Premium 
Domestic Boutique subsample 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
    First-degree connection -0.8429*** -0.8289** -0.9783*** 
 
(-3.09) (-2.61) (-2.66) 
Second-degree connection  0.6908 1.7893** 0.4271 
 
(0.57) (2.63) (0.62) 

























Constant -1.1373*** -0.8967* -1.6351** 
 
(-7.66) (-1.72) (-2.28) 
    
    Year-fixed effects No No Yes 
Industry fixed effects  No No Yes 
Firm-clustering effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 114 114 114 





Panel B Public takeover deals  
       
Acquisition Premium 
Full sample Full service subsample Boutique subsample 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
          First-degree connection -0.3435* -0.3254 -0.0295 0.5529*** 0.7611*** 0.7293*** -1.0484*** -1.1455*** -0.9189*** 
 
(-1.81) (-1.20) (-0.13) (2.84) (2.94) (3.00) (-6.96) (-6.24) (-3.26) 
Second-degree connection  0.1901 0.5335*** 0.4990* 0.4760*** 0.5824*** 0.5707** -0.4320* 0.2232 -0.4446 
 
(0.83) (2.81) (1.71) (2.72) (2.68) (2.33) (-1.71) (0.76) (-1.01) 

































































Constant -1.2791*** -0.6596*** -0.9570*** -1.3621*** -0.7829*** -0.8914*** -0.9757*** -0.5925* -1.1856** 
 
(-28.23) (-2.80) (-3.59) (-28.93) (-2.74) (-3.09) (-10.25) (-1.68) (-2.21) 
          
          Year-fixed effects No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Industry-fixed effects  No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Firm-clustering effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 459 459 459 345 345 345 114 114 114 





Panel B Public takeover deals (Continued) 
Acquisition Premium 
Domestic Boutique subsample 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
    First-degree connection -1.3321*** -1.6580*** -1.4137** 
 
(-3.65) (-9.27) (-2.52) 
Second-degree connection  0.0572 0.3590 0.5967 
 
(0.18) (1.33) (1.31) 

























Constant -1.0807*** -0.9499** -0.4275 
 
(-11.13) (-2.33) (-0.85) 
    
    Year-fixed effects No No Yes 
Industry-fixed effects  No No Yes 
Firm-clustering effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 83 83 83 
Adjusted R2 0.045 0.124 0.361 
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Table 4.4 – Announcement return analysis 
Table 4.4 presents the multivariate analysis for the announcement return for acquirers, targets and combined firms of bidders and targets. The five-day event (from 
2 days before to 2 days after the takeover announcement) cumulative abnormal return is calculated on the market model with an estimation period starting 365 days 
and ending 4 weeks before the M&A deal announcement. In Panel A, Panel B and Panel C, the dependent variables are announcement returns for acquirers, targets 
and combined firms, respectively. In each panel, the full sample is classified by types of advisors. Regression results are reported for the full sample and subsample 
of deals advised by full-service banks and boutique banks, respectively. The independent variables for social connection are dummy variables for first-degree 
connection and second-degree connection. First-degree connection (so-called board interlock) is defined when bidding firms and investment banks share the same 
board members during the acquisition period while second-degree connection refers to the situation where two individual board members, respectively from 
bidders and banks, serve on the same board of a third firm during the acquisition period. The deal and investment bank characteristics are controlled in Model 1. 
Year and industry fixed effects are controlled in Model 2 for each panel. The definition for the explanatory variable is reported in Appendix A. In all of the models, 
the firm-clustering effects for acquiring firms are considered. For brevity, the results for the industry and year dummies are not reported. Robust t-statistics are 




      
Acquirer CAR(-2,+2) 
Full sample Full service Boutique 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
First-degree connection -0.0273 -0.0305 -0.0458 -0.0348 -0.0275 -0.0374 
 
(-0.57) (-0.62) (-0.63) (-0.45) (-0.39) (-0.51) 
Second-degree connection  -0.0045 -0.0041 0.0029 0.0038 -0.0061 0.0082 
 
(-0.15) (-0.13) (0.09) (0.11) (-0.10) (0.12) 
Acquirer Tobin's Q 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0003 -0.0018 -0.0011 
 
(0.21) (0.23) (0.67) (0.87) (-1.36) (-0.80) 
Target Tobin's Q -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0003 0.0003 0.0005 
 
(-0.34) (-0.21) (-0.46) (-0.51) (0.24) (0.34) 
Acquirer Leverage 0.0509** 0.0452** 0.0507** 0.0350 0.0515 0.0703 
 
(2.45) (2.02) (2.24) (1.43) (1.28) (1.60) 
Target Tobin's Q 0.0203 0.0233 0.0381* 0.0413* 0.0176 0.0226 
 
(1.35) (1.51) (1.87) (1.94) (0.68) (0.83) 
Relative deal size -0.0018 -0.0027 -0.0036 -0.0051* -0.0008 -0.0015 
 
(-0.74) (-1.07) (-1.26) (-1.71) (-0.15) (-0.27) 
Hostile 0.0974* 0.1237** 0.0943 0.1584** 0.1386 0.1520 
 
(1.65) (2.03) (1.29) (2.11) (1.02) (1.01) 
Pure Cash Deal 0.0463*** 0.0452*** 0.0449*** 0.0456*** 0.0502** 0.0486** 
 
(5.93) (5.53) (5.31) (5.18) (2.61) (2.29) 
Competing 0.0205 0.0170 0.0236 0.0249 0.0018 -0.0305 
 
(1.13) (0.92) (1.24) (1.29) (0.04) (-0.60) 
Diversification -0.0144* -0.0144* -0.0195** -0.0178** -0.0055 -0.0147 
 
(-1.77) (-1.74) (-2.22) (-1.99) (-0.27) (-0.69) 
Constant -0.0217 -0.0203 -0.0092 -0.0121 -0.0331 -0.0120 
 
(-1.24) (-1.06) (-0.44) (-0.54) (-0.94) (-0.29) 
     
  
Year-fixed-effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Industry-fixed-effects  No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Firm-clustering effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1563 1563 938 938 625 625 




      
Target CAR(-2,+2) 
Full sample Full service Boutique 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
First-degree connection 0.0547 0.1719 0.5358** 0.5848** -0.2641** -0.2464** 
 
(0.37) (1.18) (2.36) (2.51) (-2.22) (-2.02) 
Second-degree connection  -0.1219 -0.0342 -0.1222 -0.0465 
  
 
(-1.01) (-0.29) (-1.07) (-0.41) 
  
Acquirer Tobin's Q 0.0035*** 0.0030** 0.0017 0.0015 0.0148*** 0.0128*** 
 
(2.91) (2.57) (1.38) (1.29) (4.52) (4.49) 
Target Tobin's Q -0.0019 -0.0016 -0.0035** -0.0029* 0.0054* 0.0016 
 
(-1.26) (-1.12) (-2.28) (-1.94) (1.85) (0.51) 
Acquirer Leverage -0.0649 -0.0654 0.1141 0.0597 -0.4141*** -0.3201** 
 
(-0.92) (-0.91) (1.41) (0.72) (-3.10) (-2.26) 
Target Tobin's Q 0.0944* 0.0885* -0.0974 -0.0913 0.2716*** 0.2629*** 
 
(1.92) (1.83) (-1.41) (-1.30) (3.06) (3.44) 
Relative deal size -0.0116 -0.0100 -0.0133 -0.0135 0.0051 0.0179 
 
(-1.54) (-1.30) (-1.48) (-1.49) (0.24) (0.67) 
Hostile 0.0067 0.0034 0.1910 0.1151 0.1917 0.0382 
 
(0.05) (0.02) (0.84) (0.51) (1.52) (0.25) 
Pure Cash Deal 0.0608** 0.0520** 0.0508* 0.0452* 0.0109 -0.0195 
 
(2.41) (2.07) (1.88) (1.68) (0.17) (-0.30) 
Competing -0.0409 -0.0634 -0.0272 -0.0562 0.0324 0.0564 
 
(-0.74) (-1.17) (-0.46) (-0.96) (0.22) (0.37) 
Diversification 0.0799*** 0.0924*** 0.0769*** 0.0858*** 0.0537 0.1040 
 
(3.06) (3.63) (2.77) (3.12) (0.87) (1.35) 
Constant 0.2346*** 0.2065*** 0.2574*** 0.2136*** 0.1608 0.1506 
 
(4.16) (3.47) (3.81) (3.05) (1.33) (1.01) 
     
  
Year-fixed-effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Industry-fixed-effects  No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Firm-clustering effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 476 476 369 369 107 107 
Adjusted R2 0.053 0.141 0.065 0.136 0.265 0.359 
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Panel C:    
Combined CAR(-2,+2) 
Full sample Full service Boutique 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
First-degree connection 0.0388 0.0595 0.1305* 0.1650** 0.0014 -0.0454 
 
(0.96) (1.40) (1.95) (2.35) (0.02) (-0.73) 
Second-degree connection  -0.0418 -0.0236 -0.0386 -0.0229 
  
 
(-1.19) (-0.66) (-1.14) (-0.67) 
  
Acquirer Tobin's Q -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0014 -0.0017 
 
(-0.79) (-0.74) (-0.47) (-0.20) (-0.93) (-0.88) 
Target Tobin's Q 0.0002 0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0002 0.0014* 0.0017* 
 
(0.54) (0.44) (-0.14) (-0.39) (1.79) (1.81) 
Acquirer Leverage 0.0459** 0.0249 0.0676** 0.0304 -0.0291 -0.0206 
 
(2.01) (1.00) (2.57) (1.06) (-0.54) (-0.30) 
Target Tobin's Q -0.0070 -0.0055 -0.0039 -0.0019 -0.0160 -0.0167 
 
(-0.46) (-0.36) (-0.18) (-0.08) (-1.38) (-0.81) 
Relative deal size 0.0013 0.0001 0.0011 -0.0007 -0.0021 0.0019 
 
(0.57) (0.05) (0.40) (-0.25) (-0.30) (0.24) 
Tender Offer 0.0047 0.0055 0.0022 0.0032 0.0194 0.0199 
 
(0.55) (0.64) (0.25) (0.35) (0.87) (0.71) 
Pure Cash Deal 0.0180** 0.0174** 0.0183** 0.0191** 0.0052 -0.0114 
 
(2.19) (2.06) (2.09) (2.16) (0.17) (-0.36) 
Competing 0.0290* 0.0272 0.0348* 0.0349* 0.0123 -0.0145 
 
(1.66) (1.50) (1.87) (1.83) (0.23) (-0.27) 
Diversification -0.0072 -0.0067 -0.0141 -0.0112 0.0338 0.0373 
 
(-0.88) (-0.80) (-1.58) (-1.23) (1.38) (1.57) 
Constant 0.0112 0.0092 0.0104 0.0108 0.0343 0.0321 
 
(0.65) (0.51) (0.51) (0.51) (0.92) (0.77) 
     
  
Year-fixed-effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Industry-fixed-effects  No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Firm-clustering effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 476 476 369 369 107 107 
Adjusted R2 0.014 0.016 0.044 0.062 0.0035 0.0080 
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Table 4.5 – Buy-and-hold return (BHAR) analysis 
Table 4.5 reports the relationship between social connection and long-run stock performance, measured using buy-and-hold return (BHAR). BHAR is computed as 
the difference between the buy-and-hold return of acquirers and the buy-and-hold return of reference portfolios. Following Bouwman et al. (2009), 50 reference 
portfolios are identified for acquiring firms, classified by their market valuation and Tobin’s Q ratio. Then, the buy-and-hold return of reference portfolios is 
calculated by compounding the average return of each portfolio for the event period. Finally, the size-adjusted BHAR is obtained by subtracting the BHAR of the 
reference portfolio from the BHAR of the acquiring firms. This study includes the acquirers’ buy-and-hold return for 3-month, 6-month, 9-month, 12-month, 
24-month and 36-month periods. In Panel A, Panel B and Panel C, the full sample is classified by types of advisors. Regression results are reported for the full 
sample and subsample of deals advised by full-service banks and boutique banks, respectively. The independent variables for social connection are dummy 
variables for first-degree connection and second-degree connection. First-degree connection (so-called board interlock) is defined when bidding firms and 
investment banks share the same board members during the acquisition period while second-degree connection refers to the situation where two individual board 
members, respectively from bidders and banks, serve on the same board of a third firm during the acquisition period. The deal and investment bank characteristics 
are controlled in Model 1. Year and industry fixed effects are included in Model 2 for each panel. The definition for explanatory variables is reported in Appendix. 
In all of the models, the firm-clustering effects for acquiring firms are considered. For brevity, the results for the industry and year dummies are not reported. 








      
Full sample 
BHAR_3m BHAR_6m BHAR_9m 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
       
First-degree connection 0.0785* 0.0778* 0.0754 0.0766 0.0591 0.0833 
 
(1.88) (1.72) (1.03) (0.98) (0.78) (0.96) 
Second-degree connection  0.0134 0.0049 0.0087 -0.0004 0.0304 0.0164 
 
(0.64) (0.19) (0.25) (-0.01) (0.60) (0.32) 
Acquirer Tobin's Q -0.0009* -0.0008 -0.0014 -0.0014 -0.0015 -0.0013 
 
(-1.76) (-1.51) (-1.11) (-1.05) (-1.54) (-1.27) 
Acquirer Leverage -0.0088 -0.0214 0.0972 0.1054 0.1064 0.1067 
 
(-0.25) (-0.58) (1.19) (1.36) (1.16) (1.26) 
Relative Deal Size 0.0049 0.0070 0.0038 0.0117 -0.0076 -0.0010 
 
(0.49) (0.69) (0.21) (0.67) (-0.39) (-0.05) 
Tender offer -0.0118 -0.0108 -0.0119 -0.0139 -0.0396 -0.0331 
 
(-0.79) (-0.69) (-0.47) (-0.54) (-1.35) (-1.11) 
Pure Stock deal -0.0710*** -0.0687*** -0.0699* -0.0678* -0.1172*** -0.1182*** 
 
(-2.86) (-2.79) (-1.84) (-1.79) (-2.92) (-2.96) 
Toehold -0.0130 -0.0195 -0.0740 -0.0930 -0.1119** -0.1148** 
 
(-0.45) (-0.67) (-1.12) (-1.39) (-2.03) (-2.03) 
Competing -0.0122 -0.0148 -0.0041 -0.0049 0.0227 0.0187 
 
(-0.45) (-0.52) (-0.11) (-0.11) (0.35) (0.27) 
Diversification 0.0088 0.0102 0.0024 -0.0034 0.0124 0.0123 
 
(0.74) (0.82) (0.13) (-0.18) (0.52) (0.50) 
Constant 0.0072 0.0092 0.0346 0.0611 0.0739 0.0612 
 
(0.24) (0.28) (0.49) (0.83) (1.26) (0.96) 
 
      
 
      
Year-fixed-effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Industry-fixed-effects  No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Firm-clustering effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1563 1563 1064 1064 1058 1058 
Adjusted R2 0.007 0.016 0.003 0.015 0.008 0.018 
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Panel A (Continued) 
     
Full sample 
BHAR_12m BHAR_24m BHAR_36m 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
       
First-degree connection 0.0128 0.0437 -0.1224 -0.1125 -0.1434 -0.1477 
 
(0.18) (0.54) (-1.39) (-1.25) (-1.09) (-0.99) 
Second-degree connection  0.0782 0.0707 0.0417 0.0617 0.1056 0.1241 
 
(1.33) (1.11) (0.74) (0.92) (0.89) (1.02) 
Acquirer Tobin's Q -0.0015 -0.0012 -0.0024 -0.0022 -0.0011 -0.0015 
 
(-1.21) (-0.95) (-1.31) (-1.12) (-0.46) (-0.61) 
Acquirer Leverage 0.1646 0.1549 0.1725 0.1961 0.3039 0.3325 
 
(1.34) (1.42) (1.08) (1.26) (1.29) (1.51) 
Relative Deal Size 0.0036 0.0104 -0.0352 -0.0250 -0.0492 -0.0465 
 
(0.15) (0.45) (-1.56) (-1.12) (-0.77) (-0.71) 
Tender offer -0.0587* -0.0571* -0.0357 -0.0313 -0.0780 -0.0851 
 
(-1.91) (-1.83) (-0.62) (-0.53) (-1.16) (-1.19) 
Pure Stock deal -0.1322** -0.1285** -0.1323* -0.1099 -0.1021 -0.0997 
 
(-2.55) (-2.47) (-1.84) (-1.49) (-1.20) (-1.12) 
Toehold -0.1667** -0.1632** -0.0711 -0.1054 0.0508 0.0199 
 
(-2.42) (-2.32) (-0.55) (-0.80) (0.29) (0.11) 
Competing 0.0662 0.0780 0.0407 0.0315 -0.2065* -0.2098 
 
(0.77) (0.88) (0.28) (0.20) (-1.68) (-1.49) 
Diversification 0.0052 0.0040 -0.0297 -0.0302 -0.0624 -0.0624 
 
(0.19) (0.14) (-0.68) (-0.65) (-1.07) (-1.00) 
Constant 0.1105 0.0801 0.0617 0.1002 -0.0419 -0.0080 
 
(1.53) (1.06) (0.46) (0.72) (-0.24) (-0.04) 
 
      
 
      
Year-fixed-effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Industry-fixed-effects  No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Firm-clustering effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1046 1046 877 877 727 727 




      
Full service sample 
BHAR_3m BHAR_6m BHAR_9m 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
       
First-degree connection -0.0171* -0.0214** -0.0182** -0.0174* -0.0527*** -0.0491** 
 
(-1.66) (-1.97) (-1.99) (-1.80) (-2.91) (-2.58) 
Second-degree connection  -0.0002 -0.0012 -0.0014 0.0005 -0.0153 -0.0158 
 
(-0.02) (-0.11) (-0.13) (0.03) (-0.67) (-0.65) 
Acquirer Tobin's Q -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0001 
 
(-0.59) (-0.50) (-0.99) (-1.01) (-0.79) (-0.58) 
Acquirer Leverage 0.0000 -0.0010 0.0183 0.0106 0.0038 -0.0084 
 
(0.00) (-0.09) (0.89) (0.55) (0.18) (-0.43) 
Relative Deal Size 0.0022 0.0017 -0.0071* -0.0071 -0.0062 -0.0059 
 
(0.58) (0.45) (-1.69) (-1.62) (-0.98) (-0.88) 
Tender offer -0.0037 -0.0067 -0.0105 -0.0130* -0.0094 -0.0082 
 
(-0.71) (-1.28) (-1.33) (-1.66) (-1.04) (-0.92) 
Pure Stock deal 0.0054 0.0036 0.0026 0.0016 0.0061 0.0059 
 
(0.78) (0.52) (0.26) (0.17) (0.62) (0.57) 
Toehold 0.0038 0.0017 -0.0136 -0.0124 -0.0115 -0.0067 
 
(0.57) (0.22) (-1.44) (-1.11) (-0.88) (-0.47) 
Competing -0.0084 -0.0057 -0.0089 -0.0064 -0.0294 -0.0296 
 
(-0.71) (-0.52) (-0.48) (-0.36) (-1.25) (-1.27) 
Diversification -0.0013 -0.0023 -0.0031 -0.0054 -0.0004 -0.0011 
 
(-0.37) (-0.64) (-0.62) (-1.00) (-0.06) (-0.17) 
Constant -0.0024 0.0007 0.0152 0.0182 0.0146 0.0107 
 
(-0.34) (0.08) (1.51) (1.45) (1.06) (0.65) 
 
      
 
      
Year-fixed-effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Industry-fixed-effects  No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Firm-clustering effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 938 938 897 897 879 879 
Adjusted R2 0.008 0.004 0.002 0.012 0.001 0.006 
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Panel B (Continued) 
      
Full service sample 
BHAR_12m BHAR_24m BHAR_36m 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
       
First-degree connection -0.0715*** -0.0656** -0.2857** -0.3260** -0.4572*** -0.4602** 
 
(-3.40) (-2.48) (-2.11) (-1.99) (-3.08) (-2.10) 
Second-degree connection  -0.0157 -0.0115 0.0720 0.0659 0.0064 -0.0047 
 
(-0.89) (-0.55) (0.89) (0.63) (0.05) (-0.03) 
Acquirer Tobin's Q 0.0002 0.0002 0.0003 0.0006 0.0007 0.0011 
 
(0.52) (0.64) (0.16) (0.34) (0.28) (0.40) 
Acquirer Leverage -0.0129 -0.0332 -0.0412 0.0148 0.0096 0.0649 
 
(-0.50) (-1.34) (-0.33) (0.11) (0.05) (0.31) 
Relative Deal Size 0.0109 0.0104 0.0178 0.0335 -0.0005 0.0139 
 
(0.63) (0.62) (0.37) (0.67) (-0.01) (0.21) 
Tender offer -0.0185* -0.0207* -0.0511 -0.0397 -0.1130 -0.1041 
 
(-1.71) (-1.81) (-0.80) (-0.61) (-1.52) (-1.35) 
Pure Stock deal 0.0035 0.0042 -0.1818** -0.1609** -0.1408 -0.1489 
 
(0.24) (0.29) (-2.35) (-2.03) (-1.54) (-1.56) 
Toehold -0.0223 -0.0164 -0.1318 -0.1737 -0.1150 -0.1377 
 
(-1.39) (-0.94) (-0.98) (-1.20) (-0.65) (-0.70) 
Competing -0.0231 -0.0191 0.0477 0.0275 -0.2165 -0.2279 
 
(-0.92) (-0.82) (0.27) (0.15) (-1.37) (-1.25) 
Diversification -0.0006 -0.0027 -0.0084 -0.0052 0.0027 0.0209 
 
(-0.07) (-0.30) (-0.16) (-0.09) (0.04) (0.29) 
Constant 0.0254 0.0168 0.1338 0.1803 0.1596 0.1975 
 
(1.49) (0.84) (0.98) (1.15) (0.88) (0.92) 
 
      
 
      
Year-fixed-effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Industry-fixed-effects  No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Firm-clustering effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 872 872 743 743 632 632 




      
Boutique sample 
BHAR_3m BHAR_6m BHAR_9m 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
       
First-degree connection 0.1532** 0.1385** 0.2165** 0.2035** 0.2430** 0.2475** 
 
(2.59) (2.31) (2.35) (2.29) (2.40) (2.13) 
Second-degree connection  -0.0273 -0.0320 -0.0816** -0.0642 0.0560 0.0587 
 
(-1.17) (-1.00) (-2.05) (-1.22) (0.51) (0.52) 
Acquirer Tobin's Q -0.0020 -0.0019 -0.0037 -0.0037 -0.0053* -0.0052* 
 
(-1.35) (-1.12) (-1.30) (-1.31) (-1.82) (-1.66) 
Acquirer Leverage -0.0459 -0.0557 0.0378 0.0669 0.0749 0.1175 
 
(-0.87) (-1.02) (0.39) (0.63) (0.62) (0.91) 
Relative Deal Size 0.0010 0.0015 0.0042 0.0129 -0.0088 0.0047 
 
(0.15) (0.25) (0.23) (0.78) (-0.35) (0.21) 
Tender offer -0.0140 -0.0110 -0.0160 -0.0426 -0.0627 -0.0630 
 
(-0.59) (-0.39) (-0.27) (-0.72) (-0.89) (-0.88) 
Pure Stock deal -0.1075*** -0.0992** -0.0933 -0.1011 -0.1561** -0.1583*** 
 
(-2.74) (-2.56) (-1.52) (-1.64) (-2.44) (-2.61) 
Toehold -0.0908 -0.0879 -0.0648 -0.0808 -0.1354 -0.1425 
 
(-1.33) (-1.45) (-0.78) (-1.25) (-1.06) (-1.31) 
Competing -0.1514** -0.1305* -0.1711*** -0.1630*** -0.1396 -0.1088 
 
(-2.40) (-1.92) (-3.29) (-3.27) (-1.19) (-0.86) 
Diversification 0.0079 0.0079 -0.0115 0.0022 -0.0179 -0.0087 
 
(0.41) (0.38) (-0.38) (0.07) (-0.46) (-0.21) 
Constant 0.0908 0.0825 0.0470 0.0685 0.1196 0.1056 
 
(1.28) (1.24) (0.53) (0.88) (0.91) (0.87) 
 
      
 
      
Year-fixed-effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Industry-fixed-effects  No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Firm-clustering effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 625 625 562 562 478 478 
Adjusted R2 0.039 0.048 0.008 0.025 0.017 0.029 
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Panel C (Continued) 
     
Boutique sample 
BHAR_12m BHAR_24m BHAR_36m 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
       
First-degree connection 0.1418 0.1469 0.0221 -0.0078 0.1457 0.1012 
 
(1.45) (1.36) (0.21) (-0.07) (0.71) (0.44) 
Second-degree connection  0.0872 0.0823 -0.0068 0.0847 0.2163 0.3528 
 
(0.76) (0.65) (-0.07) (0.68) (1.21) (1.53) 
Acquirer Tobin's Q -0.0076* -0.0075* -0.0163** -0.0142** -0.0141 -0.0167 
 
(-1.79) (-1.77) (-2.33) (-2.12) (-1.19) (-1.50) 
Acquirer Leverage 0.1069 0.1654 0.1574 0.1588 0.4419* 0.5150* 
 
(0.70) (0.99) (0.85) (0.81) (1.71) (1.82) 
Relative Deal Size -0.0044 0.0129 -0.0569*** -0.0442** -0.1114 -0.1214 
 
(-0.14) (0.45) (-3.07) (-2.17) (-0.92) (-1.00) 
Tender offer -0.0833 -0.0755 0.0741 0.0815 0.0705 0.0669 
 
(-1.38) (-1.19) (0.52) (0.55) (0.48) (0.42) 
Pure Stock deal -0.1155 -0.1172 -0.0537 -0.0581 0.0216 0.0182 
 
(-1.30) (-1.41) (-0.47) (-0.51) (0.12) (0.11) 
Toehold -0.1781 -0.1958* -0.0110 -0.0438 0.2749 0.1917 
 
(-1.27) (-1.65) (-0.04) (-0.16) (0.91) (0.77) 
Competing -0.0618 -0.0332 -0.1298 -0.1035 -0.2889** -0.2362 
 
(-0.47) (-0.26) (-1.33) (-0.72) (-1.99) (-1.32) 
Diversification -0.0182 -0.0102 -0.0360 -0.0206 -0.1229 -0.1285 
 
(-0.43) (-0.23) (-0.56) (-0.30) (-1.30) (-1.29) 
Constant 0.1434 0.1345 0.0276 0.0448 -0.2907 -0.3079 
 
(0.99) (1.05) (0.10) (0.16) (-0.92) (-1.09) 
 
      
 
      
Year-fixed-effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Industry-fixed-effects  No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Firm-clustering effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 449 449 378 378 297 297 
Adjusted R2 0.007 0.020 0.007 0.003 0.006 0.009 
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Table 4.6 – Industry-adjusted return on asset 
Table 4.6 presents the regression results for acquirers' post-acquisition operating performance. The post-acquisition operating performance is measured by 
industry-adjusted return on assets (IAROA). IAROA is obtained by deducting the median ROA of the bidder’s industry with the identical first two-digit SIC codes 
from the ROA of each acquirer. The full sample is classified by types of advisors. Regression results are reported for the full sample and subsample of deals 
advised by full-service banks and boutique banks. The dependent variable is acquirers’ IAROA for the fiscal year following takeover announcement. The 
independent variables for social connection are dummy variables for first-degree connection and second-degree connection. First-degree connection (so-called 
board interlock) is defined when bidding firms and investment banks share the same board members during the acquisition period while second-degree connection 
refers to the situation where two individual board members, respectively from bidders and banks, serve on the same board of a third firm during the acquisition 
period. The deal and investment bank characteristics are controlled in Model 1. Year and industry fixed effects are included in Model 2 for each panel. The 
definition for explanatory variable is reported in the Appendix. In all of the models, the firm-clustering effects for acquiring firms are considered. For brevity, the 
results for the industry and year dummies are not reported. Robust t-statistics are reported in brackets. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%-, 




Acquirer _ IAROA 
Post one year 
Full sample Full service Boutique 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
First-degree connection 0.0472* 0.0558 0.0540 0.0547 0.0742* 0.0871** 
 
(1.69) (1.58) (1.41) (1.10) (1.74) (2.17) 
Second-degree connection  0.0249 0.0255 0.0148 0.0172 0.0315 0.0398 
 
(0.97) (0.78) (0.43) (0.43) (0.86) (1.06) 
Acquirer Tobin's Q 0.0004 0.0003 0.0006 0.0004 -0.0029 -0.0027 
 
(0.52) (0.35) (0.76) (0.55) (-1.14) (-0.88) 
Acquirer Leverage -0.0010 -0.0009 -0.0015 -0.0009 0.0037 0.0022 
 
(-0.70) (-0.57) (-0.98) (-0.57) (1.03) (0.52) 
Acquirer Return on Equity 0.3945*** 0.3968*** 0.3477** 0.3281*** 0.2955*** 0.2998*** 
 
(4.68) (12.89) (2.19) (7.99) (3.03) (2.83) 
Relative Deal Size -0.0050 -0.0049 -0.0065 -0.0054 -0.0045 -0.0046 
 
(-1.14) (-1.26) (-1.17) (-1.37) (-0.56) (-0.56) 
Tender offer 0.0432*** 0.0575*** 0.0449*** 0.0555*** 0.0221 0.0319 
 
(3.03) (4.17) (2.71) (4.05) (0.95) (1.23) 
Pure Cash Deal 0.0332*** 0.0327*** 0.0235** 0.0259*** 0.0615*** 0.0598*** 
 
(3.33) (3.76) (2.21) (2.73) (3.45) (3.46) 
Competing 0.0192 0.0061 0.0199 0.0058 0.1037* 0.0648 
 
(0.65) (0.19) (0.60) (0.18) (1.68) (1.29) 
Toehold -0.0590** -0.0553** -0.0046 -0.0004 -0.1229*** -0.1090*** 
 
(-2.44) (-2.21) (-0.22) (-0.01) (-3.28) (-2.88) 
Constant 0.0475* 0.0357 0.0113 -0.0038 0.0934** 0.0782* 
 
(1.92) (1.27) (0.50) (-0.12) (2.48) (1.71) 
       Year-fixed-effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Industry-fixed-effects  No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Firm-clustering effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1563 1563 938 938 625 625 
Adjusted R2 0.146 0.264 0.105 0.259 0.134 0.218 
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Table 4.7 – Cash flow performance analysis 
Table 4.7 shows the analysis of acquirers' post-acquisition cash flow performance. Cash flow performance is measured by acquirers’ operating cash flow gauged by 
total assets. The cash flow performance is adjusted by subtracting the median cash flow ratio of the sample firms (excluding acquiring firm itself) who are in the 
same industry and in the same decile of excess cash reserve ratio with acquirers. The dependent variable is the cash flow ratio of the acquiring firms one fiscal year 
after the takeover announcement while the independent variable is the cash flow ratio one fiscal year prior to the acquisition. The constant term in the regressions 
signifies the abnormal cash flow return for acquirers after acquisition transaction. The sample is classified by social connection into subsamples of connected and 
non-connected deals. Robust t-statistics are reported in brackets. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%-, 5%- and 10%-level, respectively. 
 
    
Post-acquisition CF performance post 1 year 
Panel A Full sample Panel B Full-service advisors Panel C Boutique advisors 
Connected Non-connected Connected Non-connected Connected Non-connected 
Constant 0.0034 -0.0072** -0.0144*** -0.0098*** 0.0125*** 0.0026*** 
 
(0.64) (-2.26) (-5.59) (-8.26) (9.14) (2.95) 
Pre-acquisition CF performance pre 1 year 1.0803*** 0.8208*** 1.3518*** 0.7589*** 0.9376*** 1.2988*** 
(8.40) (10.84) (3.50) (7.69) (8.69) (12.89) 
 
      
Observations 100 1463 41 897 59 566 




4.7 Appendix A 
 
Variables Definitions Source 
Panel A: Dependent Variables 
Acquisition Premium 
Acquisition premium in public deals is measured as the log percentage difference between offer price and target stock price 4 
weeks before the takeover announcement. The premium for private deals is computed by multiplying the average premium for a 




return for acquirers 
ACAR (-2,+2) 
Following Brown and Warner (1985), the acquirers' cumulative abnormal return is calculated based on the market model with a 
five-days event window and estimation period starting 365 days and ending 4 weeks before the M&A deal announcement. As a 
benchmark, we use the value-weighted CRSP index.  
CRSP 
Cumulative abnormal 
return for targets 
TCAR (-2,+2) 
Following Brown and Warner (1985), the targets' cumulative abnormal return is computed based on the market model with a 
five-day event window and an estimation period starting 365 days and ending 4 weeks before the M&A deal announcement. As a 
benchmark, we use the value-weighted CRSP index. 
CRSP 
Cumulative abnormal 
return of combined 
entity of acquirers and 
targets CCAR (-2,+2) 
Market value-weighted cumulative abnormal return for the combination of acquirer and target's cumulative abnormal returns. 






BHAR is computed as the difference between the buy-and-hold return of acquirers and buy-and-hold return of reference 
portfolios. Following Bouwman et al. (2007), 50 reference portfolios are identified for acquiring firms, classified by market 
valuation and Tobin’s Q ratio. Then the buy-and-hold return of reference portfolios is calculated by compounding the average 
return of each portfolio for the event period. 
CRSP 
Industry-adjusted 
Return on Assets 
(IAROA) 
The ROA for each acquirer, computed as the net income divided by the book value of the assets, deducts the median ROA of the 




Following Gao (2011), the cash flow ratio is the acquirers’ operating cash flow divided by its total assets. The industry-adjusted 
cash flow ratio is computed by subtracting the median cash flow ratio of sample firms (excluding acquiring firm itself) who are 
in the same industry and in the same decile of excess cash reserve ratio with acquirers. 
COMPUSTAT 
Panel B: Key independent variables 
First-degree 
connection  









Panel C: Advisor characteristics 
Boutique advisor 
Boutique advisors are non-full-service advisors, providing specialised services in certain industries (such as technology, 








Domestic boutique investments are boutique banks that focus on US and regional markets. 
Official Website 
Full-service advisor 
Full-service advisor refers to investment bankers who engage in full-line financial services including trading, underwriting, 
M&A advisory, security and debt services etc. 
Official Website 
Reputation 
The financial advisors rank (top-25) comes from the Thomson One database, ranked by the total deal value advised over the 
period from 2005 to 2016. Following Golubov et al. (2012), the top 8 advisors are defined as top-tier. 
Official Website 
M&A advisor M&A advisors are boutique banks who point out M&A expertise in services description in their official web.   
Panel D: Firm characteristics 
Tobin's Q Following Lang et al. (1989), Tobin's Q is computed as the ratio of market value by book value of the company's assets. COMPU-STAT  
Market Value (MV) 
The market value is computed as the number of shares outstanding multiplied by the respective stock price at 4 weeks before the 
official deal announcement. 
CRSP  
Leverage Leverage ratio is a ratio of total debt divided by total assets. COMPU-STAT 
Return on Equity 
(ROE) 
Following Barber, Palmer, and Wallace (1995), the return on equity is calculated as a ratio of net income before extraordinary 
item and discontinued operations divided by the common equity and preferred equity of firms. 
COMPU-STAT 
Panel E: Deal characteristics 
Transaction value 
($millions) 
This variable accounts for the total value of consideration paid by the acquirer, excluding expenses and fees, in order to obtain the 
target. The total dollar value in millions is reported. 
Thomson One  
Relative deal size 
Relative deal size is computed as the transaction value divided by the market capitalisation of the acquirer, 4 weeks before the 
official deal announcement. 
Thomson One 
Hostile takeover Dummy variable that equals 1 if the M&A deal is reported as hostile. Thomson One 
Diversification Dummy variable that equals 1 if acquirers' first two digits of SIC code are not the same as the targets' first two digits of SIC code. Thomson One 
Toehold Dummy variable that equals 1 if acquirers own portion of target shares prior to the takeover announcement.  Thomson One 
Competing bid Dummy variable that equals 1 if the takeover deal is involved with more than one bidding firm.  Thomson One 
Pure cash deal (Cash) Dummy variable that equals 1 if the M&A deal is paid entirely using cash. Thomson One 
Pure stock deal 
(Stock) 




Advisory fee (Total 
$millions) 
Advisory fee is the total amount of fees acquirers paid to M&A advisors upon the successful completion of takeover transactions, 
which is expressed as dollar value in millions. 
Thomson One 
Advisory fee (% Deal 
value) 
Advisory fee (% Deal value) is the total advisory fees to M&A advisors expressed as a percentage of the transaction value. 
Thomson One 
Time to resolution The days between the reported announcement of the deal and the effective date when the deal takes place. Thomson One 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
5.1 Summary 
This thesis develops a composite benchmark for M&A and further investigates the 
impact of social connections on acquisition performance. The majority of M&A 
studies have addressed takeover outcomes and confined the determinants to deal 
characteristics and the firm characteristics of the acquisition partners. This thesis 
extends the previous M&A studies and provides a new perspective to review 
takeover outcomes and their determinants. Specifically, Chapter 2 creates a 
composite index (M&A index) to measure takeover efficiency and evaluate deal 
quality from a more comprehensive perspective. The M&A index captures 
pre-takeover firm information and deal characteristics and provides an effective and 
forward-looking indicator for acquisition performance. In addition, the rest of this 
thesis combines M&A studies with social network theory. Chapter 3 investigates 
social connections between acquirers and targets and their effect on acquisition 
premiums. Chapter 4 sheds light on board connections between acquirers and their 
M&A advisors and examines the impact of firm-banking connection on deals 
advised by full-service investment banks and transactions with boutique M&A 
advisors, respectively. 
Recently, composite indexes have been increasingly recognised and developed in 
areas of corporate finance, such as the KZ index (Kaplan & Zingales, 1997) to 
measures financial constraint; and the entrenchment index (Bebchuk et al., 2009) and 
governance index (Gompers et al., 2003) to measures corporate governance. The 
composite index is superior for simplifying complex processes, quantifying abstract 
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topics and facilitating comparison between different samples (Sharpe, 2004). 
However, a composite indicator is absent from the existing literature. Moreover, 
previous M&A studies have generally focused on partial merger outcomes and lack 
any overall evaluation of takeover activities. Chapter 2 fills this gap and aims to 
create a composite benchmark (M&A index) to measure takeover efficiency and 
effectively forecast post-acquisition performance.  
In Chapter 2, a deal is defined as being efficient if and only if the takeover bid 
maximises the acquirers’ announcement return when announced to the public. The 
M&A index scores the efficiency degree of each takeover deal and ranges from zero 
to one. The transaction with a higher index implies that the deal is more efficient and 
expected to have a better acquisition performance. The M&A index is constructed 
using the stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) approach. Due to the limitations of SFA, 
the sample selected in Chapter 2 is restricted to the deals in which acquirers have 
positive return on announcement day. Essentially, the M&A index is the technical 
efficiency of the SFA models and calculated as the ratio of actual acquirers’ 
announcement return over the optimal and maximum return level. The higher 
efficiency implies that observed acquirer gain is closer to the optimal acquirer return 
at the time of takeover announcement. Acquirers’ announcement return reflects the 
market response and expectations regarding a takeover bid and is adopted as the 
output in the SFA model. The inputs for the M&A index include pre-takeover deal 
characteristics and firm information of merger parties. Then, Chapter 2 examines the 
relationship between the M&A index and takeover outcomes. The empirical 
evidence shows that deals with a higher M&A index are significantly and positively 
associated with probability of deal completion, acquirers’ announcement return and 
buy-and-hold return in the long run, as well as industry-adjusted return on assets 
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over the post-acquisition period, indicating that more efficient deals are more likely 
to succeed and achieve better short-run stock performance and post-acquisition 
performance in the long run. Furthermore, the research builds a buy-and-hold 
strategy and forms three portfolios based on the level of M&A index. The results 
indicate that the portfolio with the highest indices – and the most efficient deals – 
consistently outperform the portfolio with the lowest indices – and least efficient 
deals – when holding acquirers’ stocks over the post-acquisition period. On average, 
the portfolio with the most efficient deals earns a 7% higher monthly return than the 
portfolio with the least efficient deals for 1 month to 6 months following takeover 
announcement. Overall, the M&A index, as a measurement of takeover efficiency, 
can be used to forecast acquisition performance in both the long and short run due to 
the strong and positive relationship with takeover outcomes. 
Next, the thesis explores the impact of social connections on mergers and 
acquisitions. A few previous studies have investigated social connections between 
acquirers and targets and found mixed results on the relationship between 
acquirer-target connection and acquisition performance. Chapter 3 extends the 
previous studies and provides further evidence of the effect of social connection. 
Specifically, social connection is defined as the personal network of board director 
and executives, including first-degree connection
31
 and second-degree connection
32
. 
Specifically, Chapter 3 focuses on premium analysis, which is directly affected by 
social connections and best reflects the negotiation power between connected 
acquirers and targets. Moreover, the research includes the target 52-week high 
                                                 
31
 First-degree connection in Chapter 3 refers to the situation where acquirers and targets share the 
same board members or executives. 
32
 Second-degree connection in Chapter 3 is defined as connected directors, respectively from acquirers 
and targets, being linked through the same past experience, such as employment history, educational 
background and government or club experience. 
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(Baker et al., 2012), which is a psychological reference point for both acquirers and 
targets to value target firms and decide acquisition premiums. Consequently, social 
connections between acquirers and targets, especially first-degree connections, 
significantly reduce the acquisition premium paid for targets, even when the target 
52-week high reference point is controlled. The findings imply that social connection 
outweighs the psychological reference point and plays a determining role in 
acquisition premiums. Acquirer-target connection reduces information asymmetry, 
facilitates information exchange and increases acquirers’ bargaining power in terms 
of pricing the target company and the negotiation process. Furthermore, this thesis 
analyses why social connection favours acquiring firms and why connected target 
firms are willing to accept less favourable deal outcomes. The findings can be 
explained by the positions of the connected directors or executives in the acquirer 
and target firms. 
When acquirers and targets share the same board member (first-degree connection), 
the interlocking directors or executives tend to remain on the board of the newly 
merged firms. In 90.25% of first-degree connected deals, overlapping directors had 
higher or equivalent levels of position in the acquirer firm. In second-degree 
connected deals, connected directors are generally recruited as independent directors 
in target firms and most likely offered a board seat on the newly merged firms by the 
acquirers. In addition, acquiring firms tend to be larger in size than target firms. 
According to Ferris et al. (2003), larger firms offer more opportunities for directors. 
Being retained on the board of newly merged firms certifies directors’ ability and 
gives directors both financial and non-financial benefits. Therefore, connected target 
directors have an incentive to promote deal completion and accept inferior deal items, 
leading to deviation from the interests of target shareholders. 
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Furthermore, Chapter 4 analyses social connections between acquiring firms and 
their M&A advisors. Previous studies illustrate that social connections with financial 
firms positively affect firm performance and investment decisions through 
information advantage. Yet, the connection between bidders and investment banks 
has not been explored in the literature. Chapter 4 fills this gap and sheds light on 
acquirer-banking connections through individual networks. In addition, this research 
classifies M&A advisors into full-service investment banks and boutique investment 
banks. In recent years, boutique advisors have attracted considerable firm clients and 
grabbed a large share of the market from full-service banks. However, few M&A 
studies have devoted significant attention to the study of boutique investment banks. 
Complementary to previous studies, Chapter 4 examines the effect of firm-banking 
connection in deals advised by either full-service investment banks or boutique 
advisors. Similar to Chapter 3, social connection refers to board connections through 
personal networks and includes both first-degree connections
33
 and second-degree 
connections
34
. As a consequence, social connections with full-service banks show 
completely different effects from connections with boutique advisors. The opposite 
connection effects are attributed to the essential difference between full-service 
investment banks and boutique investment banks. 
Due to the fierce competition in the investment banking industry, financial advisors 
have a strong incentive to build and maintain firm-banking relationships in order to 
get business, including profitable M&A business (Anand & Galetovic, 2006). Unlike 
full-service banks, boutique advisors are generally small, relatively unknown and 
                                                 
33
 First-degree connections in Chapter 4 refers to the situation where acquirers and M&A advisors share 
the same board members. 
34
 Second-degree connections in Chapter 4 are defined as two individual directors, respectively from 
the acquirer and target firm, serving on the board of a third firm.  
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specialise in corporate finance services (e.g. M&A, restructuring, etc.) or certain 
industries (e.g. technology, healthcare, media, etc.). The majority of boutique 
investment banks are at a distinct disadvantage in terms of their popularity, 
information and network, and unable to afford large marketing and advertising costs 
like larger players, especially for domestic boutique advisors who focus on US and 
regional markets. Therefore, domestic boutique investment banks rely more on the 
social connections through personal networks to pursue M&A business. Moreover, 
boutique advisors, especially domestic ones, tend to serve the interests of firm clients 
in order to maintain long-run connections for future financial services business. In 
addition, acquiring firms may choose connected boutique banks as their M&A 
advisors due to a sense of trust and familiarity. By contrast, connected full-service 
investment banks tend to know both the acquirers and the targets. Despite being the 
bidders’ M&A advisors, full-service banks may not only consider the interests of the 
acquiring firms. Another case is that investment bankers may help targets to initiate 
acquisition attempts and search for acquirer candidates. Due to familiarity bias, 
investment banks may give priority to connected firms. Additionally, connections 
with full-service investment banks may lead to the “lock-in” problem where firms 
may retain inferior financial advisors instead of trying to find new investment banks. 
Hence, full-service investment banks that are socially tied to acquirers may act 
against the interest of acquiring firms, resulting in unfavourable deal outcomes. 
As a result, Chapter 4 observes that the acquirer-advisor connection significantly 
increases the likelihood of boutique investment banks being chosen. In particular, 
when acquirers share overlapping directors with domestic boutique advisors, the 
probability of domestic boutique banks being selected is 4.87 times greater than the 
probability of not being chosen. These findings suggest that first-degree connections 
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help boutique advisors to obtain business, and acquirers are willing to appoint 
connected boutique banks as M&A advisors, and especially domestic boutique 
investment banks. However, social connection with full-service banks is significantly 
and negatively associated with the probability of being chosen, indicating that 
acquirers are less likely to hire full-service investment banks who are socially linked 
with them. This negative relationship can be explained by the fact that connected 
directors are generally recruited as independent directors in acquirers and/or 
full-service banks. Additionally, acquiring firms may recognise the potential agency 
conflicts with connected full-service advisors. Furthermore, Chapter 4 examines the 
impact of acquirer-advisor connection in acquisition premium and acquisition 
performance in deals advised by full-service banks and boutique advisors, 
respectively. Consequently, acquirers pay a significantly lower premium in deals in 
which acquirers and boutique advisors have first-degree connections while social 
connections with full-service investment banks are associated with a higher 
acquisition premium paid to target firms. 
In addition, acquirers’ announcement returns are not affected by the acquirer-advisor 
connection regardless of types of investment banks. This is because the market does 
not recognise firm-banking connections, thus it is not reflected in acquirers’ stock 
movements. However, connections with full-service advisors improve the 
announcement return of targets and the combined entities, implying that connected 
full-service banks do not act in the interest of acquirers. In the long run, acquirers 
who are closely connected with boutique advisors earn higher buy-and-hold return, 
higher industry-adjusted return on assets and higher cash flow return than acquirers 
without connections in the fiscal year following takeover announcement. Acquiring 
firms who hire connected full-service banks underperform non-connected acquirers 
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in terms of post-acquisition stock performance and operating performance. In a 
nutshell, the empirical results show that boutique advisors serve the interests of 
connected acquirers and deliver better deals for their clients, while acquiring firms 
suffer more agency conflicts in deals advised by connected full-service banks and 
achieve inferior deal outcomes. 
Overall, this thesis provides a new perspective to review acquisitions and their 
determinants. The findings show that the M&A index is an effective and 
forward-looking index to evaluate deal quality. In addition, takeover outcomes are 
affected by the social network between acquisition partners or between acquirer and 
M&A advisors. 
5.2 Implications 
The implications of this thesis are profound for both academic researchers and 
practitioners. Chapter 2 constructs a composite benchmark – the M&A index – for 
takeover efficiency. Due to the strong relationship with merger outcomes, the M&A 
index provides an effective measurement to evaluate overall deal quality and forecast 
post-acquisition performance. Similar to the KZ index for financial constraints or the 
entrenchment index for corporate governance, the M&A index could be included or 
controlled as a variable in the models to gauge the impact of M&A in research on 
asset pricing or corporate finance as acquisitions have a profound influence on firm 
performance and corporate decisions. Additionally, the M&A index can also be used 
to measure market response to takeover announcements. Complementary to the 
existing literature, Chapter 2 provides a new perspective to quantify and simplify 
abstract and complex issues in corporate finance. For practitioners, investors and 
arbitrageurs could develop trading strategies based on the M&A index. Shareholders 
 
250 
of merger parties could find out whether or not acquisition attempts maximise the 
interests of shareholders, therefore improving monitoring and reducing agency 
problems. Acquirers’ management could learn from the M&A indices of previous 
takeover deals and reduce the inefficiency factors to achieve a better performance for 
acquisitions in the future.  
Next, Chapter 3 examines social connections between acquirers and targets. Previous 
studies have found mixed results regarding the effects of acquirer-target connections. 
Chapter 3 provides further evidence through premium analysis and confirms the 
presence of information advantage in connected deals. However, the findings imply 
that social connections between merger parties only favour acquiring firms. 
Connected directors in targets are motivated by self-interest to accept less favourable 
deal items and promote completion. Therefore, acquirers who initiate acquisition 
attempts could consider connected firms as target candidates since inter-firm 
connections increase acquirers’ bargaining power and results in better deal terms. 
Moreover, Chapter 3 illustrates that for acquisition partners, the effect of information 
outweighs the influence of the psychological reference point in determining 
acquisition premiums. Therefore, acquirers could enhance their information 
advantage for lower premiums by hiring targets’ previous advisors or finding out 
third-party firms that are linked to both the acquirer and the target. For target firms, 
shareholders should take extra care regarding takeover bids from connected acquirers 
and agency conflicts with management and directors. 
Finally, Chapter 4 explores the social connections between acquirers and their M&A 
advisors in deals advised by full-service investment banks and transactions with 
boutique investment banks, respectively. It indicates that social connections with 
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boutique advisors, especially domestic boutique advisors, benefit acquirers by 
negotiating lower acquisition premiums and delivering better deals while social 
connections with full-service banks have a negative impact on the acquisition 
performance of acquiring firms. The results imply that connected boutique advisors 
serve the interests of their “friends” (bidding firms) while full-service investment 
banks act against the interest of connected acquirers and result in more agency 
conflicts. Therefore, connections with boutique advisors are valuable for acquirers. 
In the advisor-selection process, acquirers could rely on their personal network to 
hire closely related boutique banks as their advisors while boutique advisors could 
try to market themselves through their managers’ and directors’ network. In contrast, 
hiring connected full-service advisors is not recommended. Furthermore, the effect 
of social connection depends on the types of firm involved. Therefore, future studies 
on social network may wish to classify connected firms based on firm 
characteristics. 
5.3 Limitations and future research 
This thesis has some limitations that can be explored in further research. First, 
Chapter 2 constructs the M&A index using the stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) 
approach, which requires the output (in this case, acquirers’ announcement returns) 
for SFA models to be positive. To meet the restrictions, the research only considers 
deals with positive returns for acquiring firms on the announcement day. Moreover, 
the sample for the M&A index is limited to public deals in which both the acquirers 
and targets are public firms in order to incorporate firm and deal characteristics as 
comprehensively as possible. Therefore, future research could relax the conditions 
for the M&A index and adjust or change the SFA models to include more takeover 
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samples and expand the application of the index. Moreover, Chapter 2 sheds light on 
the inefficiency component in takeover transactions, for example corporate 
governance. Yet, due to data availability restrictions, the research only studies a 
sample from 1990 to 2006 and lacks recent data. Future research could address the 
inefficiency in M&A transactions by improving data availability or finding 
replacements for variables with many missing values. 
Second, Chapter 3 focuses on the effect of social connections between acquirers and 
targets on acquisition premium and supports the information-advantage theory. 
Social connections in Chapter 3 refer to personal connections of board directors and 
executives. Future research could adopt various indicators for social connection. For 
example, the degree of social connection could be measured with the percentage of 
connected directors, computed as the number of connected directors divided by the 
number of board members. Moreover, the research could include investment banks 
connections too and examine whether connected merger parties hire investment 
banks, what types of investment banks (full-service banks versus boutique banks; 
top-tier investment banks versus non-top-tier) are involved in the connected deals, 
and whether connected acquirers and targets hire the same investment banks. 
Third, Chapter 4 sheds light on the connection between acquirers and their M&A 
advisors through board members’ personal networks over the sample period from 
2005 to 2016. The future study could expand the sample period, for example, from 
2000 to 2016 to include more deals. In addition, the research could be extended by 
examining the connections between targets and M&A advisors or between acquirers, 
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